

SAFE FILE: Navy Department

Comparison of United States - British views.

I. Points of similarity.

- a. Willing to continue United States - British parity ratio.
- b. Maintain ratios of Great Britain and United States toward Japan.
- c. Desire abolition or reduction of submarines.
- d. Desire maintenance or extension of own base system.
- e. Willing to abolish bombing, provided universal and complete.
- f. Reduction of destroyers conditional on reduction of submarines.

II. Points of Contrast.

<u>United States</u>	:	<u>British</u>
1. Freedom of construction within categories.	:	1. Match ship for ship within categories.
2. Maintain size of battleships.	:	2. Reduce size of battleships.
3. Maintain number of heavy cruisers.	:	3. Reduce number of heavy cruisers.
4. Maintain size of light cruisers.	:	4. Reduce size of light cruisers.
5. Reduce number of light cruisers.	:	5. Maintain, <u>or increase</u> , number of light cruisers.
6. Maintain gun caliber of battleships.	:	6. Reduce gun caliber of battleships to 12".

Comparison of United States - Japanese views.

I. Points of similarity.

- a. Desire maintenance or extension of own base system.
- b. Willing to abolish bombing, (but, for Japanese, on condition only of abolition of aircraft carriers and flight decks).
- c. Abolition of chemical warfare (United States desires right to use in reprisal).

II. Points of contrast.

<u>United States</u>	:	<u>Japan</u>
1. Maintain ratio United States - Japan	:	1. Increase ratio Japan to United States and Great Britain.
2. Abolish submarines, or reduce tonnage.	:	2. Maintain submarines and increase allowed tonnage.
3. Maintain aircraft carriers at full tonnage allowance.	:	3. Abolish aircraft carriers.
4. Maintain size of battleships.	:	4. Reduce number and size of battleships.
5. Maintain number and size of heavy cruisers.	:	5. Reduce number and size of heavy cruisers.
6. Maintain size of light cruisers.	:	6. Reduce size of light cruisers.
7. Reduce number and tonnage of light cruisers.	:	7. Increase number and tonnage of light cruisers.
8. Reduce number of destroyers.	:	8. Increase number (tonnage of destroyers.
9. Maintain gun caliber of battleships.	:	9. Reduce gun caliber of battleships to 14".

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Combined Comparison - United States - Great Britain - Japan.

I. Points of similarity all nations.

- a. Desire maintenance or extension of own base system.
- b. Willing to abolish bombing (with conditions, for Japan).
- c. Abolition of chemical warfare (reserving right to use in reprisal for Great Britain and United States).

II. Points of Contrast - Great Britain and United States as regards Japan.

<u>Great Britain and United States</u>	<u>Japan</u>
1. Maintenance of ratios.	: 1. Increase of ratio of Japan.
2. Abolition or reduction of submarines.	: 2. Maintain submarines, and increase allowance.
3. Reduce destroyers, conditional on abolition or reduction of submarines.	: 3. Increase destroyers.
4. Maintain number of battleships.	: 4. Decrease number of battleships.
5. Maintain aircraft carriers.	: 5. Abolish aircraft carriers and flight decks.

III. Points of contrast - United States as regards Great Britain and Japan.

<u>United States</u>	<u>Great Britain and Japan</u>
1. Maintain size of battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers	: 1. Reduce size of battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers.
2. Maintain number of heavy cruisers.	: 2. Reduce number of heavy cruisers.
3. Reduce number of light cruisers.	: 3. Increase number of light cruisers.
4. Maintain gun caliber of battleships.	: 4. Reduce gun caliber of battleships (Great Britain to 12", Japan to 14".)

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28 May 1934
T.S.W.

Extract from General Board draft of "Trend of
naval policy of signatory nations."

. . . . (From a study of the information available) . . .
the probable attitude of the several nations at the 1935
Conference may be inferred. All nations will favor agreement
on a naval limitation treaty in some form. All nations except
Japan will be agreeable to actual reduction of their fleets,
that is, the establishment of limitations lower than those of
the Washington and London Treaties; Japan will desire to
increase her fleet. All nations except the United States
may be expected to urge the reduction of the maximum charac-
teristics of battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers.
Japan will insist upon an increase in ratio in the heavy cate-
gories and an actual increase in tonnage allowed in light
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines; she will propose the
abolition of aircraft carriers. Great Britain will urge an
increase in light cruiser tonnage and will press for the aboli-
tion of submarines or for a material reduction in that category.
France and Italy will desire an increase of capital ship ratios
and will insist upon cruiser, destroyer, and submarine strengths
in greater ratio than that now allowed for capital ships. France
and Japan may particularly be expected to oppose a reduction of
submarine tonnage. The United States will find Great Britain
favorable to any stand for the maintenance of their respective
ratios toward Japan, for the abolition of submarines, and for
the maintenance of aircraft carriers, but will probably be forced
to play a lone hand if she urges the maintenance of the present
maximum characteristics of battleships and cruisers. No single
item upon which general agreement will be readily forthcoming
can confidently be predicted.

a46 a04

C O P Y

25 May 1934.
T.S.W.

Memorandum of General Board discussion on 1935 Conference.

The following points were brought out at most informal discussions on 23 and 25 May:

Ratio of 5:5:3 should be established throughout all categories; reasons - Mandate Islands - Philippines.

Adhere to 35,000 tons, battleships size (or 33,000(?) improved NEW MEXICO); accept reduction to 14-inch guns if necessary.

Adhere to 10,000 tons, cruiser size; abolish sub-categories; freedom of construction as to gun battery up to 8-inch - no discriminatory tonnage ratio against 8" ships.

No limitation of airplanes except as occasioned by limitation of parent vessels. (Decline discussion of airplane limitation.)

Net reduction is desirable for public interests but an increase in one category, for example, cruisers, is satisfactory if over-balanced by reductions in others.

Reduction of total tonnage of battleships to a minimum of 420,000, as ultimate concession.

Destroyers can be scrapped somewhat, due to present increased number of cruisers assuming own duties formerly assigned perforce to destroyers.

Reduction of submarines will also permit reduction of destroyers.

Submarines can be reduced without limit.

Except for submarines, no new ships should be scrapped.

A 20 per cent reduction throughout all categories would appear feasible without affecting the newer and more valuable vessels.

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Extract from New York Herald Tribune - May 27, 1931.

"Five-Point Plan Outlined

"The policy which Foreign Minister Koki Hirota will submit to the Cabinet for its approval next Tuesday is said to contain the following provisions:

"1. Discussions shall be restricted to naval matters only, with all political matters excluded. Japan will emphasize the principle of equal armaments, with each nation determining its categories according to its needs, and also will emphasize the necessity of reducing offensive weapons like aircraft carriers. The Japanese further will stress the principle of permitting nations ample defensive weapons but restricting them to a power sufficient for any nation to wage an offensive naval warfare.

"2. Re-examination of tonnages, probably with special emphasis on the total rather than categories.

"3. Re-examination of regional naval needs, with attention on Pacific, North Atlantic, South Atlantic and European waters.

"4. Total abolition of whatever offensive weapons that can be dispensed with.

"5. Continuance and enlargement of the non-forfeited areas mentioned in the Washington treaty. It is expected that Japan will seek to include Singapore and Hawaii among the unfortified areas, with Japan making certain compensatory offers in return."

I. GENERAL ATTITUDE.

1. The Department favors limitation and reduction of naval armaments if in accord with the fundamental naval policy, "to maintain the Navy in sufficient strength to support the national policies and commerce, and to guard the Continental and overseas possessions of the United States." (4)*

*(This and subsequent numbers refer to pages in the Gray Book, reference (a), containing discussion of these respective items.)

2. It believes that the geographic location, territorial distribution, political situation and economic interests of each nation must be considered in the determination of the respective naval strengths agreed upon. (90)

3. It believes that our Navy should be second to none in size and strength. (91)

4. It believes that the basic ratios of the Washington Treaty should be maintained so long as the restrictions contained therein, as to fortifications, and the collateral treaties, declarations, and resolutions, remain in effect. (90)

5. It believes that no departure from the ratios of the London Treaty other than toward the fundamental ratios established by the Washington Treaty should be considered acceptable by the United States. (90)

II. METHODS OF LIMITATION.

The Department -

(1) Favors limitation of naval armament by tonnage per category. (9)

(2) Is opposed to limitation by global tonnage. (9)

(3) Is opposed to separate consideration of air armaments but favors adding the category "airplanes" to naval armaments. (9, 10)

(4) Is opposed to limitation of naval personnel as a basic method, but is willing to consider it as an indirect secondary limitation based upon full needs of material naval armament. (10, 11)

(5) Is opposed to global budgetary limitation as a direct method of limitation, and considers that under present conditions the indirect limitation of material by means of budgetary limitation is impracticable. (13, 242)

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(6) Favors full exchange of information concerning expenditures, personnel and material. (13)

III. QUALITATIVE REDUCTION.

(By this is meant the abolition of certain weapons or methods of warfare or the further reduction of the limiting characteristics of vessels of the several categories.)

A. Vessels of the Navy.

The Department -

(1) Is opposed to the abolition of battleships. (51)

(2) Is opposed to the discussion of reduction of characteristics of battleships until the 1935 Conference. (57, 61, 62)

(3) Is opposed to the reduction of the permitted size of aircraft carriers but agrees to the reduction of guns on future aircraft carriers to 6.1 inches in caliber, provided there is no restriction of the number of guns. (95, 144)

(4) Is opposed to further limitations on the characteristics of cruisers and to restrictions on the flying-deck provisions of the London Treaty. (95)

(5) Favors the abolition of submarines, but if not abolished is opposed to the reduction of the permitted characteristics. (94, 144)

(6) Is agreeable to the reduction of the unqualifiedly exempt class of combatant vessels from a maximum of 600 tons to a maximum of 100 tons, but is opposed to the reduction in speed or gun caliber of the qualifiedly exempt class (600 - 2000 tons). (167, 168)

B. Aircraft.

(1) Is opposed to the abolition of military and naval aircraft. (321)

(2) Favors the abolition of bombing if universal and complete. (300, 320)

(3) Is opposed to the abolition of "bombardment aviation," due to impracticability of delimiting such a type. (121, 124, 320)

(4) Is opposed to the restriction of characteristics of airplane e.g., unladen weight. (250, 301, 319)

IV. QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION.

(By this is meant the limitation and reduction of men or materials in numbers or tonnage.)

A. Vessels of the Navy.

The Department -

(1) Considers that the submarine is the real key to naval reduction. (94)

(2) Favors the material reduction of destroyer tonnage if submarines are first abolished. (94)

(3) Is opposed to the reduction of aircraft carrier tonnage. (95)

(4) Favors the reduction of submarine tonnage if that type of vessel is not abolished. (94)

B. Aircraft.

(1) Favors the limitation of numbers of naval combat airplanes (including all in commission, reserve and in storage) based upon full needs of the Treaty Navy and essential auxiliaries. (500, as allowed the United States by the British proposals, is inadequate for naval purposes alone.) (65, 67, 189, 250, 301, 310)

(2) Is opposed to the adoption of the present status quo of airplanes in possession of the several major naval powers as limitation figures. (313, 314)

(3) Is opposed to any method of limitation of airplanes additional to that by number, such as total horsepower, total weight, or total wing area. (64)

(4) Favors the limitation of dirigibles to the present number possessed by the respective powers. (301)

RF Safe File: Navy

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D. C.

JAN 22 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Letter of the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 15, 1942, requesting your approval of an expanded program of 2,000 vessels requested as a result of conferences with the British Commission, was transmitted by you to me for the preparation of reply and is returned herewith.

On January 16, 1942, in connection with consideration of Navy Department estimates for a supplemental in 1942 and changes to the 1943 Budget, you approved this program insofar as the construction of 1,799 vessels is concerned. Accordingly, I have prepared and there is attached hereto for your signature a proposed letter to the Secretary of the Navy advising him of your action upon his request.

I request your attention particularly to the following facts. The Navy Department advised that you had approved the 958 vessels and requested your approval of the 2,000 vessels (including a margin of 71) as set forth in the letter of the Secretary of the Navy. For your consideration, I presented the expanded program of 1,929 vessels (without the margin of 71); and, in accordance with your directions, after conferring with representatives of the Navy Department, I reduced the expanded program to 1,799 vessels by the elimination of seventy Motor Minesweepers, ten Harbor Craft, twenty 72' Motor Launches, and thirty (or half of the) 63' Aircraft Rescue Boats.

John W. Blawie, Jr.
Acting Director.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

My dear Mr. Secretary:

With reference to your letter of January 15, 1942, requesting release of the program for the construction of 2,000 miscellaneous vessels, resulting from conferences with the British Commission, you are advised as follows:

I approve the program insofar as it relates to the construction of 1,799 vessels and, under date of January 16, 1942, presented to Congress in Estimate No. 11 the following provisions for the fiscal years 1942 and 1943, respectively:

Increase and Replacement of Naval Vessels

Emergency Construction

(1942) The Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to undertake the construction of one thousand seven hundred and ninety-nine additional vessels, including hulls, machinery, outfits, armor, armament, ammunition, and essential tools, equipment and facilities in public or private plants for the building or equipping of said vessels or portions thereof, at a total cost of not to exceed \$3,900,000,000, toward which there is hereby appropriated \$300,000,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That the Secretary of the Navy is authorized to enter into contracts in the amount of not to exceed \$750,000,000 for essential tools, equipment and facilities in public or private plants for the building or equipping of said vessels or portions thereof, \$300,000,000.

(1943) On account of vessels, including hulls, machinery, outfits, armor, armament, ammunition, and essential tools, equipment and facilities in public or private plants for the building or equipping of said vessels or portions thereof, authorized (and appropriated for in part) by Title VI, Naval Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1942, \$1,588,600,000, to remain available until expended.

The details, including your estimates of cost, of the 1,799 vessels, for the construction of which my approval has been given, are set forth on the following page.

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APPROVED PROGRAM FOR EMERGENCY CONSTRUCTION
(Increase and Replacement of Naval Vessels)

<u>Type</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Estimated Total Cost</u>
Convoy Escort Vessel (BDE)	250	\$1,600,000,000
Minesweeper Fleet (AM)	48	162,480,000
Motor Minesweeper (YMs)	150	115,200,000
A/S Vessel (PC 180')	150	334,000,000
Oceangoing Tug (AT)	9	6,435,000
Salvage Vessel (ARs)	2	4,200,000
Atlantic Tank Loading Craft	300	577,500,000
Tank Landing Craft Carrier	10	45,250,000
Shallow Draft T. L. C.	300	40,131,000
- Higgins Eureka	500	6,350,000
Harbor Craft	20	14,000,000
- 72' Motor Launch	30	5,550,000
- 63' Aircraft Rescue Boat	30	3,000,000
Ordnance for above		339,290,000
All facilities		680,000,000
 TOTAL APPROVED PROGRAM	 1,799	 \$3,933,386,000

In accordance with our understanding, the allocation or use of these vessels will be determined when they are completed.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable,

The Secretary of the Navy.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

15 January 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Your authority is requested to present to the Budget and Congress a program for the construction of two thousand (2,000) miscellaneous vessels of categories and at estimated costs as shown in the accompanying table. Of these two thousand (2,000) vessels you have previously released nine hundred and fifty-eight (958) which are marked "Released" in the accompanying table. This part of the program is now under way. It is considered advisable to release the program as a whole, at this time, in order to better coordinate our efforts and to effect completion at the earliest possible date.

The number of vessels for which release is requested is a result of conferences between the British Commission based on their original request which in turn was based on their deficiencies for an all-out war effort. The list represents essentially what we consider reasonably possible to produce within the times shown in the table.

It is our understanding that with your approval of this program we will handle it with the Budget in the same way as we do our own. While this program is based on the British requirements, it is our understanding that these vessels when completed will be allocated where most needed.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

The President,
The White House.

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BRITISH NAVAL REQUIREMENTS IN ORDER OF PRIORITY

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~~SECRET~~

CATEGORY	Vessels Released	Release Requested	Total Vessels to be Provided	Unit Cost	Total Cost	ESTIMATED DELIVERIES		
						Year 1942	Year 1943	1/2 Year 1944(July)
1. Convoy Escort Vessels	250		250	\$6,400,000.	\$1,600,000,000.		150	100
2. Atlantic Tank Landing Craft	300		300	1,925,000.	577,500,000.		300	
3. Shallow Draft T.L.C.	300		300	133,770.	40,131,000.	10	290	
4. Tank Landing Craft Carriers		10	10	4,525,000.	45,250,000.	2	6	2
5. Salvage Vessels		2	2	2,100,000.	4,200,000.	2		
6. Rescue Tugs		9	9	715,000.	6,435,000.	9		
7. Minesweepers (Fleet)	48		48	3,385,000.	162,480,000.		24	24
8. A/S Vessels (PC's 180')	60	90	150	2,560,000.	334,000,000.	30	75	45
9. Harbor Craft (Boom Vessels)		30	30	700,000.	21,000,000.	30		
10. Minesweepers (small)		220	220	768,000.	168,960,000.	50	120	50
11. Higgins Borekas		500	500	12,700.	6,350,000.	450	50	
12. 72' Motor Launches		50	50	185,000.	9,250,000.	50		
13. 63' Aircraft Rescue Boats		60	60	100,000.	6,000,000.	9	40	11
	958	971	1929		\$2,981,556,000.	642	1055	232
Margin (Ships)		71	71		\$ 218,444,000.			
Total (Ships)	958	1042	2000		\$3,200,000,000			
Facilities					700,000,000			
Armor and Armament					400,000,000			
TOTAL COST					\$4,300,000,000			

4605

1-25-42 Navy
Boh
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPT. McCREA:

Will you let me have a
memorandum showing the characteristics
of these ships?

F.D.R.

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A tabulation showing the characteristics
requested above is attached hereto.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea
JOHN L. McCREA

a465b01

January 24, 1942.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SHIPS IN THE 1799 VESSEL PROGRAM

VESSEL	Length O. A.	Beam	Draft F. L. Mean	Displace- ment F.L.	Speed F.L.	Cruising Radius Miles at	Knots	Armament	Type Machinery
Escort Vessel (BDE)- Convoy	306'	35'6"	10'7"	1680	24	6000	12	1 - triple 21" T.T. 3 - 3" 50 Guns 5 - 20 mm M.G. Depth Charges: 2 tracks 8 throwers	Some Turbo Electric and some Diesel Elec. depending on avail- ability of engines.
Minesweeper Fleet (AM)	221'	32'	10'	1131	18	4500	16-1/2	2 - 3" 50 4 - 20 mm M.G.	Diesel Electric
Motor Minesweeper (YMS)	136'	24'6"	6'5"	260	14-1/2	1500	14-1/2	1 - 3" 50 Guns 2 - 20 mm M.G.	Diesel
A/S Vessel (PC)	184'6"	33'	9'	850	16	4000	15	2 - 3" 50 Guns 2 - 20 mm M.G. Depth Charges: 2 tracks 4 throwers	Diesel
Ocean-going Tug (AT)	205'	38'6"	14'3"	1500	16-1/2	5000	15	1 - 3" 50 Guns 2 - .50 M.G.	Diesel Electric
Salvage Vessel (ARS)	183'3"	37'	13'1"	1384	12	3000	12	1 - 3" 50 Guns 2 - 20 mm M.G.	Diesel Electric
Atlantic Tank Landing Craft (ATL)	309'	50'	9'	3365	10	5000	10	4 - 20 mm M.G.	Diesel
Tank Landing Craft Carrier (APM)	458'	72'	14'5"	7100	17	8000	15	1 - 3" 50 Guns 8 - 20 mm M.G.	Steam
Shallow Draft T.L.C. (YTL)	107'	32'	3'6"	265'	10	500	10	Use Tank Battery	Diesel

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VESSEL	Length C. A.	Beam	Draft F. L. Mean	Displace- ment F.L.	Speed F. L.	Cruising Radius Miles at	Knots	Armament	Type Machinery
Higgins Barka	36'	10'9"	3'6"	9.2 Tons	10.5 mph	65 mi.	Full Speed	2 - 30 Cal. M.G.	Diesel
Harbor Craft (This includes the Net Tender (YN) and certain other small craft not as yet clearly defined by the British) Net Tender (YN)	151'8"	30'6"	13'7"	700 Tons	11	3000 mi.	11	1 - 3" 50 Guns 2 - .50 M.G.	Diesel Electric
72' Motor Launch	75'	16'	4'3"	50 Tons	10 kts	500 mi.	Full Speed	1 - 3 Pounder	Diesel
63' Aircraft Rescue Boat	63'	15'	3'6"	25 Tons	34 kts	500 mi.	"	2 - 30 Cal. Twin or 2 - 50 Cal. Twin	Gasoline

Safe: Navy
BSF

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 4, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Admiral Stark quotes as follows:

1. When he gets her speed, knowing her hour of departure and destination, he intends to plot her course over the entire route to America.
2. He hasn't yet determined what Woodward or the gang afloat could do.
3. He is phoning Jerry Land and discussing with him the desirability of notifying the ship and also asking Jerry Land's advice as to further activity.

E. M. W.

FROM;- ALUSNA BERLIN
TO;- OPNAV

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4 OCTOBER 39

004 FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF NOTE HANDED ME PERSONNALLY
BY GRAND ADMIRAL RAEDER FOR WHICH I SIGNED RECEIPT :-

AMERICAN SS IROQUOIS SAILED FROM IRISH PORT WITH US PASSENGERS
2 OCTOBER WILL BE SUNK OFF THE EAST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES

UNDER ATHENIA CIRCUMSTANCES FOR APPARENT PURPOSE OF AROUSING
ANTI-GERMAN FEELING X REPLY MY SPECIFIC QUESTION RAEDER STATED

THAT HIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION IN NEUTRAL IRELAND VERY RELIABLE
CHIEFO OF STAFF SUGGESTED THAT IF SAFE ARRIVAL CLOSELY INSPECT

SHIP FOR EXPLOSIVES X IF THIS INFORMATION IS TRUE I BELIEVE IT
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5 October 1939

ITEMS FOR CONSIDERATION IN CONNECTION WITH RELEASE TO PRESS

1. Possible political effect which would probably be double-barrel one in favor, the other opposite and what the balance would be I am not competent to judge, but it should be carefully considered, at this time.

2. Effect on liaison of our Naval Attache in Berlin and the German Government. I would say - disregard.

3. The worry, etc. of families and friends of those on the IROQUOI. This might be disregarded - it would be troublesome but that is all.

4. International aspect. It would serve notice of our intention to resist by force sinking of American vessels outside the war zone by belligerent ships. Again, the national as well as the international reaction.

5. Possible public demand for escort of all U.S. ships. Disregard. This is a special case.

6. Nye and his ilk - ?! -

a46c03

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-10D-MD

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1942

Memorandum for Captain McCrea

Admiral Stark directed that I furnish
you a copy of this correspondence.

Whelme
F. C. DENEHRINK

10-26-66

Carl L. Spicer

246cc01

C
O
P
Y

Op-10-d/kr

January 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Admiral King has been furnished a copy of the attached despatch from Sumner Welles.

As King and I have repeatedly said, and as Mr. Welles has been told, the ABC Navy, if used effectively, could do a whole lot to help themselves.

As an item of interest, I am enclosing on a single sheet their individual and combined strength.

H.R.S.

a46cc02

CONFIDENTIAL

November 5, 1941

COMPARATIVE NAVAL STRENGTHS
LATIN AMERICA
(Built and Building)

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colom- bia	Cuba	Mexico East West	Para- guay	Peru	Uru- guay	Venez- uela	Total
BB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
OBB	2(1914) (1915)	2(1910) (1910)	1(1915)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
CA	2(1931) (1931)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
OCA	-	-	2(1894) (1898)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
CL	1(1939)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
OCL	-	2(1910) (1910)	1(1902)	-	1	-	-	2(1906)	-	-	6
Coast Defense (old)	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
DD	11(6-'38)	9*	6(1928)	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	28
ODD	4	1	2	-	-	-	-	2(1917-18)	-	-	9
SS	3(1933)	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
OSS	-	1	9	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	14
PG	2**	2	-	3	1	6	7	2	2	3	23
OPG	5	2	1	4	9	1	3	3	2	1	34
AM	9	6	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
AO	2	3	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	9
AP	2	-	1	2	-	1	1	-	1	-	8
Torpedo Boats	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	6
Training Vessels	1***	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	4
Total	48	37	29	12	12	8	11	5	16	4	135

* Three of the Cassin Class have been launched.
None have been commissioned.

** Building.

*** LA ARGENTINA - tabulated under CL.

Note: Figures in parentheses denote year of commissioning.

BB Battleship
OBB Old Battleship
CA Heavy Cruiser
OCA Old Heavy Cruiser
CL Light Cruiser
OCL Old Light Cruiser
DD Destroyer
ODD Destroyer, second line
SS Submarine
OSS Old Submarine

PG Patrol Vessel - Gunboat
OPG Old Gunboat
AM Mine Vessel - Mine Sweeper
AO Auxiliary - Oiler or fuel-oil tanker
AP Auxiliary - Transport

Signature: *Carl S. Spencer*

a46cc 03

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Op-10-D/KR

January 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

There is forwarded herewith a copy of the
despatch received from the Under Secretary of State,
Sumner Welles, which is self-explanatory.

HRS

a46 cc 04

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January 29, 1942

TO: DIRECTOR, Central Division, Navy Department
FROM: Liaison Officer
SUBJECT: Maintenance of patrols and other protection
in South America.

I enclose a paraphrase of a telegram of January
28 from Mr. Welles at Rio de Janeiro. I would appreciate
it if you would transmit this message immediately to
Admiral Stark.

/s/ Orme Wilson

Liaison Officer

Enclosure: Paraphrase of telegram
no. 70, January 28, 1942,
from Mr. Welles, Rio de
Janeiro.

a46cc05

Telegram no. 70

1-28-42, 5 p.m.

From: Rio de Janeiro

1-28-42, 5:47 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND THE
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

I refer to messages previously transmitted concerning the need for keeping up sufficient patrols, as well as protection of other kinds in the South American continent. The countries of South America, with the severing of relations, have been very bluntly told by the Italians, Germans, and Japanese that they can look forward to difficulties. The representatives of Bolivia, Peru, and Chile especially are greatly worried about the danger of possible attack or acts of sabotage on such strategic places as the mines of Bolivia, Talaba, and Tocopilla. Once more I urge that particular thought be given to these protection problems.

810.20 Defense/1967

U-L:SM:MPM

1-29-42

Copies to WAR and NAVY.

a46cc06

NEW DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS

	VESSEL	TRIAL DISPLT.	HULL CONSTR.	MACHINE GUNS	TORPEDO TUBES	DEPTH CHARGES	SPEED KNOTS	RADIUS MILES	SPEED FOR RADIUS	COMPLE- MENT	TOTAL COST	TIME TO BUILD MONTHS
MOTOR/TORPEDO BOATS												
	PT-1	60900*	WOOD	2-50AA	2-18"	8 *	40	120 AT PLUS 120 AT	15" FULL POWER	7	265,000	5 1/2
	PT-2	67350*	"	2-50AA	2-18"	8 *	40	"	"	7	275,000	5 1/2
	PT-3	59900*	"	2-50AA	2-18"	8 *	40	"	"	7	260,000	6 1/2
	PT-4	66350*	"	2-50AA	2-18"	8 *	40	"	"	7	270,000	7
	PT-5	94230*	"	2-50AA	2-21"	4	40+	275 AT PLUS 275 AT	15" FULL POWER	9	348,000	6
	PT-6	94230*	"	2-50AA	2-21"	4	40+	"	"	9	345,000	8
	PT-7	101800*	"	2-50AA	2-21"	4	40+	"	"	9	685,000 SEE NOTE 3	8
	PT-8	94350*	ALUMINUM	2-50AA	2-21"	4	42+	"	"	9	710,000 SEE NOTE 3	8
	PT-9	72000* SEE NOTE 1	WOOD	2-50AA SEE NOTE 2	4-18"	8 *	40	650	22	9	435,000	—
SUBMARINE CHASERS												
	PC-449	106 TONS	WOOD	—	1-3 1/2	14	17.5	1500	12	22	385,000	10
	PC-450	95 TONS	WOOD	—	1-3 1/2	14	17.5	1500	12	22	420,000	9
	PC-451	305 TONS	STEEL	4-50AA	1-3 1/2	24	22.5	3000	12	50	1,650,000	12
	PC-452	330 TONS	STEEL	4-50AA	1-3 1/2	24	22.5	3000	12	50	1,520,000	14

* ALTERNATE EQUIPMENT - TORPEDOES OR DEPTH CHARGES
BY CONTRACTOR

10P972

SIGN CHARACTERISTICS

DEPTH HARGES	SPEED KNOTS	RADIUS MILES	SPEED FOR RADIUS	COMPLE- MENT	TOTAL COST	TIME TO BUILD MONTHS			ESTIMATED COST FOR TYPE IN A PRODUCTION PROGRAM	ESTIMATED TIME TO BUILD FOR TYPE IN A PRODUCTION PROGRAM MONTHS								
8 *	40	120 AT PLUS 120 AT	15 FULL POWER	7	265,000	5 1/2												
8 *	40	"	"	7	275,000	5 1/2												
8 *	40	"	"	7	260,000	6 1/2		> 59' TYPE	250,000	4 1/2								
8 *	40	"	"	7	270,000	7												
4	40+	275 AT PLUS 275 AT	15 FULL POWER	9	348,000	6												
4	40+	"	"	9	345,000	8												
4	40+	"	"	9	685,000 SEE NOTE 5	8		> 81' TYPE	325,000	5 1/2								
4	42+	"	"	9	710,000 SEE NOTE 5	8												
8 *	40	650	22	9	435,000	—			—	—								
14	17.5	1500	12	22	385,000	10												
14	17.5	1500	12	22	420,000	9		> 110' TYPE	350,000	6								
24	22.5	3000	12	50	1,650,000	12		165' DIESEL TYPE	1,500,000	10								
24	22.5	3000	12	50	1,520,000	14		165' STEAM TYPE	1,400,000	14								

TELEGRAM

Safe Navy

Bot

The White House
Washington

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Wavell advises King enemy losses in Macassar strait to date conservatively assessed as follows:

First:- Totals definitely sunk nine ships, possibly sunk six ships including two warships. Damaged nineteen ships including seven warships. Details follow:

Second:- Definitely sunk. By U S dds four large transports including one either gasoline tanker or ammunition ship. By U S aircraft four transports; by Dutch aircraft one transport.

Third:- Possibly sunk. By U S dds two medium transports left burning from gunfire. By U S sub one heavy cruiser or carrier. By Dutch aircraft two transports.

Fourth:- Damaged. By U S dds two transports. By U S aircraft one cruiser one transport. By Dutch aircraft four cruisers two dds., nine transports.

Nothing further from Halsey raid. Will keep you advised.

MCCREA.

Feb 1 1942

1:40 p.m. /d

0464401

DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS

NO	DEPTH CHARGES	AIRCRAFT	SPEED KNOTS	RADIUS MILES	SPEED FOR RADIUS KNOTS	BELT ARMOR THICKNESS	DECK ARMOR THICKNESS	COMPLEMENT	TOTAL COST	TIME TO BUILD MONTHS								
	—	4-SOL.	30	9000	15	1.5"	1.25"	420	12,250,000	36	PRELIMINARY STUDIES ONLY							
(2)	—	—	32.5	8500	15	3.75"	1.25"	623	20,500,000	37	UNDER CONSTRUCTION							
	—	2-SOL.	(32.5)	9000	15	(6.75")	1.25"	(650)	21,350,000	38	CHARACTERISTICS NOT APPROVED							
	—	(8)	(33)	10000	15	(4.0")	(1.5")	800	27,400,000	40								
	—	4-SOL.	32.5	10000	15	5'x25"	2'	890	29,200,000	38								
	—	4-SOL.	33	10000	15	6'x25"	(2.25")	(900)	30,000,000	40								
	—	4-6	(33)	15000	15	(8.5")	(2.5")	(1200)	55,350,000	46	CHARACTERISTICS NOT APPROVED							
(2)	28	—	36+	6500	12	—	—	(85)	8,100,000	30	CANCELLED							
(2)	28	—	(36)	7500	15	—	—	(235)	10,000,000	34								
1'	—	—	16/9	6000	10	—	—	38	4,100,000	27	UNDER CONSTRUCTION							
21'	—	—	20.5/9	11000	10	—	—	60	6,000,000	29								
	—	74	(53)	20000	15	(51.5")	2.50"	(2350)	47,000,000	44	CANCELLED							
	—	1-SOL.	20	8000	12	3.5'	1'x1.25'	248	7,250,000	36	CANCELLED							

NOTE: FIGURES CIRCLED ARE SUBJECT TO DEVELOPMENT

79:1501.111.1170

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a46e02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Harry
Pot.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
February 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am forwarding the attached as being
of possible interest to the President.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCREA

JOHN L. McCREA

By *W. J. Stewart* *for* T.S.

By W. J. Stewart *for* FEB 19 1974

a46e201

DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

FROM: ADMIRALTY

T.O.R. - O.N.I. 021310

Following is a summary of recent Joint Intelligence Sub Committee's appreciation of Germany's intentions.

1. Germany is becoming short of oil and her air force has been reduced to first line strength of approximately 4,000 operational and 1,400 transport aircraft.
2. She has recently increased naval and air forces in the Mediterranean. Considerable number of submarines and small craft have arrived in this area and large stocks of oil have been accumulated at Mediterranean ports.
3. We believe the supply increase intended chiefly for protection of Axis communication with North Africa to neutralize Malta, and to insure against a successful British advance to the Tunis frontier.
4. On Russian front the initiative still in Russia's hands and German forces withdrawing under strong pressure. As yet, no sign of present Russian offensive exhausting itself. Until it does, it will be impossible for Germany to withdraw substantial forces from Russia to rest and refit so as to form a striking force for renewal of offensive on the Russian front or for large scale operations in other theatres of war.
5. On the contrary, we know Flak defences in Ukraine are being strengthened at the expense of Roumania and that other air units including air force troops, recently withdrawn from Russian front are being hurriedly returned there after minimum time spent in rest and refit.
6. Owing to reduction in strength of German Air Force unlikely that Germany will be able to make available sufficient air force to contain Russians and at the same time undertake large scale operations elsewhere. Further, this weakness will compel Germany to limit her offensive to one major operation only where she might hope to concentrate an air force sufficient to give her local superiority. To achieve this she would have to reduce her air force elsewhere to a minimum required for security.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 10 1974

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7. No evidence (?German) striking force being created now, nor do we consider a striking force sufficient for large scale operation can be created so long as the Russian offensive is maintained. Assuming for the sake of argument that stabilisation is reached by 15th February, earliest date by which division (including divisions which may be made available from detached squadrons) for large scale operations could be withdrawn, rested and restored, would be the 1st May. So far as Russia is concerned large scale operations unlikely to take place owing to thaw during April, and the consequently difficulty of movement.

Possible courses of German action.

8. (A) A renewed offensive along the whole Russian front. For reasons already given this is most unlikely, if not wholly impossible as yet.

(B) A thrust in the south towards Caucasia (while containing Russian army in north and centre).

Germany must secure, at the earliest opportunity possible substantial supplies of oil. She can only obtain fabric oil in Caucasia or Iraq. For reasons given below, Caucasia is the most likely major operation.

9. A thrust through Turkey (?towards) Syria and thence to Iraq and/or Egypt. Advance through Turkey into Iraq would put Germany in possession of oil fields potentially capable of meeting her needs. Would deprive us of oil on which our Eastern Mediterranean naval position partly depends. Would bring Germany within striking distance of Abadan and open way to a further advance into Egypt. On the other hand transport of oil from Iraq would be more difficult than from Caucasia, at least until Germany had a secure sea route through Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, even if Turkey acquiesced in passage of German forces through her territory Germans would be undertaking new military commitments. Seems unlikely that Turkey would acquiesce unless Russian army defeated or we had suffered such reverses that she felt confident that Germany would win the war.

10. Operation in central and western Mediterranean areas (a) through Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French North Africa. Advantage to be gained substantial but operation would involve Germany in another military commitment in theatre of war remote from main source of oil and other supplies. Occupation of Peninsula would subsequently be a heavy economic liability. This operation therefore appears likely, only in order to counter or forestall action against ourselves or America. (b) Through North Africa ports against Egypt from west, possibly in conjunction with an attack through Turkey. Germans will attempt to maintain and exploit their position in North Africa, and for this purpose reinforce Rommel with forces necessary. Presence of strong air force in central Mediterranean area would serve to neutralise Malta and protect communication with Tripoli. Germany may try to capture Malta.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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11. Invasion of British Isles. It is unlikely that Germany could undertake so large and risky operation as long as Russia remains undefeated.

CONCLUSION

12. Most probable German major operation likely to be made through Ukraine (?towards) Caucasus to obtain oil. Meanwhile, every effort will be made to control the central and eastern Mediterranean and to maintainand (?exploit) the position in North Africa.

13. Following is our estimate of force Germany would require for operation referred to in paragraph 5 to 11 above and of time that must elapse between beginning of withdrawal of divisions from Russia and concentration of force ready for attack in several theatres of operation. "Z" day is date on which withdrawal of divisions beginning:

(A) Renewed offensive against Russia.

(i) An offensive all along the Russian Front. We cannot as yet see possibility of this operation. Forces required more than Germans have got.

(ii) Thrust in south towards Caucasia (while containing Russian armies in north and centre). Force required against Caucasia some 30 Divisions (of which some 4 to 6 armoured and 4 to 6 motorized) and 1500 aircraft. Earliest date by which this operation could be developed. Concentration on the southern sector Z upward 2-1/2 months. Fall of Rostov Z plus 3 months. Occupation of Maikop - Tuapse area Z plus 4 to Z plus 4-1/2 months. Occupation of Srozni area Z plus 5 months. Occupation of Batum - Baku area dependent on degree of resistance in Caucasia.

?(B) Thrust through Turkey towards Syria and thence Iraq and/or Egypt. Land force required 20 Divisions (including 4 armoured and 6 motorised). Air force required .. if Germans decided to attack Turkey they would expect Turks to receive air assistance from ourselves. Unlikely therefore that Germans would attack until they had assembled, in area from central Mediterranean to Black Sea (which must be treated as a whole) some 1500 aircraft in addition to all available Italian aircraft.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

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Earliest date on which forces could be concentrated on Turkish Frontier, Z plus 2-1/2 months. Earliest date on which force could reach Syrian Frontier. Turkey acquiescent Z plus 4-3/4 months. Turkey resistance incalculable.

(C) Invasion of British Isles.

Land force required: 30 divisions (including 9 armoured), exclusive of Divisions required for diversion.

Air Force required: - Full first line strength, denuding all other theatres of war.

Naval forces required: - Substantially the whole German Navy would be involved. Earliest date by which force could be concentrated in west. Z plus 3 to 4 months.

(D) Operations in Central and Western Mediterranean.

(i) Through Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French North Africa. Land and Air Forces required - since these operations only likely to be contemplated by Germans to forestall or counter Allied action, they would have to employ such forces as they could muster at the time. Timing would similarly depend on the state of affairs then existing.

(ii) Through North African ports against Egypt from west, possibly in conjunction with an attack through Turkey. Land force required - 7 divisions made up say as follows: - 2 German armoured divisions, 1 German motorised division, 1 Italian armoured division, 1 Italian motorised division, 2 Italian infantry divisions.

Assuming of Axis forces now in Libya, equivalent of 1 armoured, 1 motorised and 2 infantry division will still be in area. These are included in above. Air Force required - the force set out in sub paragraph (E) above would cover this operation. Earliest date by which force in TRIPOLITANIA could be reinforced. Not using Tunisian ports - 3 months from date of embarkation. Using Tunisian ports - 1-1/2 months from date of embarkation.

14. Above, putting into terms of CALENDAR, and assuming 15th February as earliest date on which substantial force can be withdrawn from Russia, gives earliest date for stage referred to above as follows: -

- (a) 1. Earliest date of concentration on the south Russian sector 1st May.
2. Fall of Rostov 15th May.
3. Occupation of MAIKOP-TUAPSE area 15th June to 30th

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JCS Memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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June.

4. Occupation of GROZNI area 15th July.

5. Occupation of BATUM - BAKU area, dependent on degree of resistance in Caucasia.

(b) 1. Concentration on the Turkish frontier 1st May.

2. Earliest date on which forces could reach the Syrian frontier - Turkey acquiescent - early August, Turkey resisting incalculable.

(c) Concentration of forces for invasion of U.K. - 15th May to 15th June.

ONI DISTRIBUTION: Nav. Aide, ... Op-12 ... Op-38 ... BuAor, ...
USMC ... Op-16 ... Op-16-F ... Op-16-F-1 ... Op-16-F-3 ... Op-16-F-4
Op-16-F-5 ... Op-16-F-6 ... Op-16-F-10 ... F-11 ... F-105 ... F-111
F-35

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RETAIN OR DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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NO. 3369

From: M/O Bandoeng to War Dept.
Time Filed at Source: Jan 31, 1942
TOR MID: Jan. 31, 1942
TOR ONI: 311620 Jan. 1942

The causeway between Johore and Singapore Island has been destroyed and all ground forces have been withdrawn to within the boundaries of the island.

There are no reliable reports regarding the movements of the enemy convoy from Balikpapan.¹ Macassar² and Bandjermasin³ are the likely objectives of this convoy. It is, however, possible that the Japanese plan to secure Soerabaya or Timor--by gaining Timor to try to intercept the Australia Java route of communications. It is not probable that substantial and effective resistance can be offered against these objectives of the enemy since naval and airplane strength is not adequate.

There is nothing new to communicate with regard to the Island of Ambon.

THORPE

1. Balikpapan on east coast of Borneo.
2. Macassar in southern Celebes.
3. Bandjermasin in southern Borneo.

All copies informational.

MID DISTRIBUTION: JIC

ONI DISTRIBUTION: NAV AIDE...Op-10/11...Op-12...Op-16...Op-16-F...Op-16-C
Op-16 F-1...Op-16 F-2...F-105...F-11...F-111...F-35

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

FEB 19 1974

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No. 3984

From: C. C., A.F.F.E. Ft. Mills
To: War Department
Time Filed at Source: January 31, 1942
T.O.R.: M.I.D. January 31, 1942
T.O.R.: C.N.I. 011030

The Japanese made a sudden attempt to break the center of our lines in Luzon with no success whatsoever. Sporadic fighting has been carried on along the whole line. There has been heavy artillery fire. Activity in the air has been negligible. Nothing of special interest is reported from Mindanao.

MacARTHUR

THIS DESPATCH IS NOT TO BE DUPLICATED WITHOUT THE
PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

RETAIN OR DESTROY

Exact Action Copy: A. C. of S., WPD

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter

FEB 19 1974

MID DISTRIBUTION: JIC

ONI DISTRIBUTION: Op-16...Op-12...USMC...Op-16-F...Op-16-F-2...F 11...F-105...
F-111...F-35... NAV AIDE

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
a46ee08

No. 3381

From: CGAFFE, Fort Mills
To: War Department
Time Filed At Source: February 1, 1942
T.O.R. - M.I.D. February 1, 1942
T.O.R. - O.N.I. 011030 February 1942

The situation still remains the same in Mindanao and in the Visayas.

An uncounted number of Japanese bombers from Formosa landed at Nichols Field. They had navy crews and undoubtedly are headed further South.

Concentrations of our heavy guns wiped out a Japanese force with small boats and launches at Ternate.*

On our front we are more than holding our own against heavy shelling and intermittent infantry fights all along the lines.

MacARTHUR

*Ternate, at 120° 43' E X 140° 18' N, is a small town on S. W. shore of Manila Bay about 10 miles across from Corregidor.

THIS DESPATCH IS NOT TO BE DUPLICATED WITHOUT THE
PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

RETAIN OR DESTROY

Exact Action Copy: A. C. of S., WPD

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: JIC

ONI DISTRIBUTION: Op-12...Op-38...USMC...Op-16...Op-16-F...Op-16-F-2...Op-16-F-10
F-11...F-105...F-111...F-35... NAV. AIDE

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

No. 3394

From: CGAFFL, Fort Mills to War Dept.
Time Filed At Source: Feb. 020005
TOR MID Feb. 020049
TOR ONI Feb. 021020

There has been no change in the situation in the south and very little air activity here. Japanese attacks on my right flank and against my left rear were beaten off with serious enemy loss.

MACARTHUR

NID DISTRIBUTION: JIC

ONI DISTRIBUTION: NAV AIDE...OP10/11...OP12...USMC...OP16...OP16F...
OP16F-2...F-11...F-105...F-111...OP16C...F-35.

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DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

RETAIN OR DESTROY.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72
FEB 19 1974

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From: M/A Lima to War Dept.
Time filed at source: Jan. 30, 1942
TOR MID: Jan. 31, 1942
TOR ONI: 311620 Jan. 1942

As soon as it is received a copy of the terms of the Peruvian Ecuadorian boundary dispute settlement will be sent to Panama and Washington D. C. It is not considered important that a few younger Army Officers consider Peru was unjustly dealt with by the accord since the general public reaction is one of satisfaction.

ENT

G-2 Comment: No previous information on the attitude of the army regarding the border settlement has been received. Some few members of the army possibly feel that no compromise at all with Ecuador was in order, since Peru had complete superiority in the military operations of the last six months.

All copies informational.

MID DISTRIBUTION: State Dept....JIC

ONI DISTRIBUTION: Nav Aide...12...38...US MC...16...16-F...op 16 f-7..
F-105...F-11...F-111...F-35...16-C

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PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

RETAIN OR DESTROY.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72

FEB 19 1974

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FROM: THE ADMIRALTY
TO: DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
TOR ONI: Feb. 021310

OPTEL No. 38

Information received up to 7 A.M., 1st February, 1942.

1. NAVAL

Photographic reconnaissance on the 31st located the battleship TIRPITZ and a tanker at Trondhjem, and another photographic reconnaissance of Brest located the SCHARNHORST and CHELSEA at the torpedo-boat station and PRINZ LUGEN at the coaling wharf. A German ship, probably the SPILLERD (5,000 tons), reported on 31st in English and German that she had been torpedoed 400 miles North of Azores and was on fire and sinking and had British prisoners on board. Corvettes have been sent. An ex-United States coast-guard cutter has been torpedoed and sunk in the Atlantic while escorting a homeward-bound convoy. An 8,000 ton tanker was torpedoed and abandoned on the 15th East of Newfoundland, and survivors from a small Greek ship have been landed at St. John's. A medium sized British merchant vessel was sunk by submarine gunfire on the 30th 50 miles East of Madras. An 8,000 ton British ship, independently routed from Buenos Aires to the United Kingdom, was torpedoed this morning 300 miles South-East of New York.

2. MILITARY

LIBYA. On the 31st, there was no forward movement of enemy main bodies, which were in the area Benina-Msus. Their patrols were, however, active as far as Marawa. Our forces were approximately on a line El Garib-Charruba-Tengeder with patrols pushed well forward. Part of the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade, which had been cut off in the Benghazi area, has broken through and is reorganizing.

MALAYA. During the night 30th/31st. Our forces effected their withdrawal to Singapore Island in spite of continued enemy pressure. The causeway has been breached. Part of an Indian Brigade which was cut off two days previously has not yet rejoined during five nights beginning 26th/27th, the Royal Navy evacuated nearly 2,000 all ranks, British and Indian, who had been cut off on the West Coast of Johore.

BURMA. On the 30th, Moulmein was heavily attacked, and fighting continued throughout the night. During the 31st, our troops were withdrawn to the West bank of the Salween River.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE FEB 19 1974

SECRET

SECRET

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RUSSIA. South-East of Vyazma, the Russians have made further progress towards the town. In the Donets Sector Russian attacks are continuing.

3. AIR OPERATIONS

WESTERN FRONT. 31st. A Hudson bombed a 3,500 ton freighter in convoy off Holland. Two hits were followed by smoke from amidships. 31st January/1st February. 131 aircraft were sent out - Brest 72, St. Nazaire 31, Havre 14, leaflets 13. Five bombers are missing. Results were mainly unobserved owing to heavy cloud. 12 R.C.A.F. aircraft participated without casualties.

LIBYA. 29th/30th. Wellingtons and Liberators bombed enemy supply columns in the Aghcila-Jedabya Area. Aircraft attacked military objectives at Misurata and mechanical transport parks south of Tripoli (L). They also hit an 8,000 ton merchant vessel north of Tripoli and a 4,000 ton ship off Cape Bon. Both vessels were left stationary and listing.

MALTA. On the 30th and 31st. Enemy aircraft caused slight damage at Hal Far aerodrome which, with Takali water-logged, remains unserviceable. Dockyard property was also damaged.

MALAYA. 30th. Enemy aircraft bombed the docks area at Singapore, and on 31st Seletar aerodrome was attacked by 27 heavy bombers. Some buildings were destroyed and the aerodrome is still unserviceable. Our fighters destroyed four enemy aircraft, probably destroyed one and damaged one. Two of our fighters are missing.

ONI DISTRIBUTION: NAV AID...OP12...OP30...BU AIR...US IC...OP16...OP16F
OP16C...OP16F-1...OP16F-2...OP16F-3...OP16F-4...OP16F-5.
OP16F-6...OP16F-10...F-11...F-105...F-111...F-35...
Comdr. Bailey...JIC.

THIS DESPATCH IS NOT TO BE DUPLICATED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

RETAIN OR DESTROY.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE FEB 19 1974

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GPO 25-22814

~~SECRET~~
a46ee13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a memorandum which indicates known present status of procurement orders for aircraft, placed in this country by foreign s

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

a46 f01

Life: Navy
PSF

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

in reply refer to No.
Op-16-B-2

10 November 1939

MEMORANDUM for the Director:

SUBJECT: Aircraft - Deliveries to Belligerents.

1. Contacted Mr. Green, State Department in company with Captain Bode, to ascertain if he could furnish the number of aircraft ready for delivery to belligerents. He had no data of those completed and ready for shipment. When an order is placed, export licenses are often placed immediately. In the last four days, 510 export license requests have been received in his office. In connection with flying planes abroad, Mr. Green stated that he had furnished Secretary Hull a statement, which was brought out in the State Department press conference yesterday, that this would be an unneutral act and subject to a \$10,000 fine - (the aviators approached were offered \$4,000).

2. Through Aeronautics, have obtained following information of planes awaiting shipment:

Total number ready - 374

Breakdown -

- (a) 211 B-14's - Lockheed - Bombers for Great Britain.
- (b) 26 BC-1's - North American - Advanced trainers for Great Britain.
- (c) 50 BT-9's - North American - Advanced trainers for France.
- (d) 7 DB-7's - Douglas - Attack bombers for France (type that crashed on West Coast with French officer aboard.)
- (e) 15 SB-2U's - Vought - Scout bombers for France.
- (f) 65 Model 167 - Martin - Attack bombers for France.

40 BC-1's are now en route from West Coast for delivery to Great Britain.

3. The above information will be checked further.

4. The Clearance Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, reports they are working on figures which will be available in a few days covering progress of deliveries and contracts placed.


E. B. Nixon

a46f02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1940

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

In relation to Secret
Memorandum of October ninth,
covering measures to be taken in
preparation for war, I approve
the first three. Please do not
put any of the others into effect
without speaking to me about them.

F. D. R.

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THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

BF Navy
Safe File
~~SECRET~~

October 9, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Orders have been issued for these measures to be taken at once:

1. Call the organized Naval and Marine Reserves.
2. Call Fleet Reserve, Navy and Marine, selective basis.
3. Lay nets and booms for drill purposes.

The following steps in preparation for war can be taken to impress the Japanese with the seriousness of our preparations:

1. Army send reinforcement to Hawaii if contemplated.
2. Presidential proclamation for Maritime Commission to requisition merchant ships, in order to
3. Take over tankers, transports, auxiliaries, and begin to assemble Train on West Coast.
4. Coast Guard transfer to Navy.
5. Fill up garrisons of defense battalions in 14th District outlying bases.
6. Presidential proclamation establishing defense sea areas.
7. Withdraw nationals from China. (Inconsistent getting merchant ships out of danger).
8. Plan for evacuation of families out of Hawaii later Panama.
9. Preparations regarding seizure German and Japanese merchant vessels in ports and near our coasts.

Franklin D. Roosevelt L
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DDO LHM. 5200.9 (9/2)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L.*

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10. Pressure on Britain to speed leases Bermuda and Newfoundland (essential).

11. Change laws to take limit off naval and marine personnel - limit to President's discretion.

12. Prepare plans for concentration camps (Army-Justice).

13. Executive Order to call Volunteer Reserves, including communication and merchant marine reserves.

14. Withdraw Marines from North China (this means Embassy should be closed). Leave very small token force. Stop sending replacements, Marines Shanghai - let attrition operate. Consider withdrawal when currency situation permits.

15. Netherlands East Indies:- Assist in material; line up for mutual support.

The following are matters for Treasury and State:

1. Freeze credits and assets of Japan.

2. Continue to bolster Chinese credit.

3. Take such steps as may be necessary to insure Chinese currency carrying on in case Shanghai is occupied by Japan.

For consideration, but in abeyance for the moment:

1. Alert the Asiatic Station at once to get ships other than river gunboats out of China. This should be the first secret step.

2. Alert the Naval Establishment (Establish security patrols, etc.)

Military Establishment

Merchant Marine (Clippers)

Department of Justice - sabotage -

Surveillance of agents

Panama Canal - all security measures

a46h03

MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Safe: Navy

*To The Secretary
for
The President*

*VR
JTB*

←5229

Secretary

a46hh01

Safe: Navy

INFORMATION ABOUT RADAR

EXPLANATION

<u>CXAM-1</u>	Radar designed primarily for detecting aircraft at long ranges (antenna approximately 18' X 18').
<u>YE</u>	Radio homing device.
<u>TBS</u>	Ultra high frequency radio transmitter.
<u>ZB</u>	Part of homing device.
<u>IFF</u>	Radar identification device "Friend and Foe."
<u>MCW</u>	Modulated continuous wave radio.
<u>SC</u>	Radar designed primarily for detecting aircraft at medium ranges (antenna approximately 7' X 8').

a46hh02

February 19, 1942

The following letter was received by me from my brother, Lt. Comdr. L. J. Dow, Communication Officer on the Staff of Comairbat (Vice Admiral Halsey). It is believed that the comments on the functioning of Navy radio equipment will be of interest. As the letter is personal it is requested that this memorandum be given no further distribution and that it be destroyed when it has served its purpose:

"First I want to say that when the story of this war is told, the equipment the Radio Division is giving us will deserve the greatest credit for winning the war. We use it, depend upon it, and have every confidence in it. Your radar and YE alone are a Godsend, and the fleet from the top to the bottom appreciate it.

As you probably know already we were lucky to just miss the December 7th fiasco and after a few weeks going in circles we started paying the bastards back in the Marshalls. We didn't just hit and run, we stationed ourselves in the middle of four of their bases and pounded hell out of them for nearly twelve hours. Thanks to radar we missed being discovered the day before by one of their patrol planes, were able to keep their bombers off with fighters, and were able to retire without getting hurt. We did shoot down a few antennas and probably would have shot down a couple more Jap suicide pilots with AA fire if we had been equipt with gunnery radars but outside of that we have nothing to gripe about. We broke every rule of warfare (and of communications) and in doing so were able to accomplish the thing we were sent to do. A few of the choice excerpts from the voice radio log are as follows:

(Torpedo plane attack going in)

- - - "You ease off to the right, that big one is mine, ease off to the right"
- - - "Take that cruiser underway off to the right"
- - - "Tak 'em home boys, tak 'em home"
- - - "Attack completed one plane missing (later showed up)"
- - - "We sure got that big bastard didn't we Mr---" (interphone conversation)

(From a fighter who had withdrawn from attacking a Jap bomber due to own AA fire)

- - - "You're shooting too high, too high"
- - - "Now you're getting closer, but too far astern"
- - - "Aw tell 'em to cease firing and I'll shoot the son-of-a-bitch down" (He did)

There is much to be told about all this.

This is a war of aircraft and submarines and light forces. Everything

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in the book about battleships, battle lines, and heavy ships, and fleet actions is as useless as a left-handed corkscrew in prohibition days. Speed is the essence of the whole thing. When you are struggling with priorities keep this in mind and push the equipment for aircraft, carriers, submarines, cruisers, destroyers in that order. Bear in mind that the aircraft and light force picture to be of real value. The old concepts and unfortunately the tactics we have had the most training in are practically dead issues in this naval blitz. In the development of new equipment give us the things we need and want and we will bring home the bacon. Another thing, with all due respect to the British and their problems and ways of doing things, it is all right to find out what their problems are but let's solve them in the American way - it's better. Too much of our stuff is based upon how the British do it. Take fighter direction for example, their average interceptions with fighters is from 3 to 6 percent of those attempted - ours around 90 percent - yet our books on the subject would have us use their methods. There are many other things being done along the same lines, not only in methods but in equipment and arrangements. There are too many reports and opinions from abroad.

A few comments on equipment. Our CXAM-1 is performing beautifully and gives us little trouble. We use it twenty-four hours a day every day we are at sea. The only thing that causes consternation is images caused by side lobes. When they installed the radars they set each one on a slightly different frequency to reduce mutual interference. The frequency therefore does not exactly conform to that of the array hence an enlarged side lobe. You can imagine what happens on the bridge in enemy waters when you report that you "think" it is only a false or sidelobe echo. We are rematching ours and hope to eliminate this difficulty. We have tracked single aircraft as far away as eighty six miles and groups of aircraft over a hundred miles. Our altitude curves consistently permit us to determine altitude of approaching planes within three hundred feet. I suggest that carriers be equipped with an SC in addition to the CXAM-1. Greater use is made of radar in carriers than in any other type of ship. We are lost when our one radar is out of commission at any time. Our gunnery radars must be pushed - we need them badly. Repeater screens for radar plot and on the bridges would be a desirable improvement if they could be developed. Each ship should be furnished with frequency measuring equipment to make proper adjustments. There is a shortage of 852 tubes in this area - a larger number of spares of this type should be aboard.

The YE is invaluable. It works fine but requires much maintenance. The array rotating part, brushes, and sliprings give continuous trouble due to moisture. I suggest an arrangement similar to that on the radars be developed to replace the present system. Other recommended improvements: Provide voice modulating equipment so that it can be used to communicate with planes. Also the modulation frequency should be variable between 3000 and 7000 kcs to correspond to the usually used aircraft frequencies and to preclude the

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necessity for shifting coils in the plane. When the planes are on the YE frequency we have a hell of a time communicating with them. A ready means of orientating the dividing line between any two letters-sectors to any desired bearing. This is desirable to permit using the dividing line between two sectors as a beam for planes to follow to an objective.

The next item is a MUST item and we need them pronto. All carriers, cruisers, and destroyers must be equipt with TBS equipment immediately. One frequency is all that is required (72.5). We have built haywire equipment to work our destroyers. The carriers are task force flag-ships and are constantly the primary targets of enemy submarines and aircraft. We must have a direct voice channel for day and night emergency maneuvers and warning or radar reporting channels with our protecting cruisers and destroyers. Radio silence and limitations on visual signalling at night and the normal delays in handling this type of traffic preclude the use of other circuits for this purpose. I cannot too strongly emphasize the necessity for equipping the carriers and cruisers with TBS equipment immediately. When can we expect ours? CXAM and SC equipped ships need two each - one for the radar net and one for maneuvering channel.

Based upon my entire experience and most thorough considerations, the following are the general specifications for the ultimate aircraft radio equipment for all CV or single engined aircraft. Crystal controlled, five channel, quickshift both transmitter and receiver, 25 watts, 3000 to 20000 kcs., built-in ZB circuit with provisions for two way voice communication on the ultra high frequency. No direction finders and no plug-in-coils, voice and MCW only. Inter-phone separate from radio. Include IFF circuit if practicable. The number contracted for after all bugs were worked out would be sufficient to provide all small planes in the navy with one model. I could expound for hours on the advantages of such a set over the present equipment and know about all the limitations and arguments against crystal control."

J. B. Dow,
Comdr. U.S.N.

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330 MAR 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-11-71

Signature- RHP

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DDO DIA. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Safe: Navy

October 11, 1940

PSF

U.S. FLEET Dispositions and Operations to meet special
situation in Western Pacific.

ASSUMPTIONS.

1. The Gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.
2. The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of Burma Road is an act unfriendly to Japan.
3. The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce operation with Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.
4. Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce cooperation by the Dutch East Indies.
5. The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the United States or United States possessions to Japan and intercourse with Japan.
6. The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent Japanese trade, in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations, with the Western Hemisphere.
7. The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific, - in Australia and Singapore, - and Dutch Forces in the Dutch East Indies in stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea - Celebes Sea area.
8. The United States is prepared to accept war if the measures taken cause Japan to declare war.
- a very impt. assumption* 9. Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic against the Western Hemisphere by the Axis Powers.
10. The situations and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October, 1940.

a46101

~~SECRET~~MEASURES AND OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S.F.

1. Mobilize U.S. Fleet, in accordance with Orange Plan.
2. Redispose forces now in the Atlantic as follows:
 - a. Move 2 heavy cruisers and one division of 4 Old Destroyers Southern Brazil - Uruguay, and Argentine ports, basing locally or on Falkland Islands in order to interdict ORANGE trade and protection of U.S. Shipping. *Use of South Am. ports - by U.S. Navy, facilitate this operation*
 - b. Move 2 heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and 4 destroyers (from Pacific) to cover west coast ports of South America, locally or at Panama.
 - c. Move 18 Old Destroyers to Pacific for local defense and protection of U.S. Shipping as follows:-
 - 9 to Puget Sound and Alaska
 - 5 to San Francisco
 - 4 to Hawaii
 - d. Move one aircraft carrier, one light cruiser, two transport ships, one destroyer tender, all new destroyers, one Destroyer tender plus 1st Marine Brigade (now at Guantanamo), and three new submarines, and three old submarines to West Coast.
 - e. Move PatWing 5 (____ planes) with tenders to San Diego for coastal defense (relieve PatWings 1 and 4).

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3. Take measures for defense of Alaska as follows:
 - a. Dispatch two submarines and small tender to Dutch Harbor.
 - b. Reenforce Marine garrison at Dutch Harbor by remainder of defense battalion, housing them in vessels chartered for the purpose.
 - c. Dispatch one squadron (6 planes) of Patrol Planes, plus tender to Dutch Harbor, and one squadron (6 planes) and tender to Kodiak.
4. Prepare a detachment for possible dispatch to East Indies area consisting of 4 CA, 1 CV, 9 DD, 4 AMD, (Desdiv 51), 1 AO, 1 AD. This force will reenforce U.S. Asiatic Fleet units which will have retired to this area, and will operate in conjunction with British and Dutch Naval Forces. Upon arrival Asiatic waters, this force will report to the Commander-in-Chief, ASIATIC FLEET. (NOTE: If degaussing and other mobilization measures have not been completed prior to departure, this hazard will have to be accepted, and materials required will have to be forwarded at a later date. In addition, if sent prior to the completion of readiness measures for the operation of the main body in the Mid-Pacific, it must be realized that war may result with this valuable force exposed and unsupported. The same is true of the Asiatic Fleet.
5. Dispatch promptly from Hawaii a detachment consisting of carrier, cruisers, and destroyers to sweep North Pacific waters between Hawaii and Aluetians for Japanese commerce, or Japanese raiders. To be fitted in with mobilization requirements.
6. Assemble transports and train and embark 2nd Reenforced Marine Brigade in West Coast ports.

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10-11-40

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7. Take measures for defense of Pacific Islands as follows: -
 - a. Reenforce MIDWAY with remainder of Defense Battalion, 2 Patrons, 4 OSS, 1 ASR.
 - b. Operate 2 SS for defense of WAKE.
 - c. Operate 2 SS and 1 Patron with tender from JOHNSTON ISLAND, provide small Marine listening post.
 - d. Operate 6 VP, 1 AVP, and 2 SS for defense of CANTON ISLAND.
 - e. Dispatch 2 OSS for defense of SAMOA.
 - f. Dispatch 2 Patrons of Patwing ONE to HAWAII (24 Planes) after relief by Patwing FIVE.
8. Dispatch remainder of Subrons FOUR and SIX (Approximately 14 SS) to CAROLINES and MARSHALLS for preliminary reconnaissance operations.
9. Upon completion of mobilization preparations, assemble fleet in HAWAII prepared to initiate further measures as the situation requires.
10. Assist in defense of U.S. Shipping by the detail of certain Fleet Forces to Coastal Frontier forces. On the Pacific this will be comprise: -
 - 4 DM to HAWAII
 - 3 OCL to Pacific Coastal Frontier.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 11-24-69

Signature- *RHP*

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OUR RIGHTS ON THE SEAS

President Roosevelt has given the Navy the only orders that could properly follow the attack on the destroyer Greer. Those orders are to track down the submarine that made the attack and to "eliminate" it if it is found. The circumstances of the case leave no doubt that the attack was deliberate. On the authority of the President we know that it was made in broad daylight; that visibility was good; that the Greer was plainly marked, both by her flag and by her identification number, and that she was attacked more than once. A navy which permitted an assault of this kind to go unanswered would not be worthy of its name. Its failure to take action would expose the nation to great danger.

A few torpedoes that failed to find their mark in the gray wastes of the North Atlantic may seem to some observers, at a first superficial glance, to create no important "incident." But in reality it is impossible to isolate this "incident" from the whole large question of American rights on the high seas. The logic that leads from one point to the other is inescapable. The Greer was on the Iceland run because American troops have occupied that island in order to safeguard one of the strategic controls of the North Atlantic passage, and our imperative interest in the safety of the North Atlantic passage is determined at this time by the necessity of maintaining that uninterrupted service-of-supply to Britain which Congress has approved in the interest of our own security.

The attack on the Greer ought to bring prompt action on a major policy. The present situation calls on us to use the best Navy in the world to safeguard the delivery of vital war materials. We have every right under international law to take such action, since no American Government, either in this war or in the last one, has ever recognized the legality of the German submarine "blockade." We have every reason in common sense to protect to the best of our ability the ships that carry to the battle lines those weapons which Congress, voting by overwhelming majorities, has made available to our allies under the Lease-Lend Act.

The American Government and the American people have shown in every crisis of our history a firmness of will and an ability to make decisions once the facts of a given situation were clearly visible. Since we do not intend to yield to Nazi Germany, since we are committed to a democratic victory, since we are already "in" the war in the sense that Congress has made us a vital link in the service-of-supply, we can best move forward to protect what we would hold. It is time to arm our merchant ships, to remove the last restrictions imposed on them by the outworn so-called "Neutrality Act," and to give them the protection of our Navy.

SECRET

6 November 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL STARK

PSF

Complying with your request for comments on your secret memorandum for the Secretary dated November 4, 1940, the following comments are submitted but are not offered in any sense as a criticism.

I think your secret memorandum is excellent. I agree with it and with the general conclusions.

Under the national major objectives which you mention I note that no reference is made either to Hitler or to Nazi ambitions.

On page 5 of the secret memorandum emphasis is placed on survival of the British Isles. For us is not the survival of the British Fleet a more vital factor?

I think the elements vital to Britain which must be held in order of importance:-

1. British Fleet
2. British Isles
3. Suez and Egypt
4. Gibraltar
5. Far Eastern Possessions

I do not think that Hongkong, India and British Possessions in the Far East in any way compare in importance to holding these vital areas in Europe.

The immediate menace to Britain at the moment appears to be in the Eastern Mediterranean. The outcome here depends in no small degree on the attitude and the possible action of Russia. Perhaps more consideration should be given to the possible attitude of Russia particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean.

a46j01

~~SECRET~~

As an Ally of Britain I do not wholly agree that the landing of large bodies of troops on the Continent of Europe necessarily follows as the only means to win the war. Egypt, Suez and Gibraltar I consider vital and must be held. This doubtless will involve land combat. Land combat in Egypt, for example, will handicap the enemy in the matter of distance as well as Britain. Land war on the Continent of Europe will handicap Britain and ourselves alone. Land warfare on the Continent of Europe, I believe, is poor strategy.

In addition to the vital considerations discussed in your secret memorandum under Plans (B) and (C), unlimited and limited war against Japan, the following vital factors should be added.

If we wage war against Japan, either limited or unlimited, under Plan (B) or (C), we are aiding the enemy by enabling the Third Ally, Japan, to participate in the war. At present Japan can render no material aid to Germany or Italy by actual operations in Europe. Should we wage war against Japan and enable Japan to fight, and furthermore, to fight in an area to her own advantage, it seems to me to be extremely poor strategy.

As you have pointed out in your secret memorandum if we wage war upon Japan under the present circumstances we will have started something and our ability to finish it will depend, not upon ourselves, but upon some one else, namely, upon Great Britain and upon her holding out for a prolonged period of time. In battle

~~SECRET~~

or in war I do not think it wise to depend upon others for victory.

As you have also pointed out, if we wage war on Japan it will reduce the amount of aid which we can give to Great Britain. I believe Britain cannot survive without aid from the United States. If we wage war upon Japan under present circumstances we are not only risking, but contributing to, the following eventuality:

War on two fronts in two oceans separated thousands of miles and a war which we will have to fight alone.

I believe survival of Great Britain, or at least survival of the British Fleet, is essential to save us from war in two oceans. If this is true, this factor then becomes the one paramount vital factor for us to consider.

I believe the following to be, not only the soundest, but the safest strategic course to follow:

Protect the Americas, aid Britain with our whole strength ensure victory in the Atlantic and Europe, and then deal with Japan and any questions in the Far East regardless of what may happened in the mean time.

If victory in the Atlantic and Europe is insured, then we are secure both in the Atlantic and Pacific. If victory in Europe is only partial, or if it should be a reverse, we are still in advantageous position to defend the Americas.

Respectfully,

J. M. Reeves

-3-

a46j03

August 11, 1958

Admiral Stark Memorandum for the Secreta
November 4, 1940 (Op-12-CTB)(24 pp.) marke
"Secret" has been declassified and moved to
PSF, ~~██████████~~. Navy, 1940

246:04



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVY MANAGEMENT OFFICE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

20 FEB 1956

Conley
56-472

Mr. Herman Kahn, Director
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
Hyde Park, New York

Dear Mr. Kahn:

As requested in your letter of November 10, 1955, the classification status of Admiral H. R. Stark's memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy dated November 10, 1940, bearing the notation Op-12-OPB and known as "Plan Dog," has been reviewed.

The Chief of Naval Operations has declassified the "Plan Dog Memorandum" and the security classification on the document in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library should be removed.

Very truly yours,

Louis J. Dwyer, Jr.
L. J. Dwyer
Head, Naval Archives Branch

a 46105

*Life: Navy
PSF*

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON

March 20, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.

Subject: Tasks of United States' naval forces in the Atlantic in case of a decision to escort convoys.

1. The conference in the Navy Department has reached agreement that the protection of shipping in the Atlantic, bound to and from the United Kingdom, would be most effectively accomplished as indicated herein.

2. The plan, in broad outline, consists of placing in convoy as much as possible of the shipping in question. North American shipping would be assembled in northern United States and Canadian ports, and pass thence via a route north of 60° North into the northwestern approaches to the United Kingdom. South American, African, and Indian Ocean shipping would assemble at Freetown, move west of the Azores, and thence also into the Northwestern Approaches.

3. Protection would be afforded by escorting all convoys; and by tracking down surface raiders in the open sea by patrols and striking forces.

4. The United States, under this plan, would do the following:

- (a) Provide ocean escorts consisting of a battleship or a cruiser and two destroyers, from Halifax to a point in about Latitude 60° North, Longitude 30° West. As available United States' forces are insufficient, they would be assisted by a few British merchant cruisers.
- (b) Provide a force of destroyers and patrol planes for assisting the British to escort convoys between the point in Latitude 60° North, Longitude 30° West, and United Kingdom ports. The United States' forces involved initially would be three squadrons of destroyers (27) and four squadrons of patrol planes (48); mine-sweepers, tenders, etc. This force would base in ports in North Ireland.

a46k01

10-26-66

(initials)

- (c) Protect against raiders in the Western Atlantic by a striking force of two carriers, two cruisers, and four destroyers based in Halifax, Bermuda or Trinidad, as necessary.
- (d) Patrol the ocean area from Latitude 10° North to 25° South, using four old light cruisers. Patrol in the Caribbean and coastal waters with a very few patrol planes, short range seaplanes, nine old destroyers, and a considerable number of small craft.

5. The British would provide all additional escort forces required in the Northwestern Approaches; would escort convoys from Freetown to the United Kingdom; and provide striking forces in the eastern North Atlantic and in the South Atlantic.

6. When the situation in the Pacific would permit our withdrawing forces from the Pacific Fleet for duty in the Atlantic, we could send them to Gibraltar to escort convoys from Freetown as far north as Latitude 50° North, and to act as striking forces in the eastern North Atlantic. This step would permit the British to strengthen their forces in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. As suitable reinforcements become available from the Pacific Fleet and from new construction, we would increase our destroyer and aircraft escort forces based in the United Kingdom, and ultimately establish a detachment in Iceland to improve the efficiency of the escort.

7. In addition, we are now providing increased tankage for long range work to some of the Navy fighters now under construction. These will not be available at once, but when they are, we would base them in North Ireland and Iceland to escort convoys in the Northwest Approaches, in order to protect these against bombing planes.

8. Involved also in our plan is sending about twenty-five or thirty submarines to the British Isles and Gibraltar, for operations against enemy shipping in the Bay of Biscay and the Western Mediterranean.

9. We have begun intensive training of forces for all of this work. Our Navy is ready to undertake it as soon as directed, but could do it more effectively were we to have six to eight weeks for special training.

Respectfully,

Frank Knox.

a46k02

10-26-66
(Clail) L. S. J. Speer
-2-

In reply refer to Initials
and No.
Op-12-2-EH

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Franklin D. Roosevelt L
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/2)

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- Carl L. S.

SECRET - MEMORANDUM

April 30, 1941.

From: The Director, War Plans Division
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Requirements of the Navy for Merchant Vessels
for Immediate Conversion.
Reference: (a) Director of War Plans Secret memo to CNO.
of April 29, 1941.

1. In reference to paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of reference (a), the de-Gaussing, arming, conversion, and manning of the following ships with Navy crews should be accomplished prior to the times noted for the various groups to enable the Navy to carry out the initial movements for which commitments have been made and to give early support to United States Forces beyond the continental limits.

2. Transports - 13 ships, all on East Coast.

1 of the Brazil Class	August 1
AMERICA	" "
1 of Delbrasil Class	" "
SANTA CLARA	" "
PRESIDENT ADAMS	" "
PRESIDENT VAN BUREN	" "
SIBONEY	" "
CHIRIQUI	" "
ORIENTE	" "
ACADIA	" "
3 PRESIDENT BUCHANAN CLASS	August 25
1 EXCALIBUR CLASS	" "
2 Delmundo Class	" "
1 MEXICO CLASS	" "
HENRY R. MALLORY	" "

Five cargo ships, all on East Coast

1 EXPRESS CLASS	August 1
ROBIN KETTERING	" "
CAPE WEDDICK	" "
CAPE COD	" "
1 THOMPSON IXES CLASS	" "

a46401

Tankers - Eight ships

CORSICANA

August 1

1 GULFCOAST TYPE (80,000
barrel capacity)

" "

6 PARATEX TYPE (20,000
barrel capacity)

" "

Refrigerator Ships - two

2 of the NORMACTREN CLASS

August 1

Total ships - 33

²
R. K. Turner
R.K. TURNER

a46402

Safe : Navy
DECLASSIFIED

20. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972


RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-12-D-LED/hjw

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

12 May 1941.


MEMORANDUM for The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Convoy System as established by the
British and Recommended Changes if
the United States enters the War.

1. From observations made in the North-
western approaches to the British Isles it is my con-
sidered opinion that the reasons for the large merchant
ship losses in these approaches are as follows: -

(a) Too many Ships in Convoy.

Size of convoys vary from 30 to as
many as 90 ships. This tends to cut down speed of
convoy as a whole, and makes convoys very unwieldy,
especially when only a few escort ships are available.

With large convoys considerable time
is also lost in assembling the ships of the convoy.

(b) Too Slow Average Speed of Convoys.

C-in-C of the Western approaches stat-
ed that the speed of the convoys varied from 5 to 8 knots,
with the average about 5.5 knots.

(c) Inadequate Number and Type of
Escort Ships.

Many large convoys have only two or
three escort vessels, usually destroyers and corvettes.

Two out of three convoys have only
armed merchant cruisers instead of capital ships as
escorts to protect them against such raiders as the
SCHARNHORST, GUEISENEAU, and HIPPER.

(d) Inadequate Air Protection of
Convoys.

Insufficient planes available at pre-
sent to have air escorts over convoys, except when near
land.

(e) Round About Route taken to reach Final Destination causes Loss of so many Ship Days that the same Result is obtained by the Axis Powers that would be reached if more Ships were sunk.

Present routes, used especially by convoys and single ships leaving Halifax, make it necessary to cover about 900 additional miles, which at the average speed of the convoys means the loss of approximately 7 ship days for each ship in a convoy, and if a convoy is composed of 60 ships the reason for the delay in getting essential material into Britain is readily seen.

The Northern route to Iceland is being used by the British due to lack of adequate numbers of escort ships and planes. This route is not recommended due to the great loss of time, not only due to the distance to be covered but to the slowing down of convoys incident to the continual gales in the winter months.

The S.S. GEORGIC, in which we travelled unescorted from New York to Liverpool, was routed to within forty miles of Iceland and almost to the Faeroe Islands in an endeavor to keep her clear of submarine waters. It took 13 days to make what would normally in peace time be a 7 day trip.

(f) Weather Conditions are such on the Northern route used by the British that from 50 to 70 percent of the escort vessels have been out of commission during the winter months due to storm damage and other material breakdowns. The British Navy hopes to reduce the number of ships out of commission to 30% during the summer months.

(g) Inadequate Repair Bases.

Great Britain has never had Navy repair bases, as such, in the Northwest, and until the collapse of France, they were never considered necessary. Now it has not been possible to give this sufficient attention, and only makeshift repair facilities are available.

The escort ships for the Northwest approaches base at Londonderry, Liverpool and Greenock, and there are no repair facilities at any of these three ports that we would consider adequate, although every effort is being made to improve the facilities.

ST

Op-12-D-LED/hjw

All British Navy Yards are on the south and east coasts, and they have become untenable due to their being continually bombed by the Germans from bases in France.

(h) Insufficient Ships and Planes Available to Employ Groups to Hunt Down and Destroy Submarines and Planes along Routes Convoys are to use.

The plan used by the British, due to lack of sufficient ships and planes, is to route shipping so as to avoid areas in which enemy submarines and planes are known to be located rather than having sufficient destroyers, submarines, and planes keeping the routes clear which it is desired to use.

During the month of March an average of 14 enemy submarines were known to be at sea from Gibraltar to Iceland. They were on the arc of a circle between these two points, most of them being on the northwestern part of the arc. With the limited number of ships available four enemy submarines are known to have been sunk during that period. With more destroyers and planes available it is anticipated many more would be destroyed.

(i) Inadequate Anti Aircraft and Fighter Plane Protection at Assembly and Unloading Ports.

This allows the axis powers to drop acoustic, magnetic and contact mines from planes in the entrance to all the ports of Great Britain, and even in the inner harbor and rivers. Great loss of time is experienced sweeping these mines, and many ships are lost from mine damage.

2. It is realized that the British have a hard task to perform, and their Navy is spread very thin over the world. The above comments are not made in any critical vein, but rather in an effort to properly evaluate the methods used and results obtained with a view to avoiding their errors if we enter the war.

3. It is essential that the largest number of ships possible reach the British Isles in the shortest possible time, with as little loss as possible.

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11452, (S) and (D) 11 (S)

OSD letter, May 2, 1942

RECEIVED, MAR 28 1943

a46m03

To do this satisfactorily, in an effort to win the war, it is my considered opinion that the following procedure be carried out, with minor changes.

(a) Escort groups to consist of 1 capitol ship, at least 3 - 1500 ton destroyers and 3 - 1200 ton destroyers, and 1 escort vessel (aircraft) with fighter planes attached.

(b) Air escort group to consist of from 3 to 6 patrol planes to be over or ahead of the convoy at all times when in waters where enemy submarines and aircraft are to be expected. In addition each escort group should have an escort vessel (aircraft) with fighter planes available for use over convoy to dispose of enemy long range bombers when sighted.

Air escort to cover such areas ahead, abeam and astern before dark, so that no submarine will be likely to get in attacks during night.

Air escort to keep enemy submarines down and enemy aircraft away from convoy, so that position of convoy cannot be reported.

(c) In addition to the escort groups, a force of surface ships and planes should be available as a striking group to attack enemy submarines and aircraft whose position is known within reasonable limits either by radio direction finder, having been sighted by surface ships or aircraft, or by ships having been attacked.

(d) Convoys should consist of about 20 ships, all ships having approximately the same speed.

(e) Convoys should be assembled in U. S. Ports and Halifax, and proceed directly from these ports to the Northwestern approaches to the British Isles by the most direct route. Routes to be varied from time to time.

(f) Merchant ships should not be allowed to travel independently unless they have more speed than any enemy raider known to be at large. It may be necessary to furnish escort ships for individual fast merchant ships.

(g) Planes and ships should be based on Iceland to attack any submarines or planes reported in the vicinity.

SEC

Op-12-D-LED/hjw

(h) Adequate anti-aircraft and fighter plane protection should be established at ports of assembly and unloading in the British Isles as well as at our own operating and repair bases.

(i) Establish adequate advance air and destroyer operating and repair bases in Ireland and Scotland for the use of our Force. The units for each base will have to be dispersed, be well camouflaged, and have bomb proof protection against bombing attacks. It is essential that we have a number of small bases, rather than one or two large ones.

4. If the above procedure is followed with an adequate number of ships and planes for escort and attack groups, there should be no difficulty in successfully escorting shipping from the United States to the British Isles.

L. E. Denfeld

RECEIVED

U.S. 11-11-11, 11-11-11, 11-11-11

11-11-11, 11-11-11, 11-11-11

11-11-11, 11-11-11, 11-11-11

a 46m 05

Safe: No

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTELLIGENCE

May 14, 1972

Composition of French Fleet

Port:	PA	CA	CV	GA	CE	DF	DD	FS	FG	
			0-8						F1	
French Fleet										
Atlantic	1(1)	1(2)	1(3)	1(4)	2(5)	17(6)	15(7)	22(8)	15(9)	
North Africa	1(10)					2(11)	7(12)	11(13)		
Caribbean	1(14)				2(15)	2(16)	5(17)	10(18)	3(19)	
India	1(20)				2(21)	2(22)		3(23)	4(24)	
Indonesia								2(25)		
Black Africa			1(26)		2(27)				1(28)	
Indo China					1(29)			1(30)	1(31)	
Malaysia						2(32)		3(33)	2(34)	
Total French	4	1	2	4	10	25	28	60	40	
British Fleet										
Scotland		2(35)				2(37)	7(38)	7(39)	12(40)	
Albania		1(41)		1(42)	1(43)		1(44)	1(45)		
Total British		3		2	1	2	10	8	12	
Lost										
Env. Hostilities					1(46)	1(47)	6(48)	2(49)	2(50)	
Ship Aviation		1(51)				1(52)	1(53)	9(54)	1(55)	
Total Lost		1			1	5	7	7	3	
Scuttled							1(56)	5(57)	6(58)	
Sunk							1(59)			
Total	4	5	2	7	12	32	47	82	61	

Basic Source of Information: French Ministry of Marine.

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Op-10/11

EO. 11652, Sec. 3.5) and 5(D) or (5)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, RADS Dtd APR 6 1973

a46n01

May 24, 1941

Section	(1)	21	STRASSBURG		
	(2)	212	PROVENCE (damaged)		
	(3)	213	COMMANDANT TESTE		
	(4)	2A	ALCANTARA	COLBERT	DUPREUX
			FOCH		
	(5)	2B	LA GAYSSONNIERE	JEAN DE VIENNE	MARSEILLAISE
	(6)	2C	ARLE	CASARD	CHEVALIER PAUL
			CERFAUT	REBAINT	L'INDOCTABLE
			LEON	LENY	PANTIERE
			SPARTU	TIGRE	VAUBAN
			VAUCHELAN	VAUTOR	VERDUN
			VOLTA	MOGADOR (damaged)	
	(7)	2D	EXISTE	CASQUE	LOUGHEUX
			LANSQUERET	LA DAYONNAISE	LA FOURBIVANTE
			LE HARDI	MAMMUK	TOULON
			EMILIONNAIR	TROMBE	TYPHON
			L'ADROIT (ex EPHE)	FOUDROYANT (ex PLURIST)	
			EMSON (ex ALIBUSTIER)	SIROCO (ex COCHERE)	
	(8)	2E	ACHIRON	ACHIRON	AMAZON
			APHETRITE	ARCO	ARCEUTE
			BEVEZIER	DIAMANT	ERENNE
			GALATHE	GLORIEUX	HENRI FOURCARE
			HEROS	LE CREMAURE	LE CONQUERANT
			LE REDOUTABLE	LE TONNANT	MATAIS
			PASCAL	PERLE	SIRENE
			SMILLE		
	(9)	2F	ALLETTE	BATAILLUSE	BEAUTEPS-BEAUFRI
		2F	CHALIS	CHANOIS	COMTE. RIVIERE
			CHRISUSE	DEDEIRNAUSE	D'IBERVILLE
			DUCORDIEN	ELAN	ENGAGEMENTE
			IMPETUEUSE	LESGIGNY	LUCONNE
			TAPAGUSE		
North Africa	(10)	2B	DUNKERQUE (Damaged) at Oren.		
	(11)	2C	ALBATROS	MILAN	
	(12)	2D	EMBARDE	BOUDELANS	ITONTEUR
			ITHICENIE	LA PALAIS	LE MARS
			FOURONS		

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.3, and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

-2-

a46n02

0-17-4-5
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 14, 1941

North Africa
 (cont.)

(19) SS	ARIANE	GALLIAN	CALYPSO
	CERES	DIANE	DIANE
	EURDICE	PARSOUTH	NAUTILUS
	REQUE	SAPHIR	SOUFFLER
	TURQUOISE		

Casablanca

(14) BE	JEAN BARE (77% completed)		
(15) GL	GLOIRE	PRIMAUGUET	
(16) DL	EPERVIER	LE MALIN	
(17) BD	ALCORN	BRESTOIS	BOULONNAIS
	SIMOUN	TEMPETE	
(18) SS	ANTHOPE	ARTEUSE	CERES
	IRIS	MEUSE	PALLAS
	PSYCHE	ORPHE	THETIS
	VENUS		

(19) PG FR	COMDT. BORY	GRACIEUSE	GAZELLE
---------------	-------------	-----------	---------

Morocco

(20) BD	RICHELIEU (damaged)		
(21) GL	GEORGES LEYGURE	MONTCAIS	
(22) DL	LE FANTASQUE	LE TERRIBLE	
(23) SS	ARCHIMEDE	ATALANTE	AURORE
	CASABLANCA	OREADE	SIDI-FERUCH
	SULTANE	VESTALE	
(24) PG FR	BOUDEUSE	BOUGAINVILLE	COMDT. DELAGE
	D'ENTRECASTEAUX	LA SURPRISE	

Madagascar

(25) SS	ESPOIR	VENGEUR
---------	--------	---------

West Indies

(26) CV	BEACH at Martinique
(27) CL	EMILE BERTIN at Martinique
	JEANNE D'AR at Guadeloupe

(28) ES	VILLE D'ES at Martinique
---------	--------------------------

(29) FOL	BARLEUR at Martinique
----------	-----------------------

Indochina

(30) CL	LANOTTE PICQUET
(31) ES	KONGE
	PEGASE

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(F) or (E)

OSD letter, July 1, 1962

By RT, NAME D. APR 6 1973

0-1-1-1-1
~~SECRET~~

May 14, 1941

<u>Yedochira. (Cont)</u>	(32)	PG	AMIRAL CHARNIER	ARGES	AVALANCHE
		PR	DAISY	COMET. BOURDAYS	HERNE
			BOUDART-DE-LAGEEE	VIGILANTE	MYTHO
			FRANCIS-GANNIER	TOURANE	TANURE
			DUMONT D'URVILLE		

Unaccounted
for (*)

(33)	DL	GUEPARD	VALMY	
(34)	SS	DAUPHIN	ESPADON	PHOCUE
(35)	PG	ANEMITE	LA GRANDIERE	

(*) Departure from Beirut announced April 23, 1941.
 Destination unknown.

British Control
England

(36)	CMB	COURBET at Portsmouth.		
		PARIS at Plymouth.		
(37)	DL	LEOPARD at Portsmouth	Le Triomphant at Plymouth.	
(38)	DD	FLORE at Portsmouth.	BOUCHIER at Plymouth.	
		LA CORDELIERE "	MISTRAL " "	
		LA MEFOMENE "	OURAGON " "	
		L'INCOMPRISE "		
(39)	SS	MINERVE at Plymouth.	LA GNEOLE at Swansea	
		JUNCH " "	ONDINE at Southampton	
		SURCOUF " "	ORION " "	
			RUBIS Unknown	
(40)	PG	AMIENS	ARRAS	COMET. DOMIN
	PR	COMET. DUROC	COUCY	CHEVRUIL
		EPINAL	LA MOQUEUSE	LA CONQUERAN
		LA CAPRICIEUSE	SAVORCHAN DE DRAZZA	
		SUIPPE		

Alexandria

(41)	CMB	LORRAINE		
(42)	CA	DUQUESNE	SUPREN	TOURVILLE
(43)	CL	DUGUAY-THOUIN		
(44)	DD	BASQUE	FORSIN	LE FORTUNE
(45)	SS	PROTEE		

Lost (during
hostilities)

(46)	CL	PLUTON (LA TOUR D'AUVERGNE)		
(47)	DL	MAILLE BREZE	BISON (*)	JAGUAR
		CHACAL		

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

(*) This name has been given to DD ELNEUSIER.

Op-16-1-3
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 14, 1941

Lost (during hostilities)
 (cont.)

(48)	ED	L'ADROIT (*) FOURNASQUE	FOUDROYANT (**) ORAGE	SIRIUSCO (**) LA FAMILLEUSE
	(*)	This name has been given to ED EPHE		
	(**)	" " " " " "	" " " "	ED PLEUNET
	(***)	" " " " " "	" " " "	ED CONSAIRE

(49)	SS	MORSE	DORIS
(50)	PG	ANCHE	VAUCUDIS

Lost (since Armistice)

(51)	GE	PRESTAGNE	
(52)	DL	L'AUDACIEUX	
(53)	PD	BRANLE-PAS (Operating with British)	
(54)	SS	AJAX SEAN	PERSÉE MARVAL (Operating with British)
(55)	PG	RIGAUD DE GENOUILLY	

Scuttled (*)

(56)	ED	CYCLONE		
(57)	SS	ACHILLE PASTEUR	ACOSTA ROLLAND-MORILLON	QUESSANT
(58)	PG	ANCHE ENSEIGNE-HENRY	AUDACIEUSE ETOURDI	DU COUDIC YSER

(*) It is reported that all submarines scuttled by the French prior to German occupation will be reconditioned by the Germans.

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 Op-33
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 USMC
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REUNITED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(D) and 5(D) or (E)
 OGD MEX, May 3, 1972
 By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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a46n05

Op-16-1-3
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 14, 1941

Lost (during hostilities)
 (cont.)

(48)	ED	L'ADROIT (*) FOURNASQUE	FOUDROYANT (**) ORAGE	SIRIUSCO (**) LA FAMILLEUSE
	(*)	This name has been given to ED EPHE		
	(**)	" " " " " "	" " " "	ED PLEUNET
	(***)	" " " " " "	" " " "	ED CONSAIRE

(49)	SS	MORSE	DORIS
(50)	PG	ANCHE	VAUCUDIS

Lost (since Armistice)

(51)	GEF	PRESTAGNE						
(52)	DL	L'AUDACIEUX						
(53)	PD	BRANLE-PAS (Operating with British)						
(54)	SS	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>AJAX</td> <td>PERSÉE</td> <td>PONCELET</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SEAX</td> <td>NARVAL (Operating with British)</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	AJAX	PERSÉE	PONCELET	SEAX	NARVAL (Operating with British)	
AJAX	PERSÉE	PONCELET						
SEAX	NARVAL (Operating with British)							

(55) PG RIGAUD DE GENOUILLY

Scuttled (*)

(56)	ED	CYCLONE						
(57)	SS	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>ACHILLE</td> <td>ACOSTA</td> <td>QUESSANT</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PASTEUR</td> <td>ROLLAND-MORILLON</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	ACHILLE	ACOSTA	QUESSANT	PASTEUR	ROLLAND-MORILLON	
ACHILLE	ACOSTA	QUESSANT						
PASTEUR	ROLLAND-MORILLON							
(58)	PG	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>ANCHE</td> <td>AUDACIEUSE</td> <td>DU COUDIC</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ENSEIGNE-HENRY</td> <td>ETOURDI</td> <td>YSER</td> </tr> </table>	ANCHE	AUDACIEUSE	DU COUDIC	ENSEIGNE-HENRY	ETOURDI	YSER
ANCHE	AUDACIEUSE	DU COUDIC						
ENSEIGNE-HENRY	ETOURDI	YSER						

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 OSD MEX, May 3, 1972
 By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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a46n05

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-10-Dy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

So far as I know only two people in the Navy Department know about this, my Aide and myself, and I am enjoining strict secrecy.

Whether or not the Skipper did the right thing I admire his decision and guts and feel like patting him on the back. It takes no stretch of the imagination to consider that he was acting in pure self-defense against an oncoming enemy.

It is my understanding that German submarines have instructions to "beat it" just as fast as they can if they see a man-o-war coming over the horizon; their mission being only to attack shipping.

Betty.

PSF
Safe
Navy

a46001

CinC Lant File
A2/(0039)

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
U. S. S. AUGUSTA, (Flagship)

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Newport, Rhode Island,
May 17, 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
To : Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Events in connection rescue survivors S.S.
SALEIER (Dutch).

1. Forwarded for information and for consideration
as to:

(a) possible repercussions upon the arrival
home of the German submarine involved and,

(b) possible action by German submarines
which encounter United States Naval vessels at
sea in future.

2. I feel obliged to state that this incident was
reported to me only this forenoon (at about 0830 E.S.T.).
The subject report has since been made up and acted on and
is going forward by air in the hands of Rear Admiral Bristol
(Commander Support Force) this afternoon in order that know-
ledge of the incident may be known to the Chief of Naval
Operations this same day.

E. J. King
E. J. KING

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DDP DIA 5222.9 (9/27/58)

a46002

Serials

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET

DD13/111-1

SUPPORT FORCE

U. S. S. PRAIRIE, Flagship

Newport, Rhode Island,
May 17, 1941.

From: Commander Destroyer Division THIRTEEN.
To: Commander Support Force.
Subject: Events in connection rescue survivors S.S. SALEIER(Dutch).

1. On Thursday, 10 April at about 1930, zone plus three, U.S.S. NIBLACK intercepted S.O.S. from S.S. SALEIER stating that she had been torpedoed in Lat. 58-05N Long 30-46W and was sinking rapidly. Decision was made to proceed to her assistance and accordingly at 2024 NIBLACK went ahead at 28 knots on course 063°.

2. At 0750, 11 April three small boats were sighted and after circling them on a sound search the NIBLACK at 0826 lay to to receive survivors on board. The entire crew of the SALEIER of nine officers and 51 men were taken aboard.

3. In the meantime sound searching was continued and at 0840 as the last of the survivors were coming aboard sound contact was reported bearing 75° true distant 1400 yards. This contact was about two points abaft the starboard beam and if it were a submarine, it was rapidly approaching a position for attack. With safety of ship, crew, and survivors in mind, decision was made to attack instantly as the most effective method to escape damage. Accordingly, on my orders the ship went ahead as soon as possible at full speed and turned to an intercepting course. When it was estimated the ship should be over the submarine (if one were present) three depth charges were dropped at ten second intervals, and then the ship proceeded to clear the area at 28 knots on course North without further investigation.

4. All survivors of the SALEIER were turned over to the British authorities at Reykjavik on arrival on 12 April.

D. L. Ryan
D. L. Ryan

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100 648 5200.9 (9/27/58)

246003

Serial: L11-1(0031)

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
SUPPORT FORCE
U. S. S. PRAIRIE, Flagship

~~SECRET~~

Newport, R.I.,
May 17, 1941.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CDD13 Secret ltr file
DD13/L11-1 dated 17
May, 1941.

From: Commander Support Force, ATLANTIC FLEET.
To : Commander in Chief, ATLANTIC FLEET.
Subject: Events in connection rescue survivors S.S. SALEIER(Dutch)

1. Forwarded.

2. The report of this incident was first made to Comm ander Support Force by Commander Ryan in person on the return of the NIBLACK to Newport, R.I. Commander Support Force took into consideration two pertinent factors; first, the elapsed time from 11 April to the date the report was made, 28 April, and, second that the matter was an accomplished fact. My decision at that time was that best interest would be served by holding the information in my own hands and making no further report to higher authority. Recently there is evidence that some information regarding this incident has leaked out. It is therefore now considered that an official report of the matter must be forwarded.



A. L. Bristol, Jr.

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DDO DIA 5200.9 (9/27/58)

a46004

file
part

June 23, 1941

Sir,

I am instructed by the Admiralty to put forward the following requests from the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty for the provision of Convoy Escort Vessels, Minesweepers, Submarines and Tugs.

A. Convoy Escort Vessels.

2. The extension of the field of enemy submarine activity has increased our need for ships to protect our convoys.

3. The need can be met most economically by the Convoy Escort Vessel of about 1,500 tons. It is estimated that two or three Convoy Escorts can be built in the place of one Destroyer. On the other hand our experience of vessels of less than 1,500 tons proves that they are not able to fulfil their function in the Atlantic and we deprecate the expenditure of building effort on smaller vessels for this purpose.

4. The capacity of U. K. and Canada is estimated to be eight Convoy Escorts per month. This rate of increase does not meet our expanding requirements and we are seriously concerned to provide against the possibility of damage to our productive capacity by enemy action.

5. It is understood that U.S.A. have designed a Convoy Escort Vessel of about 1,500 tons. If production of such a ship is a reasonably early prospect, building and release of some of them would be a great contribution towards solving our convoy problems. In the interim, transfer of the 7 Coastguard Cutters of the George W. Campbell type would be of utmost value.

6. As a longer term policy it is requested that consideration may be given to the building of 100 Convoy Escort Vessels of about 1,500 tons for transfer to the British Navy at rate of about 10 per month. The exact number and rate to be fixed so that Merchant Shipbuilding may not be interfered with.

B. Minesweepers.

7. Anxiety is also felt about our present deficiency of large size Minesweepers and possible damage to our productive capacity for this type. We should be glad to know of the possibility of obtaining 20 vessels such as AM 57 - 81 of 1,070 tons standard displacement.

8. These vessels if supplied could be regarded as taking the place of some of the Trawlers for which requisitions

a46p01

have been lodged.

9. As a longer term policy would it be possible to construct say 40 smaller vessels of about 800 tons?

C. Submarines.

10. War experience has shown the need for Submarines of about 700 to 900 tons to operate in "confined" waters off the enemy's coasts, and owing to the extent of these operations our losses have been heavy.

11. At the same time damage to our yards has resulted in some loss of capacity.

12. Information is therefore requested whether U.S.A. could transfer two Submarines of about this size and build a further 18 ships. Ships complete with armament and spare gear would be required.

D. Tugs.

13. Merchant ship sinkings can often be avoided if Rescue Tugs are available. We have several on service but more are required. For these Ocean-going duties they require to be of about 600 tons displacement, about 157' in length, of 1500 Horse Power, with an endurance of 24 days at 10 knots. 14 of these vessels are required.

14. Commander Sullivan, U.S.N., who has recently returned from the United Kingdom has full details and knows our requirements.


E. Further Action.

15. A requisition has been lodged for the above mentioned Tugs but no other action about the other requirements has yet been taken beyond showing advance copies of telegrams to Admiral Reeves and discussing the situation generally with Admiral Robinson.

16. I need hardly say that I am at your disposal at any time to discuss these requirements and would ask to be informed what further action if any is required to put forward these requests.

I am, Sir,

Yours truly, .



J. W. S. Dorling,
Rear Admiral, R. N.

Colonel Frank Knox
Secretary of the Navy
United States Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

PSP
Safe
Navy

July 14, 1941.

1. I would leave out all reference in written instructions to British convoys and substitute a simple paragraph providing for constant information to the British and Canadian convoy authorities telling them exactly where American, Icelandic or neutral flagships are on the communications line between the United States or Newfoundland and Iceland, in either direction. They should also be simultaneously informed as to what the American Navy escort is of such ships.

2. In place of paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6, I suggest something like the following:

"The President, in his message to the Congress, notified the Congress that:

(a) communications between the United States and U. S. Naval bases on the one side, and Iceland on the other, would be kept open and

(b) that such communications by water would be protected against attack or threat of attack. It is obviously impossible to define "threat of attack" by the presence of a German submarine or surface raider a given number of miles away from a convoyed vessel. It is necessary under the conditions of modern sea warfare to recognize that the words "threat of attack" may extend to reasonably longer distances away from a convoy ship or ships.

It thus seems clear that the very presence of a German submarine or raider on or near the line of communications constitutes threat of attack.

Therefore, the presence of any German submarine or raider should be dealt with by action looking to the elimination of any threat of attack on the line of communications or close to it.

a 46901

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8-26-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With further reference to the submarine attack on Convoy OG-71, the attached chart prepared by the War Plans Division, showing the submarine locations as reported on 22 August, is forwarded as of possible interest to the President.

Respy
J. R. Beardall
JOHN R. BEARDALL
Captain, U. S. N.

a46r01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25 August 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

1. We have already carried out the escort of several Icelandic flagships in each direction.
2. Three U. S. flag tankers are now under escort to Reykjavik.
3. In the preparations to fully execute W.P.L. 51 the one item which has required rather extensive arrangements has been the acquisition of merchant vessels in the necessary number and of proper characteristics to ensure that at least one is fully ready and will positively be in each convoy we escort, eastbound and westbound.
4. Close collaboration has been had with the Maritime Commission to obtain the required vessels which obviously must be under naval control (N.S.&T.S.) as regards sailing dates and routing, and they must be acquired through the Maritime Commission; the first list compiled contained only a very few 10 knot ships, the great majority being rated at only 9 knots; all units of a more recent list appear to have acceptable characteristics and it is expected to have the necessary initial units at Reykjavik by 8 September and to initiate the escort schedule on or about 14 September.
5. Convoy schedule (eastbound), as now presented by Canadian authorities, is as follows: Depart Halifax 27 August - 2 September - 8 September - 14 September, and every 6 days thereafter.

R. M. BRAINARD,
Rear Admiral, USN.

10-76-66

Capt. L. Speck
Jack

Show President-



a46902



STANDARD TIME

DOMINION OF CANADA



UNITED STATES

Aug 19

Aug 20



E Asia

246503

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-12B-9-Br

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Serial 096712 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON



August 25, 1941.

~~SECRET~~ - MEMORANDUM

From: The Director, War Plans Division.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Submarine Locations.

1. On August 19, OG71 (empty convoy en route England to Gibraltar) was attacked twice 500 miles west off Brest. Four ships were struck.
2. On August 22 and 23 this convoy was repeatedly attacked west of Portugal (having been shadowed in the meantime by air and submarines).
3. In the second series of attacks, 6 ships were hit. Total merchant ships sunk: 7 (all about 1500 tons); 1 tug; 2 escort vessels (one was the ex-USS Hopewell).
4. The accuracy of exact submarine locations received from London is doubtful.

R.K. Turner
R.K. TURNER.

a46r04

10-26-66

Carl L. Sprick

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1941.

file
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The President will be interested in the attached tabulation of characteristics of our proposed 2100-ton destroyers set opposite those of the new British destroyer for Fleet use.

Bearing on this comparison, we are now giving consideration to improvements in the AA machine gun battery for the later of these ships. As a first move, we will probably install twin 40 mm (Bofors) guns instead of the 1.1", with probable omission of the .50 caliber guns. 20 mm Oerlikon guns may be added. We also feel that additional depth charges are necessary. With increased AA battery and depth charges, we may have to reduce torpedo tubes to one quintuple or two triple tubes.

Respectfully,

J. R. Beandall
J. R. BEARDALL

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By _____
Date APR 6 1973

a46501

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial _____
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-40, 2-40)

Monograph Index Guide No. _____
(To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide.
Make separate report for each main title.)

From _____ at _____ Date _____, 19__
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference _____
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source _____ Evaluation _____
(As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject _____
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The Director of Naval Construction, Admiralty, has issued a preliminary decision of a "fleet" destroyer based on requirements established by the Naval Staff.

1. The Director of Naval Construction is preparing sketch plans of a destroyer for fleet use to meet requirements established by the Naval Staff. The following are the characteristics of the design:

US DD 445	CLASS	
2110	Displacement (standard) - - - - -	3,220 tons
2890	Displacement (deep) - - - - -	3,660 tons
369	Length - - - - -	364 feet
38.5	Beam - - - - -	39' 6"
3.0-3.5	Draft - - - - -	Not less than 3.0 feet
1.2	Draft - - - - - (light condition) - - - - -	1.2 feet
60,000	Max. endurance (free route clear bottom) at	45,000
5000	20 knots - - - - -	4150 miles
6500	15 knots - - - - -	about 4600 miles
41 APPROX.	standard displacement - - - - -	36 kts.
35	At deep displacement - - - - -	32 kts.

Armament:

- 5-6^{3/8} Two in number, twin 4".7 H.A./L.A. turrets forward of bridge.
MAX. ELEV. Maximum elevation 30 degrees. "Below Deck" (swivel) mountings.
85°
1-QUAD. Four in number, twin Bolers (40 m.m.) aft arranged for four corner defense.
4-450 CAL. Six in number, Corliss (30 m.m.).
2-QUINT. Two in number, quadruple torpedo tube mounts.
10-600# Seventy depth charges.

REUS 8-300*

NONE: Arrangements are to be provided for "two speed" mine sweeping equipment if required.

Distribution By Originator _____

Routing space below for use in O. N. I. Draw circle around unit or units (as shown on the distribution block below) to which this particular copy of this report has been routed for information, for further routing, or for retention. Indicate by check (y) on this copy the complete distribution of other copies of this report. To show routing not provided for on this form, use blank boxes.

Op.-16	Op.-16-1	A-B-C-D-E-F-X								Mono- graph	Archives	Budget	Gen'l. Board	Sec. Nav. Off. Invs.
		F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4, F-5, F-6, F-7, F-8, F-9, F-10, F-11, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-8												
* War College	M. I. D.	H. O.	Nav.	Ord.	Y. & D.	S. & A.	M. & S.	Arm.	U. S. M. C.	C. in C. U. S.	C. in C. Land.	C. in C. Pac.	C. in C. A. F.	
Attaché at		Op.-10/11	Op.-12	Op.-13	Op.-14	Op.-20	Op.-21	Op.-22	Op.-23	Op.-39	Op.-38	Com. Bat. For.	Com. Sec. For.	
F. A. T. U.	State	Com- merce	Maritime Com.	Civil Aero Auth.	F. B. I.	N. R. L.	Naval Dist.				Return to Room No.			

a46502

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Brown Boat in - Navy - Destroyer Design.

2. This design is referred to in the Department of Naval Construction as "Ship No. 1 (High in the) destroyer" which points up the emphasis placed on anti-aircraft armament in the design.

3. A Gunny-armor stabilizer is included in the design.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

a46503

Capt. Braidall - Read and talk over with (),

Safe: No
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

ppuch

2078

IN REPLY ADDRESS NOT THE SIGNER
OF THIS LETTER, BUT

HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.



REFER TO NO.

HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 2, 1941.

Dear Admiral Stark:-

Your letter about my encounter with a submarine went all over creation, and finally came to me last Saturday. I hasten to reply. For exact information I would have to send to the TEXAS, and pore over the records of the event, but I believe that my memory serves well enough for the kind of information you wish.

about July 17 or 18

We were on our sixth day of patrol, going NE, in Latitude 47 N., Long 41 W., approximately, when about 2000, a little before dusk, a submarine periscope was sighted by several lookouts simultaneously, or nearly so. It was sighted on the port quarter bearing about 225 relative, distant less than 1000 yards. We immediately went to torpedo defense quarters, hoisted the emergency signals to the DD's, sent them out to try to track the sub, and attack if she was a menace to us. The TEXAS was on an easterly course, speed increased, and maneuvered to be in advantageous position for any eventuality should such occur to one of the DD's. *The presence of the sub was broadcast, and of War notified in usual manner later.*

How the submarine was able to get into that local is a mystery to me. She had to pass through a cordon of at least DD's, unless she was deeply submerged and rose to ~~periscope~~ periscope depth immediately they had passed over. In all of our past we had submarine alarms (sound) in this approximate locality. I believe that this is caused by the fact that this latitude is about right for a trip from Brest to Newfoundland.

The DD's formed a scouting line and tried to locate the sub, but she got away. This may be accounted for by the increased noises in the water when a vessel increases speed, or maneuvers in any way to disturb the normal situation. I would have put this alarm down as one of the ordinary alarms except for the fact that I saw the periscope myself before he submerged, and it was seen by at least three other officers and several lookouts.

In my opinion this sub was on the way home to Brest with no more torpedoes, because had he had any, the chance was grand one if the Germans wanted to start anything. *After an hour of search I recalled the DD's and we continued our patrol.*

246+01

I hope this sketchy recital gives you the main fact
In order to keep this secret and personal I am typing this myself
so if the script has a lean and hungry look, that is the cause

I thank you sincerely for your good wishes, and
be assured that mine follow you always.

With great respect,

Very sincerely,

C. T. Shubert
Captain U. S. Navy,

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations.

Note:- My new address is Hydrographic Office.

PSF (safe) Nav

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1941

1304

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

I think the President would like to read this latest despatch from Senior Officer Present Afloat, Iceland, dealing with attack on GREER, in connection with preparation of the President's forthcoming speech.

Respectfully,

J. R. Beardall
J. R. BEARDALL

John F. Kennedy Library
UNCLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)

Date-5-24-65

Signature *Carl L. Spicer*

a46u01

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES		MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM	CONTASKGROUP 1.5	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY				URGENT
DATE	6 SEPT. 1941			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM	2130	INFORMATION	CINCLANT	DEFERRED
DECODED BY				URGENT
PARAPHRASED BY	GLUNT			ROUTINE
				DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

152100CR1372

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE

TIME

TEXT IN REFERENCE TO YOUR 042106. SUBMARINE ORIGINALLY SIGHTED ON SURFACE AT 0707 BY BRITISH PLANE. SUBMARINE SUBMERGED AND AIRCRAFT REPORTED POSITION TO GREER. UNDER-WATER CONTACT MADE BY GREER AT 0920. MAINTAINED CONTACT, TRAILED AND BROADCAST WARNING ON 510 KCS. UNTIL 1244. AT 1030 BRITISH ATTACKED SUBMARINE DROPPING 4 - 250 LBS DEPTH CHARGES WITHOUT EFFECT. PLANE RETURNED TO BASE AND GREER CONTINUED TRAILING. 1244 SUBMARINE FIRED TORPEDO AT GREER FROM CLOSE ABOARD FOLLOWED BY TWO MORE TORPEDOES SHORTLY AFTERWARD. AFTER BEING ATTACKED GREER DROPPED 8 DEPTH CHARGES APPARENTLY WITHOUT EFFECT AND LOST CONTACT. GREER MADE CONTACT AGAIN AT 1512 ATTACKED SUBMARINE DROPPING 11 DEPTH CHARGES. GREER DID NOT CONTACT SUBMARINE AGAIN. 1615 I RECALLED OUR FORCES ON REQUEST OF BRITISH WHO IT NOW DEVELOPES DID NOT HAVE COMPLETE INFORMATION. POSITIVE EVIDENCE THAT SUBMARINE FIRED AT LEAST 2 TORPEDOES AND PROBABLY 3 AT GREER. FROM BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE BRITISH PLANES AND DESTROYERS ARE PATROLLING AREA HAVE NOT MADE CONTACT WITH SUBMARINE SINCE GREER DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES LAST TIME. SUBMARINE HAS NOT BEEN SEEN BY GREER HENCE THERE IS NO POSITIVE EVIDENCE THAT SUBMARINE KNEW

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DDO DIR

5800-9 (8/27/88)

MAKE ORIGINAL (8/27/88) DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

45425

Date- 5-24-65

SEE ART 76 (NAV REGS

246u02

MESSAGE EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>COMTASKGROUP 1.5</u>	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION	CINCLANT	PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

SECRET **152110CR0372** UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

NATIONALITY OF SHIP AT WHICH IT WAS FIRING.

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DECLASSIFIED
DDO DIR. 6200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 5-24-65

Signature- *Carl A. Spier*

DISTRIBUTION:

38W.....ACTION
FILE

FORWARD TO ADMIN CINCLANT BY RADIO

RECORD COPIES TO:

12.....13..... 16.....01A.....38...NAVAIDE....

*SHOWN TO OP-38 & OP-20 AT 2200/05

SHOWN TO OP-10 AT 2250
SHOWN TO OP-11 AT 2300

* OP-10A STATED THAT IT WAS NOT
NECESSARY TO DELIVER TO ADM KIL
IN PERSON.

SECRET

SEE ART 76(4)
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

part

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Sup
Navy*

September 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

These despatches, from Naval authorities, having to do with the sinking of the "STEEL SEAFARER," are of possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,

J. R. Beardall
J. R. BEARDALL

a46v01

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

HOME EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES		MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM		FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY				ROUTINE
DATE				DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM		INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY				ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY				DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.
 ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

23
 1. STRAITS LINES SS STEEL SELFARER SUNK AT MIDNIGHT SEPTEMBER
 6-6 BY AERIAL BOMBS 25 MILES SOUTH OF SOMAI PENINSULA. NO LOSS
 OF LIFE, RN CRUISER COVENTRY ON SPOT INVESTIGATING, 24 OF CREW
 ON SHADHAN ISLAND AND 12 AT MURGADA.

DISTRIBUTION:

SHOW TO CPDO.....

SOS.....ACTION

ONO FILE.....

R/O TO 38.....38.....12.....13.....16.....38A.....NAVALIE.....

FILE.....

DELIVERED TO.....BY.....

~~SECRET~~SEE ART 76(4)
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

HOME EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>SPERAVL LONDON</u>	FOR ACTION	CPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>7 SEPT. 1941</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>SIEGLER</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ALLENBORTH</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

271716 CR 2719

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIPS IN RED SEA ARE STEAMING AT NIGHT WITH
NAVIGATION AND OTHER LIGHTS BURNING FIRST SEA LORD HAS BEEN
INFORMED BY CINC MEDITERRANEAN.

DISTRIBUTION:

CNO FILE.....

38S.....ACTION

R.C. TO 38S....16....38....39A....12....13....NAVAIDE....FILE.....

DELIVERED TO.....AT.....BY.....

~~SECRET~~SEE ART 76 (4)
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.
 ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

REFERENCE NY 74948, FOLLOWING RECEIVED BY ADMIRALTY FROM SEN-
 IOR NAVAL OFFICER SUEZ CANAL AREA QUOTE BOAT CONTAINS 12 MEN
 LANDED MURGRADA REPORT ALL CREW SAVED UNQUOTE

DISTRIBUTION?

END FILE

13 ACTION

R.C. TO 38...16...38...12...385...NAVAIDE

FILE

SHOWN TO OPED AT 2245/7 BY CMLING

DELIVERED TO...AT...BY...

~~SECRET~~SEE ART 76 (4)
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

a46v04

PSF
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL STARK

I wholly approve the Re-
definition of Western Atlantic
Area as approved by you and
Admiral King.

F. D. R.

a46w01

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-10-10D
Serial 0103312

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1941.

~~SECRET~~

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59

Signature-
Carl L. Spicer

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Re-definition of Western Atlantic Area.

You may remember at our recent conference you approved the re-definition of the Western Atlantic Area, as shown in green on the attached chart. However, Admiral King feels that this line runs somewhat too close to the southern part of Iceland, and has proposed another line whose western end is somewhat further south. The slanting line coincides approximately with your definition of the European Combat Area.

I can see several advantages in going along with Admiral King in this matter. I did not like to bother you with it, under the present circumstances, and so have myself issued instructions to him, defining the Western Atlantic Area as shown by the vertical green line at longitude 26° West, but turning northeast at latitude 52° North and running along the line shown in blue entitled "Proposed Modification".


This new area should give a better opportunity for appropriate sea routes to Iceland, and the protective operations of naval escorting and covering forces. It is also advisable from an iceberg standpoint.

I would like to get an "Okay, F.D.R.", but, of course, if you do not approve, we can cancel instructions by dispatch and adhere to the green line.

I felt so sure that the orders issued would meet your approval, and in the interest of getting them out as soon as possible, I went ahead.

Betty.

a46w02



Box

PSF

Safe: Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

September 17, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A despatch has been received from Commander Task Group 15 (Army Convoy) reporting the following contacts:

At 2110, GCT, 14 September, in latitude 59-02 N., longitude 25-25 W., visibility about 500 yards, TRUXTON in sound screen encountered submarine on surface, distance 300 yards on port bow, on opposite course. Submarine dived and TRUXTON attacked with depth charges, results uncertain.

Other contacts (sound) by screening destroyers of same convoy:

H. P. JONES	1430, Sept. 10th	Lat. 49-35 Long. 49-50
BAINBRIDGE	1904, Sept. 11th	Lat. 51-15 Long. 43-55
TRUXTON and MacLEISH	1815, Sept. 12th	Lat. 52-23 Long. 37-30
BENSON and H. P. JONES	1100, Sept. 14th	Lat. 57-12 Long. 25-15

Contacts developed and depth charges dropped, but results unknown.

Respectfully,

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

1941 O-35017 (2/27/38)

1941 O-35017 (2/27/38)

J. R. BEARDALL

Date - 10-26-66

Signature - Carl L. Spicer

a46x01

P3F SAME
NAVY
port.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~

September 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached digest of lengthy secret
despatches from the Naval Attache, Istanbul,
will be of general interest to the President.

Respectfully,


J. R. BEARDALL

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DECLASSIFIED

11/12/71 0445, CPNAVINST
5510.1C By CP 09891C
Date 11/12/71

Date- 11/12/71

Signature- RHP

a46y01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In reply refer to No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1941

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DECLASSIFIED

Art. 0446, CINAVINST
5510.1C BY CP 0909
DATE 11/10/71
Date- 11/10/71

Signature- RHP

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NAVAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT

The following memorandum is based on information received from the American Naval Attache in Istanbul. The source is an informant believed by the Naval Attache to be reliable.

The Office of Naval Intelligence gives the information a reliability rating varying from "A" to "B". An explanation of this rating is as follows:

Rating "A" - The information is considered reliable in substance and proceeding from a reliable source. Subject to other information received from other reliable sources either in affirmation or in negation, weight and credence in general should be given to it.

Rating "B" - Information is considered reasonable, but is not confirmed. Information of this type may proceed from a mere logical deduction from the general or specific circumstances attending and influencing general or specific situations.

The memorandum will for purposes of coherence be divided into separate subjects, but attention is called to the fact that all the subjects are interrelated, and each contributes toward the general conclusion that may be reached.

I. Factional strife in Germany: possible peace moves.

The Reichswehr command is today (September 15th) divided into two factions, the first - Extremist, the second - Conservative. The Extremists are strong adherents of Hitler, and include such personalities as Generals Keitel and Reichenau, and a dozen or so less important high ranking officers. The conservative group includes such men as Generals Witzleben, Brauchitsch, Runsted, and Blaskowitz. In addition to these men Marshal Goering is now inclining toward the Conservative group, which is the real reason for his present alienation from Hitler. He and other members of the Conservative faction are under close surveillance of the Gestapo.

The Conservatives aim at final liquidation of the Nazi party at the earliest opportunity, and through loyal non-commissioned officers are spreading disrepute of Nazi leaders among the soldiers. The argument of the Conservatives when approaching the soldiery is to point

a 46y 02

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

out the damage being done to German world prestige and German army reputation by Nazi tactics, and this argument has had telling effect.

The Conservative group is not in favor of embarking on such a costly venture as the invasion of Britain. They feel that even if this venture proved successful, it would greatly weaken Germany at a time when America grows progressively stronger. However, even the Conservatives will risk an invasion if unable to negotiate a satisfactory peace. They do not any longer believe in the possibility of a German dictated peace, but hope for American intervention in arriving at a negotiated peace. They consider that even with America's help, Great Britain would be unable to successfully invade Europe since the German army reserve in men and equipment is sufficient to enable Germany to carry on for a long time independently of supplies obtained in Russia. The Army claims to have a reserve of armament, munitions, and equipment sufficient to last years, and stored all over Europe, particularly in France, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.

The liquidation of the Nazi party is held by the Conservatives to be a primary essential to a successful peace move, but they realize that it could be effected only by a coup which would be accompanied by serious internal disorders and bloodshed. The Conservatives hesitate to take such a step while major military operations are still under way, since the success of these operations would then be prejudiced. If there was some assurance that the British would meet them half way, and not seek dismemberment and eternal ruination of Germany, the coup might be attempted.

A discussion was recently held in Munster under the leadership of Colonel Schmidt and Major Gerken of the Sixth Army Staff, with respect to possible peace terms. In general these terms might be broadly outlined as follows:

1. The British Empire would be left intact.
2. The Germans would be given a free hand in Russia to occupy up to the Ural Mountains for twenty-five years.
3. A free occupation of the protectorates of Poland and Czechoslovakia.
4. Germany would free Holland, Belgium, and Norway, but would retain Luxemburg, and Alsace Lorraine.
5. France would be freed, but with the condition that the Germans have unlimited freedom of enterprise and movement of German Nationals in French Colonies.
6. Croatia, some Greek Islands, and part of Greece near Albania to go to Italy.
7. Germany would claim no colonies, but would want large concessions in East Indies products for which she now has contracts with the Dutch

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Page Three

puppet Government.

8. Germany would not back Japan in any conquest of the Dutch East Indies.

The Naval Attache's informant states that the Conservative group would like to send, preferably to Istanbul, one of their principals, to meet a person having the confidence of the President of the United States, in order to discuss peace terms, and obtain the latter's views as to a just peace.

II. Possibilities of invasion of England.

The Brauchitsch (Conservative) group have no enthusiasm for invasion, but will ultimately try it unless some kind of favorable negotiated peace can be arranged.

The German general staff admits they are seven weeks behind schedule in the Russian campaign, and they are disappointed with the slow progress and the heavy losses they have suffered. This may result in postponing any contemplated plans for invasion of England for six months or longer. The staff realizes that such an invasion would entail the sacrifice of huge quantities of men and material and would leave Germany so weakened as to make it impossible to carry out further military operations.

The General Staff, while not very confident of accomplishing a successful invasion of Britain, has nevertheless made detailed preparation for such a venture. More than 3,000 Heinkel 111's with several thousand towing gliders with specially trained pilots are being held in reserve. There are also many Junkers transports of which 500 are now in daily operation bringing back seriously wounded from the Russian front.

The High Command realizes invasion of Britain must be done chiefly from the air, especially since motor speed boats, of which much was expected, have proved worthless in rough weather. If an invasion is attempted 80% of the troop carrying and other activity will be in the air, and the Germans will throw in everything they have. For this reason, an invasion attempt is held highly improbable, until three months or more after destruction of Russian first line forces and the establishment of a front line east of Moscow and Kiev.

Hitler wanted to undertake an invasion of England soon after the end of the Greek campaign, but the high command was unwilling to embark on such a venture with the potential threat of Russia at their backs and their dependence on that country for supplies.

III. German Morale.

The heavy bombing by the British during the last two months has had a decided effect upon the German civilian morale, especially at Munster,

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Page Four

Aachen, Bremen, Hamburg and Kiel. The damage to date in Berlin has been slight, however. Should this bombing by the English continue to increase, the inhabitants in some of the above enumerated cities may not be able to stand it much longer, and will decamp.

It is obvious that German workmen, to say nothing of indentured workmen, will not continue indefinitely to produce under the present high pressure conditions. This fact is evidenced by the noisy protest meetings held in numerous factories last month, in addition to serious revolt at the Junkers works at Dessau and Leipzig, and at the shipyards in Hamburg and Bremen. Such grumblings cannot be curtailed without placing a substantial percentage of available workmen in prison camps, which would result in a serious stoppage of production. Even though serious consequences might follow if such a step were taken, it would not mean that German morale would crack. The German rulers try to avoid shooting those who interfere with the production schedule, but would not hesitate to do so if they felt conditions warranted such steps.

IV. Intelligence information on Italy. (Source - Adelchi Serena)

Italian people no longer believe in German victory, but cannot get out of German grip. The morale is low and there is a longing for peace, but nevertheless there have been no strikes or sabotage in factories.

Hitler asked for ten more Italian divisions for Russia, but Il Duce refused on the grounds that Italian soldiers were not inured to the Russian climate. The Axis is training many Germans and Italians in Sicily, while at the German Colonial School in Rome, there are being trained 2,200 young Germans for colonial police.

Bombardment of Naples toward the end of August hit a big munitions train of 98 cars which all exploded. Missed, however, were two large cruisers and three destroyers in the harbor. These were protected by a smoke screen. The ships mentioned were still there about the tenth of September.

The Italians are working hard on fortification of the Italo-Austrian frontier.

The Italian government no longer believes that Japan can be relied on as an axis partner.

V. Military Intelligence.

Germany has great need of manganese, rubber, cotton, and nickel. Their supply of copper seems to be sufficient for about one year, and they have enough gasoline for the time being.

During the past six months some twenty auxiliary cruisers have been completed and equipped. In part, these cruisers have been converted from large freighters seized from Holland, Belgium, and Norway, and bought from Denmark. Four 18,000 ton cruisers of a new secret type are now under

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construction in Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel and Danzig, but will not be ready for some time. They are reputed to be very fast and effective. Informant is endeavoring to secure more information concerning these ships.

Central Headquarters, air defense set up in Berlin Tiergarten one minute from Zoo station and eighty meters from Charlottenburger Chaussee. It is a large green stone building, resembling a 16th century fortress with four of the largest AA guns ever built, in retractible turrets on the roof. These guns are said to be able to fire up to heights of 12,000 meters. The largest sound locator in Germany is erected in a building close by.

VI. The Russian campaign.

German losses in men and material in the Russian War are far greater than in all previous military operations combined.

Hitler did not desire SS troops used on active fronts but Goering, who has read the writing on the wall for the Nazi party, sent many under fire in Serbia, Greece, Crete and Russia. These units suffered heavy casualties, especially in Russia, around Minsk and Smolensk. One of these SS units did however do effective work at Minsk, and later south of Kiev by slipping through the Russian lines and giving false orders supposedly emanating from a Russian major. These orders caused confusion in the Russian ranks and resulted in heavy losses in men and material. The leader of this unit and the man responsible for the feat was one Captain Donner of SS regiment 17 G (or E?). He was born in St. Petersburg of German parents, is forty-five years old, and of course speaks Russian like a native. He did successful intelligence work in Russia as a member of military delegations before the Russian campaign started.

Two motorized and one infantry division which were stationed at Stahnsdorf and Luchenwald, and especially trained and equipped for African service, were re-equipped and sent to Russian front because of heavy losses there.

The Germans have nearly 70,000 trained pilots and at least 100,000 more are being trained. They have suffered heavy losses in Russia among their most experienced pilots including 18 of their best squadron leaders during the first month.

VII. Coordinated advance on Suez, Malta, and Gibraltar.

Notwithstanding the fact that the German General Staff is not inclined to undertake simultaneous major operations on different fronts renewal of action against the Suez is quite probable within the next two to four weeks. (Date of this information approximately September 17th.)

The Germans claim that they have moved great quantities of material to Libya in the last four months and that they now have, in addition to strong Italian reinforcements, seven mechanized and infantry divisions. The axis

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reinforcements in Libya are reputed to be heavier than the British believe, as only six transports in forty were torpedoed or damaged while enroute from Italy in the three weeks preceeding September 2nd. The British were successful however in damaging five more in the harbors of Tripoli and Benghazi, but not until they had been unloaded.

The Germans feel that unless they can reach Suez, or render it untenable, they cannot hope to stop the enormous supply of men and materials for that area, and eventually for Russia.

Hitler and Mussolini have met alone four times recently, and in these meetings decided upon taking stronger action in the Mediterranean in general, and specifically to attack Malta and Gibraltar. The source of this last item is the cousin of Signor Serena, the chief adviser of Mussolini, and the Secretary of the Fascist party. (A position formerly held by Starace).

The British should be on the alert for a new thrust from General Rommel aimed at the Suez defenses, coupled with a simultaneous air attack on Alexandria with special air troops, transport planes, and equipment from Greece and Crete. At the same time, there will be a heavy and coordinated drive on Malta and Gibraltar, for which German troops are now being organized in Italy. In this connection, our informant states that German soldiers in civilian clothes are reported filtering through the Spanish frontier. Troops, transport planes, and equipment for the Malta Gibraltar operation are now being assembled in Italy.

End of this memorandum.

Additional information from this informant will be supplied when available.

A. G. Kirk

A. G. Kirk, Captain, USN.,
Director of Naval Intelligence

Copies to
CNO 16-F
MID F-1
Op-16 Fe9

OP-12

a46407

PSF Safe
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1942.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Last night you "wondered" about two items. Here is what information I have been able to get today.

RADAR for Small Craft. You specifically mentioned the possibility of using aircraft RADAR on small surface craft. The Bureau of Ships tells me that to be effective for as much as two miles on a periscope three feet in height above the water, the radar antenna (weight slightly above 100 pounds) must be at least thirty feet above the water. Most small craft, of course, will not have masts which can carry that weight, nor are they susceptible of alteration to permit carrying such top side weight. BuShips states that they are developing radar equipment for all types of vessels in excess of 75' in length, and hope to be in production with same about July 1942.

The nub of the problem seems to be that when the antenna is placed but slightly above the water's surface, the more difficult the problem becomes. Aircraft, medium and large surface craft, use comparatively low frequencies, whereas in small surface ships very high frequencies are necessary.

Cedar Point, Maryland. As I recall it, you said "Piney Point" - and that the activity there was being undertaken by the Bureau of Aeronautics. Aeronautics disclaims knowledge of any activity at Piney Point and the Budget Office (Navy Department) states that there is nothing in the estimates having to do with that place. Aeronautics and the Navy Budget Office think you had in mind Cedar Point. The story of that place follows: Aeronautics wants to establish at Cedar Point (mouth of the Patuxent River) a Flight Test Center. It is intended to concentrate at this station all testing work for Naval sea and land aircraft, which is now done unsatisfactorily at widely scattered points, i.e., Philadelphia, Anacostia, Dahlgren and Norfolk. The advantages of having such a place, according to Aeronautics, are:

- (a) That there will be concentration and better control of testing efforts.
- (b) That test flights will be removed from the densely populated areas where they now take place.
- (c) That there will be better security of tests involving confidential matters.

The initial increment involves some \$3,000,000. The whole project, according to the Plans Division of Aeronautics, will cost about \$8,000,000.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. 7 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB

Very respectfully,

V. L. McCrea
JOHN L. McCREA

a46201

SAFE FILE: NAVY DEPARTMENT: MAR.-SEPT. 1942

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

(SC)P17-2/00
(012900A)/GEM

March 9, 1942

RF
3-11
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[REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

As I told you sometime ago, I have asked nine senior officers in the Navy, in whose judgment I have confidence, to serve for me as an unofficial selection board to select the forty most competent officers in the Navy out of 120 of flag rank. I have just received complete returns from all nine officers who were asked to serve on this unofficial selection board. Applying the rule that five votes out of nine in a selection board constitutes a selection, the returns gave me the names of 38 officers which, including King and Stark, bring the total up to the desired forty. King and Stark were not voted on. They were divided as follows:

Those receiving all nine votes: -

Bristol
Edwards
Hoover
Ingram
Purnell

Those receiving eight out of the nine votes: -

Halsey
Ghormley
Glassford
Giffen
C. M. Cooke
Pownall

Those receiving seven votes: -

Ingersoll
Fletcher
Fitch
Bellinger
Turner
Hustvedt
Mitscher

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5290.9 (8/27/58)

March 9, 1942

Those receiving six votes: -

Leary	Carpender
Russell Willson	W. W. Smith
Brainard	Olendorf
McCain	Griffin
Farber	

Those receiving five votes: -

Wilcox	Kirk
Draemel	Ainsworth
Theobald	Bieri
Jacobs	Badger
Monroe	Callaghan
Lee	

Here we have, then, 38 officers by process of selection *as by* probably as high class a selection board as one could get together, *all* available for sea command. Incidentally, the nine officers who comprised this unofficial selection board were as follows:

Richardson	Yarnell
King	Reeves
Jacobs	Bloch
Stark	
Edwards	
Kalbfus	

All nine of these men have had unexcelled opportunity to know the ranking men of the Navy and are themselves men of sound judgment and utter devotion to the service.

In addition to these 38, I have available the names of others who received less than five votes as additional background material for future guidance. It is interesting to note that the average age of the 38 officers in the above lists is 56.2 years.

I also asked Admiral Jacobs to prepare for me, and he has done so, a list of the best 100 men in his judgment in the Navy below the grade of rear admiral, and I have this list available for reference.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

Frank Knox
Frank Knox

a47a02

PX 71-38 (6)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date ~~APR 3 1973~~

2207

DATE 14 MAR 1972

ALBEMARLE POINT, ALBEMARLE ISLAND, FROM NORTH.

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PX 71-38(32)

B-207 DATE 14 MAR 1942

EASTERN POINT OF PINTA ISLAND, FROM SOUTH.

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
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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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PX71-38(33)

252297	DATE 14 MAR 1973
SUBJECT BINDLOE ISLAND, FROM NORTH	
U.S. AIR FORCE PHOTOGRAPH	
BY ORDER OF THE	

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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PX 71-38(34)

237 DATE 14 MAR 1942

NORTHERN POINT OF BINDLOE ISLAND

RECEIVED AND REACTION
TO THE GALLI LONE.

PHOTOGRAPH
OF THE
ORDER OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


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OSD letter, May 2 1972 APR 6 1973

By RT, NARS Date

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Pe 78-38(35)

132231 DATE 14 MAR 1942
SUBJECT Tower Island & Darwin Bay, Galapagos.
U. S. AIR FORCE PHOTOGRAPH
BY ORDER OF THE
UNITED STATES.

CONFIDENTIAL


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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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PL 7-36(36)

738217 DATE 1 MAR 1962

TOWER ISLAND, AND DARWIN BAY, FROM SOUTH

STATION
PHOTOGRAPH
OF THE

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
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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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PX 71-38 (37)

1247	DATE 14 MAR 1942
TOWER ISLAND AND DARWIN BAY, FROM WEST	
OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH	
BY ORDER OF THE	

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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PX 71-38(38)

2277-14 MAR 1942
NORTH SIDE OF TOWER ISLAND, AND DARWIN BAY

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CSD letter, May 3, 1972

E. RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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[PSF: Safe, Navy]

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In accordance with your memorandum of March 16, Secretary Stimson and I conferred this morning on the matter of the use of aerial torpedoes in the southwest Pacific.

The conference was attended by Admiral King and Admiral Towers and myself on behalf of the Navy, and Secretary Stimson, General Marshall and General Arnold on behalf of the Army. A very satisfactory arrangement was completed under which the torpedoes are made immediately available to the Army and the necessary number of Navy fliers to use the torpedoes who are now in Australia, without planes, are ordered to report to the Army to carry out the mission. This very satisfactory arrangement brings together both the planes to carry the torpedoes, the torpedoes themselves and provides the pilots who are trained in the use of torpedoes, to fire them.

I understand the necessary orders are going out at once to carry out this agreement.

Frank Knox

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

a47a101

page 1 *Safeg: navy*
Blanchy

DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE,
Coastal Information Section,
March 17, 1942.

REPORTED CONTACTS - 5ND

- 1.) "LAMMUT" reported hit submarine with 4" shell on conning tower at position 3723 N. - 7518 W. (11 fathoms), February 2, 1942.
- 2.) Submarine believed destroyed, (unknown source), at 1820 Zed, February 5, 1942, position 3812 N. - 7345 W. (63 fathoms).
- 3.) Submarine believed destroyed, (source unknown), at 3540 N. - 7415 W., February 6, 1942. (1500 fathoms)
- 4.) Sub believed contacted, (source unknown), at 0600 Zed, February 10, 1942, 3417 N. - 7635 W. (16 fathoms)
- 5.) Coast Guard Cutter "DIONE" apparently contacted submarine at 2125 Zed, February 12, 1942. 3520 N. - 7506 W. (13 fathoms)
- 6.) Submarine contacted by U.S. S. "STANSBURY" at 2050 Zed, February 13, 1942. Depth bombs dropped. Result unknown. Position 3703 N. - 7458 W. (23 fathoms).
- 7.) Navy Patrol Plane sighted submarine 17 miles East of Diamond Shoals, (3510 N. - 7503 W.) Dropped bombs (110 fathoms). February 14, 1942.
- 8.) Submarine contacted by U.S.S. "ALLEGHENY" at 2214 Zed, February 15, 1942, position 3758 N. - 7400 W. (80 fathoms)
- 9.) From U.S.S. "DALLAS" - Sound contact at 1815 Zed, February 27, 1942. 3803 N. - 7412 W. (25 fathoms).
 Later, (3/1/42), from "DALLAS":-
 "Continuous sound contact. Dropped 46 depth charges. Contact has not moved since 1500. Heavy oil slick spots, some debris visible and increasing with each attack".
- 10.) Sound contact by U.S.S. "DUPONT" at 2204 Zed, March 14, 1942, position 3616 N. - 7511 W. (17 fathoms) Result unknown.

a47aj01

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PSF, Safe, NAVY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

To read and return for secret
files.

F.D.R.

THIS HAS BEEN READ BY H.R. HOPKINS

a47ak01

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

HH
To read & return
for secret files

~~SECRET~~

March 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Unity of Command in Sea Frontiers.

References: (a) Secretary Ickes' letter of March 23d.
(b) Your memo of March 24th.

1. The question of unity of command as to the defense commands (Army), coastal frontiers, and sea frontiers (Navy) is complex - but - as an integral part of the solution the attached joint (Army-Navy) despatch has been sent this day in the name of General Marshall and myself.

E. J. King
E. J. KING

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

a47ak02

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

MARCH 25, 1942

JOINT DESPATCH

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY
COMINCH

TO : COM EASTERN, GULF, WESTERN, NORTHWESTERN SEA FRONTIER
COM NORTHEAST, SOUTHERN, WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND

PENDING THE REACHING OF AGREEMENTS AS TO THE TERMS UNDER WHICH UNITY OF COMMAND WILL BE EXERCISED AS TO DEFENSE COMMANDS COASTAL FRONTIERS AND SEA FRONTIERS AND AS AN INTEGRAL PART THEREOF UNITY OF COMMAND AS SET FORTH IN PARA NINE BAKER PAREN TWO PAREN AND PARA TEN OF JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND NAVY NINETEEN THIRTYFIVE IS HEREBY VESTED IN SEA FRONTIER COMMANDERS OVER ALL NAVAL FORCES DULY ALLOCATED THERETO AND OVER ALL ARMY AIR UNITS ALLOCATED BY DEFENSE COMMANDERS FOR OPERATIONS OVER THE SEA FOR THE PROTECTION OF SHIPPING AND FOR ANTISUBMARINE AND OTHER OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY SEABORNE ACTIVITIES PARA DEFENSE COMMANDERS WILL ALLOCATE ARMY AIR UNITS ON FULL TIME BASIS BUT MAY ROTATE THEM IN NOT LESS THAN TWO WEEK PERIODS AS REQUISITE FOR ESSENTIAL TRAINING

E. J. KING

G. C. MARSHALL

a47ak03

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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REF ID: A5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- Carl J. Spicer

Page 19

N.B.S.(745)
B-6

COMBATANT VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY
REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF JUNE 1, 1952

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
			Master	Type		June 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
BATTLESHIPS BB59 BB60 BB61 BB62 BB63	MASSACHUSETTS	Beth. Fore River	A-1-a	2	N0d1099	Del'd & Comm'd.	5/12/42								NYd Boston	NYd Boston	BB59
	ALABAMA	Norfolk	A-1-a	4	P.O. 172	85.8	4.5	2/1/40	2/16/42	4/1/39	34	8/1/43	10/1/43	12/1/42	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	BB60
	IOWA	New York	A-1-a	15	P.O. 208	59.5	5.7	6/27/40		7/1/39	33	11/1/43	11/1/43	4/1/43		NYd New York	BB61
	NEW JERSEY	Philadelphia	A-1-a	16	P.O. 209	45.5	5.5	9/16/40		7/1/39	33-1/2	5/1/44	5/1/44	7/1/43		NYd Phila.	BB62
	MISSOURI	New York	A-1-a	1539	P.O. 223	15.1	0.7	1/6/41		6/12/40	52-5/6	6/12/44	11/1/44	6/1/45		NYd New York	BB63
	WISCONSIN	Philadelphia	A-1-b	1540a	P.O. 224	16.2	3.3	1/25/41		6/12/40	43-1/5	6/12/40	6/12/45	9/1/44		NYd Phila.	BB64
BB65 BB66 BB67 BB68	ILLINOIS	Philadelphia	A-1-1	1559a	P.O. 319	4.0	0.2			9/9/40	34	5/1/46	5/1/46	10/1/45		NYd Phila.	BB65
	KENTUCKY	Norfolk	A-1-b	1542	P.O. 320	9.1	2.5	3/7/42		9/9/40	32-4/5	5/1/45	5/1/45	12/1/44		NYd Norfolk	BB66
	MONTANA & OHIO	Philadelphia			P.O. 321					9/9/40							BB67
		Philadelphia			P.O. 322					9/9/40							BB68
	MAINE & NEW HAMPSHIRE & LOUISIANA	New York			P.O. 323					9/9/40							BB69
		New York			P.O. 324					9/9/40							BB70
BB71		Norfolk			P.O. 325					9/9/40							BB71
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS CV9 CV10 CV11 CV12 CV13	ESSEX	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-a	6	N0d1442	42.6	5.5	4/28/41		7/3/40	20	4/15/44	1/15/44	12/31/42	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CV9
	RON HOMME RICHARD	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-a	8	N0d1442	30.8	4.1	12/1/41		7/3/40	15	9/15/44	4/15/44	2/28/43	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CV10
	INTREPID	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-a	10	N0d1442	18.3	3.1	12/1/41		7/3/40	17	2/15/45	7/15/44	4/30/43	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CV11
	KEARSARGE	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-a	11	N0d1490	9.4	1.8	4/13/42		9/9/40	17-3/5	7/15/45	10/15/44	9/30/43	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CV12
	FRANKLIN	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-a	13	N0d1532	3.8	0.7			9/9/40	17-3/5	12/15/45	6/1/45	12/31/43	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CV13
CV14 CV15 CV16 CV17 CV18	HANCOCK	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-b	1468	N0d1532	3.4	0.5			9/9/40	16-1/2	4/15/46	9/1/45	2/23/44	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CV14
	HANDOLPH	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-b	1503	N0d1532	3.1	0.6			9/9/40	17-1/4	8/15/46	12/1/45	4/30/44	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CV15
	CANOT	Beth. Fore River	A-1-a	7	N0d1491	34.5	6.6	7/15/41		9/9/40	18-1/2	5/15/44	2/15/44	1/31/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	CV16
	BUNKER HILL	Beth. Fore River	A-1-a	9	N0d1491	31.2	5.9	9/15/41		9/9/40	18-1/2	8/15/44	6/15/44	3/31/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	CV17
	ONTARIO	Beth. Fore River	A-1-a	12	N0d1491	7.6	2.6	3/18/42		9/9/40	20-2/5	2/15/46	11/1/45	11/30/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	CV18
CV19 CV20 CV21 CV22 CV23	TICONDEROGA	Beth. Fore River	A-1-b	14	N0d1491	7.0	2.3			9/9/40	20-1/2	4/15/46	12/31/45	5/31/44	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	CV19
	BENNINGTON	New York	A-1-1	1541	P.O. 1162					12/15/41	26	12/1/44	9/1/45	5/1/45	NYd New York	NYd New York	CV20
	ROKER	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-b	1555a	N0bs81					12/15/41	16-1/2	6/1/45	6/30/44	6/30/44	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CV21
	INDEPENDENCE (c)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-a	5	N0d1437	60.3	3.6	5/1/41		7/1/40	20	12/1/42	3/1/43	12/30/42	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CV22
	TRINCKTON (e)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-a	7a	N0d1437	48.7	3.3	6/2/41		7/1/40	20-2/5	2/1/43	6/1/43	2/15/45	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CV23
CV24 CV25 CV26 CV27 CV28	BELLEAU WOOD (f)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-a	9a	N0d1494	39.9	4.2	8/11/41		9/9/40	19-2/3	4/1/43	8/1/43	4/1/43	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CV24
	COWPENS (m)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-a	10a	N0d1494	34.0	4.5	11/17/41		9/9/40	17-3/5	7/1/45	10/1/43	5/15/43	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CV25
	MANTREY (t)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-a	10b	N0d1494	25.6	4.1	12/29/41		9/9/40	18	4/1/45	12/31/43	7/1/43	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CV26
	CROWN POINT (r)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-a	11a	N0bs470	7.7	4.4	4/11/42		2/5/42(g)	15-2/3	10/20/43	12/9/43	7/31/43	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CV27
	WILMINGTON (u)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-b		N0d1494	20.1	3.8	3/16/42		9/9/40	18	11/1/45	3/1/44	9/15/43	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CV28

(c) Former CL59
(e) Former CL61
(f) Former CL76
& Work Suspended.

(m) Former CL77.
(t) Former CL78.
(r) Former CL79.
(u) Former CL85. Construc-
tion changed from
Federal S.B. & D.D. Co.

(g) Date
of award.

First estimate submitted subsequent
to 11/1/41.
\$ Revised Estimate.

As of June 1, 1942

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Priority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
			Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
CV29 CV30	AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (Cont'd.) BUFFALO (b) NEWARK (d)	A-1-b A-1-b			N0d1494 N0d1494	10.2 9.7	0.8 1.2			12/16/40 12/16/40	18 18	12/30/45 3/ 1/46	10/15/44 12/ 1/44	2/15/44 4/ 1/44			CV29 CV30
CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5 CB6	LARGE CRUISERS ALASKA GUAM HAWAII & PHILIPPINES & PUERTO RICO & SAMOA &	A-1-b A-1-b	1544 1551	1 2	N0d1492 N0d1492 N0d1492 N0d1492 N0d1492 N0d1492	15.1 11.1	4.1 3.4	12/17/41 2/ 2/42		9/ 9/40 9/ 9/40 9/ 9/40 9/ 9/40 9/ 9/40 9/ 9/40	30 30-2/5	4/ 1/45 8/ 1/45	1/ 1/45 3/ 1/45	6/15/44 8/15/44	NYd Phila. NYd Phila.	NYd Phila. NYd Phila.	CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5 CB6
CA68 CA69 CA70 CA71 CA72	HEAVY CRUISERS BALTIMORE BOSTON PITTSBURGH ST. PAUL ALBANY	A-1-b A-1-b A-1-b A-1-b A-1-b	1119 1206 1316 1376 1543	1 2 3 4 5	N0d1440 N0d1440 N0d1440 N0d1440 N0d1493	53.6 46.6 37.6 34.6 5.4	9.3 7.1 6.7 6.3 1.2	5/26/41 6/30/41 9/ 3/41 10/ 9/41		7/ 1/40 7/ 1/40 7/ 1/40 7/ 1/40 9/ 9/40	21-1/6 21-1/2 22 26-1/5 21-1/2	6/14/43 8/14/43 12/14/43 4/14/44 7/14/45	4/ 1/43 6/ 1/43 8/15/43 12/15/43 12/ 1/44	3/ 1/43 4/15/43 7/ 1/43 12/15/43 9/ 1/44	NYd Boston NYd Boston NYd Boston NYd Boston NYd Boston	NYd Boston NYd Boston NYd Boston NYd Boston NYd Boston	CA68 CA69 CA70 CA71 CA72
CA73 CA74 CA75	ROCHESTER COLUMBUS DES MOINES	A-1-b A-1-b A-1-b	1550 1552 1557	6 7 8	N0d1493 N0d1493 N0d1493	5.3 5.3 4.9	1.2 1.2 1.0			9/ 9/40 9/ 9/40 9/ 9/40	22-1/2 21 21	8/14/45 9/14/45 10/14/45	1/15/45 3/ 1/45 5/ 1/45	10/ 1/44 11/15/44 12/15/44	NYd Boston NYd Boston NYd Boston	NYd Boston NYd Boston NYd Boston	CA73 CA74 CA75
CL95 CL96 CL97 CL98	LIGHT CRUISERS (6000 ton) OAKLAND RENO SPOKANE TUCSON	A-1-b A-1-b A-1-b A-1-b	1207 1315 1509 1525	1 2 3 4	N0d1499 N0d1499 N0d1499 N0d1499	29.5 25.7 5.7 5.1	3.6 2.8 0.5 0.3	7/15/41 8/ 1/41		9/ 9/40 9/ 9/40 9/ 9/40 9/ 9/40	21-1/2 23 22 22-1/2	6/ 9/43 8/ 9/43 10/ 9/44 12/ 9/44	5/ 1/43 7/ 1/43 8/ 1/44 10/ 1/44	5/ 1/43 7/ 1/43 8/ 1/44 10/ 1/44	Mare Island Mare Island Mare Island Mare Island	Mare Island Mare Island Mare Island Mare Island	CL95 CL96 CL97 CL98

& Work suspended.
(b) Former CL99.
(d) Former CL100.

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REPRODUCTION

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N.B.S. (745)

As of June 1, 1942

B-6

Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Pitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
				Master	Type		June 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
As of June 1, 1942																		
LIGHT CRUISERS		(10,000 ton)																
CL55	CLEVELAND	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-a	706	1	NOD1351	96.7	5.3	7/ 1/40	11/ 1/41	3/23/40	23-1/2	3/23/43	7/ 1/42	6/15/42	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CL55
CL56	COLUMBIA	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-a	707	2	NOD1352	90.5	6.3	8/19/40	12/17/41	3/23/40	22-5/6	6/23/43	9/ 1/42	7/15/42	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CL56
CL57	MONTPELIER	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-a	965	3	NOD1380	76.0	6.4	12/ 2/40	2/12/42	6/12/40	21-2/5	6/27/43	11/ 1/42	9/15/42	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CL57
CL58	DENVER	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-a	967	4	NOD1381	72.5	5.6	12/26/40	4/ 4/42	6/12/40	22-1/6	9/27/43	12/30/43	11/ 1/42	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CL58
CL60	SANTA FE	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	A-1-a	1205	6	NOD1437	54.0	3.9	6/ 7/41		7/ 1/40	17-4/5	1/16/44	4/15/43	12/ 1/42	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CL60
CL62	BIRMINGHAM	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-a	966	5	NOD1438	72.1	4.7	2/17/41	3/20/42	7/ 3/40	21	3/ 3/43	3/ 3/43	11/20/42	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CL62
CL63	MOBILE	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-b	1118	7	NOD1438	60.8	6.7	4/14/41	5/15/42	7/ 3/40	22-1/6	6/ 3/43	6/ 3/43	2/19/43	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CL63
CL64	PLINT	Beth. Fore River	A-1-b	1373	11	NOD1439	22.4	2.4	3/ 7/42		7/ 1/40	17-4/5	12/ 1/43	10/15/43	9/ 1/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	CL64
CL65	PASADENA	Beth. Fore River	A-1-b	1473	17	NOD1439	17.3	0.8			7/ 1/40	21	6/ 1/44	4/15/44	6/ 1/44	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	CL65
CL66	SPRINGFIELD	Beth. Fore River	A-1-b	1510a	19	NOD1439	15.3	0.8			7/ 1/40	22	9/ 1/44	8/15/44	9/ 1/44	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	CL66
CL67	TOPEKA	Beth. Fore River	A-1-b	1508	21	NOD1439	14.9	0.6			7/ 1/40	21-1/2	11/ 1/44	10/15/44	11/ 1/44	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	CL67
CL80	BILOXI	N.N.S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-b	1208	8	NOD1495	42.3	4.5	7/ 9/41		9/ 9/40	22-2/5	11/ 9/43	9/ 3/43	5/21/43	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CL80
CL81	VICKSBURG	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-b	1319	10	NOD1495	31.2	3.7	8/ 4/41		9/ 9/40	24-1/2	3/ 9/44	2/ 1/44	8/20/43	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CL81
CL82	PROVIDENCE	Beth. Fore River	A-1-1	1558	25	NOD1496	4.7	0.9			9/ 9/40	21	12/9/45	7/ 1/45	2/15/45	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	CL82
CL83	MANCHESTER	Beth. Fore River	A-1-1	1560	26	NOD1496	4.6	0.8			9/ 9/40	21-1/2	2/ 9/46	9/ 1/45	10/ 1/45	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	CL83
CL86	CHEYENNE (c)	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-b	1375a	14	NOD126					2/ 4/42(g)	18-1/4	7/ 8/44	12/30/43		NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CL86
CL87	DULUTH (c)	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-b	1430a	15	NOD126					2/ 4/42(g)	19	12/30/44	2/29/44		NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	CL87
CL89	MIAMI	Cramp S.B. Co.	A-1-b	1318	9	NOD1498	43.4	5.3	8/ 2/41		10/29/40	24	1/ 1/44	11/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CL89
CL90	WILKES-BARRE	Cramp S.B. Co.	A-1-b	1320	12	NOD1498	32.9	4.0	9/ 6/41		10/29/40	23-5/6	7/ 1/44	3/20/44	9/ 1/43	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CL90
CL91	OKLAHOMA CITY	Cramp S.B. Co.	A-1-b	1527	22	NOD1498	10.8	1.7			10/29/40	24	1/ 1/45	8/15/44	11/ 1/44	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CL91
CL92	LITTLE ROCK	Cramp S.B. Co.	A-1-b	1528	24	NOD1498	8.6	1.3			10/29/40	23	5/ 1/45	1/ 7/45	12/ 1/44	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CL92
CL93	GALVESTON	Cramp S.B. Co.	A-1-1	1563	27	NOD1498	7.2	0.4			10/29/40	23	9/ 1/45	6/ 8/45	1/ 1/46	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CL93
CL94	YOUNGSTOWN	Cramp S.B. Co.	A-1-1	1564	28	NOD1498	7.1	0.4			10/29/40	23	12/31/45	10/ 1/45	2/ 1/46	NYd Phila.	NYd Phila.	CL94
CL101	AMSTERDAM	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-b	1472	16	NOD82					12/16/41	20-2/5		3/ 1/44	4/30/44		NYd Norfolk	CL101
CL102	PORTSMOUTH	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-b	1507	18	NOD82					12/16/41	19-3/5		6/ 1/44	7/31/44		NYd Norfolk	CL102

(c) Construction changed from Fed. S.B. & D.D. Co. to N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.

CL77 changed to CV25
CL78 changed to CV26
CL85 changed to CV27
CL79 changed to CV28
CL99 changed to CV29
CL100 changed to CV30

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.
Cruisers CL84 and CL88 cancelled 16 December 1940.
* Work suspended.

(g) Date of award.

\$ Revised estimate.

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RESTRICTED

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N.B.S.(745)

As of June 1, 1942

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Priority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
			Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
DD462 DESTROYERS (1620 and 1630 ton)	FITCH * Boston	A-1-a	83	15	P.O. 272	Completed 5/5/42.									NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD462
DD487 LARDNER	Fed. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-a	356	18	NOD1500	Del'd 5/12/42. Comm'd 5/13/42.									NYd New York	NYd New York	DD487
DD488 MC CALLA	Fed. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-a	361	20	NOD1500	Del'd 5/26/42. Comm'd 5/21/42.									NYd New York	NYd New York	DD488
DD489 MERVINE	Fed. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-a	708	24	NOD1500	96.0 10.0 11/ 3/41 5/ 3/42 9/ 9/40					7-2/5	3/ 9/44	7/15/42	6/16/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD489
DD490 QUICK	Fed. S.B. & D.D. Co.	A-1-a	715	28	NOD1500	92.0 9.2 11/ 3/41 5/ 3/42 9/ 9/40					8	4/ 9/44	8/ 1/42	6/30/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD490
DD492 BAILEY	Beth. Staten Island	A-1-a	357	21	NOD1501	Del'd 5/9/42. Comm'd 5/11/42.									NYd New York	NYd New York	DD492
DD493 CARMICK	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	A-1-a	976	33	NOD1502	72.3 5.0 5/29/41 3/ 8/42 9/ 9/40					17	2/ 1/43	11/ 2/42	11/ 2/42	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD493
DD494 DOYLE	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	A-1-a	981	44	NOD1502	69.4 6.1 5/26/41 3/17/42 9/ 9/40					17-2/3	2/15/43	11/16/42	11/16/42	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD494
DD495 ENDICOTT	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	A-1-a	984	50	NOD1502	66.5 8.9 5/ 1/41 4/ 5/42 9/ 9/40					19	3/ 1/43	11/28/42	11/28/42	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD495
DD496 MC COOK	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	A-1-a	989	54	NOD1502	60.4 9.3 5/ 1/41 4/30/42 9/ 9/40					19-2/5	3/15/43	12/14/42	12/14/42	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD496
DD497 FRANKFORD	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	A-1-a	996	56	NOD1502	56.2 9.8 6/ 5/41 5/17/42 9/ 9/40					18-4/5	3/31/43	12/29/42	12/29/42	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD497
DD599 BARTON	Beth. Pore River	A-1-a	709	22	NOD1632	Del'd & Comm'd 5/29/42.									NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD599
DD600 BOYLE	Beth. Pore River	A-1-a	979	45	NOD1632	68.2 7.6 12/31/41					10-1/2	12/ 1/43	11/15/42	11/15/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD600
DD601 CHAMPLIN	Beth. Pore River	A-1-a	999	58	NOD1632	60.2 4.8 1/31/42					11	12/31/43	12/31/42	12/31/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD601
DD602 MEADE	Beth. Staten Island	A-1-a	716	30	NOD1640	96.3 10.0 3/25/41 2/15/42 12/16/40					14-5/6	9/15/42	8/ 1/42	6/20/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD602
DD603 MURPHY	Beth. Staten Island	A-1-a	723	35	NOD1640	87.4 10.9 5/19/41 4/29/42 12/16/40					14-1/5	11/ 1/42	9/15/42	7/ 25/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD603
DD604 PARKER	Beth. Staten Island	A-1-a	974	42	NOD1640	81.5 9.8 6/ 9/41 5/12/42 12/16/40					14-2/3	12/31/42	11/ 1/42	8/29/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD604
DD605 CALDWELL	Beth. San Francisco	A-1-a	362	25	NOD1641	89.7 13.0 3/24/41 1/15/42 12/16/40					14-1/2	8/ 1/42	6/15/42	6/10/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD605
DD606 COGILAN	Beth. San Francisco	A-1-a	713	29	NOD1641	77.6 5.7 3/28/41 2/12/42 12/16/40					15-3/5	9/ 1/42	7/15/42	7/15/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD606
DE607 FRAZIER	Beth. San Francisco	A-1-a	724	34	NOD1641	72.2 5.9 7/ 5/41 3/17/42 12/16/40					14-1/3	10/ 1/42	9/15/42	8/15/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	DE607
DD608 GANSEVOORT	Beth. San Francisco	A-1-a	719	32	NOD1641	68.1 6.9 6/16/41 4/11/42 12/16/40					14	10/15/42	8/15/42	9/15/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD608
DD609 GILLESPIE	Beth. San Francisco	A-1-a	969	39	NOD1641	64.3 7.5 6/16/41 5/ 8/42 12/16/40					16	11/ 1/42	10/15/42	10/15/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD609
DD610 HOBBS	Beth. San Francisco	A-1-a	980	46	NOD1641	56.9 8.1 6/30/41					16-1/2	12/ 1/42	11/15/42	11/15/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD610
DD611 KALK	Beth. San Francisco	A-1-a	992	55	NOD1641	52.5 7.2 6/30/41					17-1/2	12/31/42	12/15/42	12/15/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD611
DD612 KENDRICK	Beth. San Pedro	A-1-a	968	37	NOD1633	76.6 6.3 5/ 1/41 4/ 2/42 12/16/40					17	11/ 1/42	10/ 1/42	10/ 1/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD612
DD613 LAUB	Beth. San Pedro	A-1-a	975	41	NOD1633	69.8 6.9 5/ 1/41 4/28/42 12/16/40					18	12/ 1/42	11/ 1/42	11/ 1/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD613
DD614 MAC KENZIE	Beth. San Pedro	A-1-a	985	48	NOD1633	66.0 7.3 5/29/41					18	1/15/43	12/ 1/42	12/ 1/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD614
DD615 MC LANAHAN	Beth. San Pedro	A-1-a	995	53	NOD1633	62.5 7.2 5/29/41					19	2/ 5/43	12/28/42	12/28/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD615
DD616 NIELDS	Beth. Pore River (h)	A-1-b	1242	69	NOD1632	35.5 4.4					10-1/2	6/15/43(x)	6/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD616
DD617 ORDRONAU	Beth. Pore River (h)	A-1-b	1323	70	NOD1632	33.7 4.4					10-1/2	7/ 5/43(x)	7/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD617

* Commissioned 3 February 1942.
(h) DD616 and DD617 transferred from Beth. San Pedro to Beth. Pore River October 7, 1941.

(x) Contract completion dates of DD616 and DD617 changed October 7, 1941.
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Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Priority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
			Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
DD618	DESTROYERS (1620 and 1630 ton) (Cont'd)																
DD618	DAVISON	A-1-a	973	40	NOD1642	54.0	13.0	2/26/42		12/16/40	6-2/3	12/31/43	10/30/42	9/15/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD618
DD619	EDWARDS	A-1-a	983	43	NOD1642	51.0	10.5	2/26/42		12/16/40	7-1/6	12/31/43	11/27/42	9/30/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD619
DD620	GLENNON	A-1-a	993	49	NOD1642	44.5	8.5	3/25/42		12/16/40	6-2/3	12/31/43	12/15/42	10/14/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD620
DD621	JEPPERS	A-1-a	1000	52	NOD1642	41.3	6.8	3/25/42		12/16/40	7-1/6	12/31/43	12/31/42	10/30/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD621
DD622	MADDOX	A-1-a	1124	57	NOD1642	36.5	10.0	5/ 7/42		12/16/40	6-1/4	12/31/43	2/20/43	11/14/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD622
DD623	NELSON	A-1-a	1132	59	NOD1642	35.0	9.6	5/ 7/42		12/16/40	6-4/5	12/31/43	3/13/43	11/30/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD623
DD624	BALDWIN	A-1-b	1133	60	NOD1502	46.8	10.4	7/19/41		12/16/40	18	12/31/43	3/15/43	1/15/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sound	DD624
DD625	HARDING	A-1-b	1214	61	NOD1502	40.9	8.2	7/22/41		12/16/40	18-1/4	12/31/43	4/ 1/43	1/30/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sound	DD625
DD626	SATTERLEE	A-1-b	1219	62	NOD1502	37.1	8.5	9/10/41		12/16/40	17-1/6	12/31/43	4/15/43	2/15/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sound	DD626
DD627	THOMPSON	A-1-b	1228	63	NOD1502	34.8	8.6	9/22/41		12/16/40	17-1/5	12/31/43	5/ 1/43	2/28/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sound	DD627
DD628	WELLES	A-1-b	1236	64	NOD1502	32.0	8.0	9/27/41		12/16/40	17-3/5	12/31/43	5/15/43	3/15/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sound	DD628
DD632	COWIE	A-1-a	363	23	P.O.688	89.3	7.0	3/18/41	9/27/41	12/16/40	16-2/5	8/ 1/42	6/15/42	7/31/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD632
DD633	KNIGHT	A-1-a	714	27	P.O.689	82.2	6.5	3/18/41	9/27/41	12/16/40	16-5/6	9/ 1/42	7/15/42	8/15/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD633
DD634	DORAN	A-1-a	725	36	P.O.690	72.6	11.7	6/14/41	12/10/41	12/16/40	15	12/ 1/42	9/15/42	9/15/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD634
DD635	EARLE	A-1-a	970	38	P.O.691	67.6	9.3	6/14/41	12/10/41	12/16/40	16	1/ 1/43	10/15/42	10/15/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD635
DD636	BUTLER	A-1-a	987	47	P.O.692	70.4	20.0	9/16/41	2/12/42	12/16/40	12-1/2	4/ 1/43	12/ 1/42	10/ 1/42	NYd Phila.	NYd Philadelphia	DD636
DD637	GHERARDI	A-1-a	1001	51	P.O.693	70.4	20.0	9/16/41	2/12/42	12/16/40	13-1/2	5/ 1/43	12/31/42	10/31/42	NYd Phila.	NYd Philadelphia	DD637
DD638	HERNDON	A-1-b	1229	67	P.O.694	66.9	8.9	8/26/41	2/ 5/42	12/16/40	17-1/6	5/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	2/ 1/43	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	DD638
DD639	SHUBBRICK	A-1-b	1249	68	P.O.695	59.5	8.0	2/17/42	4/18/42	12/16/40	12-1/2	6/15/43	6/15/43	3/ 1/43	NYd Norfolk	NYd Norfolk	DD639
DD640	BEATTY	A-1-a	710	26	P.O.696	97.0	9.0	5/ 1/41	12/20/41	12/16/40	14	7/ 1/42	7/ 1/42	7/ 1/42	NYd Charl.	NYd Charleston	DD640
DD641	TILLMAN	A-1-a	721	31	P.O.697	91.4	9.0	5/ 1/41	12/20/41	12/16/40	15	9/ 1/42	9/ 1/42	8/ 1/42	NYd Charl.	NYd Charleston	DD641
DD645	STEVENSON	A-1-b	1233	65	NOD1732	11.5	1.8			2/10/41	6	2/15/44	5/12/43	2/ 4/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD645
DD646	STOCKTON	A-1-b	1243	66	NOD1732	11.2	1.8			2/10/41	6-1/2	3/15/44	6/ 1/43	2/18/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD646
DD647	THORN	A-1-b	1337	71	NOD1732	10.9	1.6			2/10/41	6	4/15/44	8/20/43	6/14/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD647
DD648	TURNER	A-1-b	1348	72	NOD1732	10.9	1.6			2/10/41	6-1/2	5/15/44	9/ 9/43	6/30/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD648

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Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Pitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
			Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
DD445 DESTROYERS (2100 ton)																	
DD445 FLETCHER	Fed. S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-a	360	4	NOD1433	94.0	15.0	10/ 2/41	5/ 3/42	7/ 1/40	8-2/3	6/ 9/43	8/ 19/42	6/22/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD445
DD446 RADFORD	Fed. S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-a	711	6	NOD1433	89.0	12.5	10/ 2/41	5/ 3/42	7/ 1/40	9-2/5	7/ 9/43	9/15/42	7/15/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD446
DD447 JENKINS	Fed. S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-a	718	9	NOD1433	76.0	12.8	11/27/41		7/ 1/40	8-3/5	8/ 9/43	10/15/42	8/15/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD447
DD448 LA VALLETTE	Fed. S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-a	722	11	NOD1433	71.7	12.2	11/27/41		7/ 1/40	9-1/6	9/ 9/43	10/17/42	9/ 2/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD448
DD449 NICHOLAS	Bath Iron Wks.	A-1-a	351	1	NOD1434	99.0	7.5	3/ 3/41	2/19/42	7/ 1/40	15	1/ 9/43	4/25/42	6/ 4/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD449
DD450 O'BANNON	Bath Iron Wks.	A-1-a	354	2	NOD1434	91.0	7.8	3/ 3/41	3/14/42	7/ 1/40	15-2/3	2/24/43	5/26/42	6/25/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD450
DD451 CHEVALIER	Bath Iron Wks.	A-1-a	359	3	NOD1434	83.4	11.1	4/30/41	4/11/42	7/ 1/40	14-2/3	3/24/43	6/30/42	7/20/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD451
DD452 PERCIVAL	Fed. S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b	1445	123	NOD1432					7/ 1/40	10	10/ 1/43	3/ 1/44	3/15/44	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD452
DD465 SAUPLEY	Fed. S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-a	978	12	NOD1433	64.8	11.8	1/27/42		7/ 1/40	7-3/5	10/ 9/43	1/11/43	9/15/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD465
DD466 WALLER	Fed. S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-a	990	14	NOD1433	60.0	10.5	2/12/42		7/ 1/40	7-2/3	11/ 9/43	1/30/43	10/ 1/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD466
DD467 STRONG	Bath Iron Wks.	A-1-a	364	5	NOD1434	77.0	10.8	4/30/41	5/17/42	7/ 1/40	15-2/5	4/24/43	5/30/42	8/13/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD467
DD468 TAYLOR	Bath Iron Wks.	A-1-a	712	7	NOD1434	67.7	6.2	8/28/41		7/ 1/40	12-1/4	6/ 9/43	6/30/42	9/ 5/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD468
DD469 DE HAVEN	Bath Iron Wks.	A-1-a	717	8	NOD1434	64.6	5.2	9/27/41		7/ 1/40	12-1/6	8/ 9/43	7/30/42	10/ 1/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD469
DD470 BACHE	Beth. Staten Island	A-1-b	1210	19a	NOD1435	41.5	13.1	11/19/41		7/ 1/40	11-5/6	8/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	11/14/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD470
DD471 BEALE	Beth. Staten Island	A-1-b	1224	25a	NOD1435	37.8	11.6	12/19/41		7/ 1/40	12-1/3	10/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	12/28/42	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD471
DD472 GUEST	Boston	A-1-b	1126	28	P.O.282	49.4	0.5	9/27/41	2/20/42	6/28/40	16	3/ 1/43	3/ 1/43	2/ 1/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD472
DD473 BENNETT	Boston	A-1-b	1225	32	P.O.283	37.3	5.5	12/10/41	4/16/42	6/28/40	14-2/3	5/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	3/ 1/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD473
DD474 PULLAM	Boston	A-1-b	1245	36	P.O.284	37.3	5.5	12/10/41	4/16/42	6/28/40	15-1/6	7/ 1/43	6/15/43	3/15/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD474
DD475 HUDSON	Boston	A-1-b	1331	45	P.O.285	30.3	9.0	2/20/42		6/28/40	14-1/3	9/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD475
DD476 HUTCHINS	Boston	A-1-a	1121	24	P.O.286	51.4	6.0	9/27/41	2/20/42	6/28/40	15	1/ 1/43	1/31/43	12/31/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD476
DD477 PRINGLE	Charleston	A-1-a	991	21	P.O.287	50.0	6.0	7/31/41	5/ 2/42	6/28/40	16-1/2	1/ 1/43	1/ 1/43	12/15/42	NYdCharleston	NYd Charleston	DD477
DD478 STANLY	Charleston	A-1-b	1122	30	P.O.288	49.0	5.0	9/15/41	5/ 2/42	6/28/40	16	3/ 1/43	3/ 1/43	1/15/43	NYdCharleston	NYd Charleston	DD478
DD479 STEVENS	Charleston	A-1-b	1211	41	P.O.289	28.5	3.5	12/30/41		6/28/40	15	5/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	NYdCharleston	NYd Charleston	DD479
DD480 HALPORD	Puget Sound	A-1-b	1127	33	P.O.290	32.5	1.5	6/ 3/41		6/28/40	23	2/ 1/43	2/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD480
DD481 LEUTZE	Puget Sound	A-1-b	1212	39	P.O.291	31.0	0.4	6/ 3/41		6/28/40	24	4/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD481

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Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Priority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
			Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
DD482	DESTROYERS (2100 Ton)(Cont'd)																
DD498	WATSON	A-1-b	1474	127	MOD1432					7/ 1/40	11	11/ 1/43	4/ 1/44	4/15/44	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD482
DD499	PHILIP	A-1-b	1218	26	MOD1503	30.5	9.0	5/ 7/42		9/ 9/40	8-1/4	6/ 9/44	4/ 2/43	1/15/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD498
DD500	RENSHAW	A-1-b	1222	29	MOD1503	28.0	9.5	5/ 7/42		9/ 9/40	8-5/6	7/ 9/44	4/22/43	2/ 2/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD499
DD501	RINGGOLD	A-1-b	1251	35	MOD1503	20.2	2.7			9/ 9/40	7-4/5	1/ 9/45	6/21/43	2/15/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD500
DD502	SCHROEDER	A-1-b	1324	38	MOD1503	18.3	1.8			9/ 9/40	8-1/3	2/ 9/45	7/10/43	3/ 1/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD501
DD507	SIGSBEE	A-1-b	1330	61	MOD1503	17.0	1.0			9/ 9/40	7-5/6	3/ 9/45	7/31/43	7/ 1/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD502
DD508	CONWAY	A-1-a	720	10	MOD1506	52.0	7.4	11/5/41		9/ 9/40	11-2/3	3/ 1/43	8/27/42	10/26/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD507
DD509	CONY	A-1-a	726	13	MOD1506	50.2	7.4	12/24/41		9/ 9/40	10-5/6	4/ 1/43	9/30/42	11/19/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD508
DD510	CONVERSE	A-1-a	972	16	MOD1506	38.2	7.8	2/23/42		9/ 9/40	9-2/3	10/ 1/43	10/30/42	12/14/42	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD509
DD511	EATON	A-1-b	985	19	MOD1506	35.9	7.8	3/17/42		9/ 9/40	9-2/3	11/ 1/43	11/30/42	1/ 7/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD510
DD512	POOTE	A-1-b	997	23	MOD1506	29.8	5.9	4/14/42		9/ 9/40	9-3/5	12/31/43	12/30/42	2/ 1/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD511
DD513	SPENCE	A-1-b	1120	27	MOD1506	25.9	4.3	5/18/42		9/ 9/40	9-1/4	12/31/43	1/30/43	2/25/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD512
DD514	TERRY	A-1-b	1125	31	MOD1506	21.7	4.5			9/ 9/40	9-1/2	12/31/43	2/25/43	3/25/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD513
DD515	THATCHER	A-1-b	1137	37	MOD1506	19.4	3.2			9/ 9/40	9-1/2	12/31/43	3/30/43	4/22/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD514
DD516	ANTHONY	A-1-b	1223	43	MOD1506	16.3	1.4			9/ 9/40	9-1/2	12/31/43	4/30/43	5/20/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD515
DD517	WADSWORTH	A-1-b	1238	51	MOD1506	16.2	1.4			9/ 9/40	9-1/2	12/31/43	5/27/43	6/17/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD516
DD518	WALKER	A-1-b	1252	59	MOD1506	15.8	1.1			9/ 9/40	9-1/2	1/ 3/44	6/30/43	7/15/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD517
DD519	BROWNSON	A-1-b	1246	56	MOD1507	22.6	5.4	2/15/42		9/ 9/40	16	11/15/43	7/15/43	6/15/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD518
DD520	DALY	A-1-b	1325	64	MOD1507	17.7	4.4	4/29/42		9/ 9/40	14-1/2	12/31/43	9/ 1/43	7/15/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD519
DD521	ISHERWOOD	A-1-b	1340	79	MOD1507	15.9	3.9	5/12/42		9/ 9/40	15-2/3	2/15/44	10/15/43	9/ 1/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD520
DD522	KIMBERLY	A-1-b	1399	101	MOD1507	8.5	2.9			9/ 9/40	16-1/4	7/ 1/44	12/ 1/43	12/ 1/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD521
DD523	LUCE	A-1-b	1408	108	MOD1507	8.4	2.8			9/ 9/40	16-1/3	8/15/44	1/15/44	12/31/43	NYd New York	NYd New York	DD522
DD524	ABNER READ	A-1-b	1128	34	MOD1508	26.2	5.6	10/30/41		9/ 9/40	16	7/ 1/43	3/ 1/43	3/ 1/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD523
DD525	AMMEN	A-1-b	1213	40	MOD1508	22.6	5.4	11/29/41		9/ 9/40	16	7/15/43	4/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD524
DD526	MULLANY	A-1-b	1239	53	MOD1508	18.3	5.1	1/15/42		9/ 9/40	16-1/2	8/15/43	6/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD525
DD527	BUSH	A-1-b	1332	70	MOD1508	15.0	4.1	2/12/42		9/ 9/40	17-2/3	9/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD526
DD528	TRATHEN	A-1-b	1341	80	MOD1508	11.9	3.2	3/17/42		9/ 9/40	17-1/2	10/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD527
DD529	HAZELWOOD	A-1-b	1377	87	MOD1508	11.1	3.4	4/11/42		9/ 9/40	17-2/3	11/ 1/43	10/ 1/43	10/ 1/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD528
DD530	IGERMANN	A-1-b	1389	90	MOD1508	9.8	3.4	5/ 8/42		9/ 9/40	17-4/5	11/15/43	11/ 1/43	11/ 1/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD529
DD531	HOEL	A-1-b	1400	100	MOD1508	6.5	0.8			9/ 9/40	18	12/ 1/43	12/ 1/43	12/ 1/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD530

Destroyers DD523 to DD525, inclusive, cancelled
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Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Priority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Pitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
			Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
DD534	DESTROYERS (2100 Ton)(Cont'd)																
DD535	MC CORD	A-1-b	1409	107	NOD1508	6.1	0.9			9/ 9/40	18-1/2	12/31/43	12/31/43	12/31/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD534
DD536	MILLER	A-1-b	1439	114	NOD1508	5.0	0.2			9/ 9/40	16-1/2	6/ 1/44	2/ 1/44	2/ 1/44	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD535
DD537	OWEN	A-1-b	1446	119	NOD1508	4.8	1.1			9/ 9/40	16-1/2	7/ 1/44	3/ 1/44	3/ 1/44	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD536
DD538	PUTNAM	A-1-b	1475	124	NOD1508	4.7	1.1			9/ 9/40	20	8/ 1/44	4/ 1/44	4/ 1/44	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD537
DD539	STEPHEN POTTER	A-1-b	1483	128	NOD1508	4.1	0.5			9/ 9/40	16	8/15/44	5/ 1/44	5/ 1/44	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD538
DD540																	
DD541	TINGEY	A-1-b	1490	130	NOD1508	3.7	0.7			9/ 9/40	15-1/2	10/15/44	6/ 1/44	6/ 1/44	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD539
DD542	TWINING	A-1-b	1511	133	NOD1508	3.7	0.7			9/ 9/40	15-1/2	11/ 1/44	7/ 1/44	7/ 1/44	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD540
DD543	YARNELL	A-1-b	1514	136	NOD1508	3.7	0.7			9/ 9/40	18	12/15/44	9/ 1/44	9/ 1/44	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD541
DD544	BOYD	A-1-b	1378	84	NOD1509	11.5	3.5	4/ 2/42		9/ 9/40	18	4/ 1/44	10/ 1/43	10/ 1/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD542
DD545	BRADFORD	A-1-b	1390	92	NOD1509	10.5	3.0	4/28/42		9/ 9/40	18	5/ 1/44	11/ 1/43	11/ 1/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD543
DD546																	
DD547	BROWN	A-1-b	1401	99	NOD1509	9.0	3.0			9/ 9/40	17-1/6	12/15/43(x)	12/ 1/43	12/ 1/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD544
DD548	COWELL	A-1-b	1410	106	NOD1509	7.8	2.3			9/ 9/40	18	1/15/44(x)	12/31/43	12/31/43	Mare Island	Mare Island	DD545
DD549	CAPPS	A-1-b	1247	37a	NOD1510	51.3	5.3	6/12/41	5/31/42	9/ 9/40	24	7/ 9/43	6/15/43	6/15/43	NYdCharleston	NYd Charleston	DD546
DD550	DAVID W. TAYLOR	A-1-b	1335	52a	NOD1510	47.5	5.0	6/12/41		9/ 9/40	26	1/ 9/44	8/15/43	8/15/43	NYdCharleston	NYd Charleston	DD547
DD551	EVANS	A-1-b	1384	68a	NOD1510	27.0	4.5	7/22/41		9/ 9/40	26-4/5	6/ 9/44	10/15/43	10/15/43	NYdCharleston	NYd Charleston	DD548
DD552																	
DD553	JOHN D. HENLEY	A-1-b	1406	83a	NOD1510	27.0	4.5	7/21/41		9/ 9/40	28-4/5	11/ 9/44	12/15/43	12/15/43	NYdCharleston	NYd Charleston	DD549
DD554	FRANKS	A-1-b	1385	69	NOD1511	15.0	3.0	3/ 8/42		9/ 9/40	16-4/5	6/30/43	10/15/43	8/ 1/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD550
DD555	HAGGARD	A-1-b	1395	73	NOD1511	14.0	2.7	3/27/42		9/ 9/40	16-5/6	7/15/43	11/15/43	8/15/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD551
DD556	HAILEY	A-1-b	1402	77	NOD1511	11.5	2.4	4/11/42		9/ 9/40	16-2/3	7/31/43	12/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD552
DD557	JOHNSTON	A-1-b	1437	81	NOD1511	10.0	1.5	5/ 6/42		9/ 9/40	16-1/3	8/16/43	1/ 3/44	9/15/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD553
DD558																	
DD559	LAWS	A-1-b	1440	86	NOD1511	10.0	1.5	5/19/42		9/ 9/40	16-2/5	8/31/43	2/ 1/44	10/ 1/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD554
DD560	LONGSHAW	A-1-b	1442	91	NOD1511	6.8	0.4			9/ 9/40	16-1/5	12/ 1/43	2/15/44	11/ 1/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD555
DD561	MORRISON	A-1-b	1452	94	NOD1511	6.8	0.4			9/ 9/40	16	12/15/43	3/15/44	11/15/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD556
DD562	PRICHETT	A-1-b	1476	98	NOD1511	6.8	0.4			9/ 9/40	15-2/3	1/ 3/44	4/ 1/44	11/30/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD557
DD563	ROBINSON	A-1-b	1484	104	NOD1511	6.8	0.4			9/ 9/40	15-5/6	1/15/44	5/ 1/44	12/15/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD558
DD564																	
DD565	ROSS	A-1-b	1491	110	NOD1511	6.8	0.4			9/ 9/40	16	1/31/44	6/ 1/44	12/30/43	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD559
DD566	ROME	A-1-b	1493	131	NOD1511	6.6	0.2			9/ 9/40	17	10/31/44	6/15/44	6/15/44	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD560
DD567	SMALLEY	A-1-b	1512	134	NOD1511	6.6	0.2			9/ 9/40	17-1/2	11/15/44	7/15/44	7/15/44	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD561
DD568	STODDARD	A-1-b	1513	135	NOD1511	6.6	0.2			9/ 9/40	18	11/30/44	8/15/44	8/15/44	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD562
DD569	WATTS	A-1-b	1515	137	NOD1511	6.6	0.2			9/ 9/40	18	12/15/44	9/ 1/44	9/ 1/44	NYd Puget Sd.	Yd Puget Sd.	DD563

Destroyers DD542, DD543, DD548, and DD549 cancelled 16 December 1940.

(x) Contract completion dates of DD546 and DD547 changed October 7, 1941.

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Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Priority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
			Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
DD568 DESTROYERS (2100 ton) (Cont'd.)	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	A-1-b	1530	138	NOD1511	6.6	0.2			9/ 9/40	18-3/5	12/30/44	10/ 2/44	10/ 2/44	NYd Puget Sd.	NYd Puget Sd.	DD568
DD569 WREN	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-a	971	15	NOD1512	55.9	4.5	5/14/41	3/ 2/42	9/ 9/40	17-1/2	7/ 9/43	10/28/42	10/28/42	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD569
DD570 CHAS. F. AUSBURNE	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-a	977	17	NOD1512	53.6	5.7	5/14/41	3/16/42	9/ 9/40	18	8/24/43	11/11/42	11/11/42	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD570
DD571 CLAXTON	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-a	982	18	NOD1512	51.4	7.0	6/25/41	4/ 1/42	9/ 9/40	17	10/ 9/43	11/24/42	11/24/42	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD571
DD572 DYSON	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-a	988	20	NOD1512	47.9	7.2	6/25/41	4/15/42	9/ 9/40	17-2/5	11/24/43	12/ 8/42	12/ 8/42	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD572
DD573 HARRISON	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-a	994	22	NOD1512	44.4	7.4	7/25/41	5/ 7/42	9/ 9/40	16-5/6	1/ 9/44	12/20/42	12/20/42	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD573
DD574 JOHN RODGERS	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-a	998	25	NOD1512	40.7	6.9	7/25/41	5/ 7/42	9/ 9/40	17-1/5	2/24/44	12/31/42	12/31/42	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD574
DD575 MC PEE	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-b	1226	48	NOD1512	28.1	5.5	3/ 2/42		9/ 9/40	14	4/ 9/44	5/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD575
DD576 MURRAY	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-b	1234	52	NOD1512	25.4	7.5	3/1 6/42		9/ 9/40	14	5/24/44	5/15/43	5/15/43	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD576
DD577 SPRIESTON	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-b	1240	55	NOD1512	22.6	9.5	4/ 1/42		9/ 9/40	14	7/ 9/44	6/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD577
DD578 WICKES	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-b	1248	57	NOD1512	17.9	7.2	4/15/42		9/ 9/40	14	8/24/44	6/15/43	6/15/43	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD578
DD579 WILLIAM D. PORTER	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-b	1321	62	NOD1512	13.1	4.9	5/ 7/42		9/ 9/40	13-4/5	10/ 9/44	7/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD579
DD580 YOUNG	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	A-1-b	1326	67	NOD1512	10.7	3.1	5/ 7/42		9/ 9/40	14-1/4	11/24/44	7/15/43	7/15/43	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD580
DD581 CHARRETTE	Boston	A-1-b	1342	50	P.O. 459	27.9	9.0	2/20/42		9/ 9/40	14-5/6	11/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	5/15/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD581
DD582 CONNER	Boston	A-1-b	1379	60	P.O. 460	11.6	5.3	4/16/42		9/ 9/40	14-1/2	1/ 2/44	10/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD582
DD583 HALL	Boston	A-1-b	1391	65	P.O. 461	11.6	5.3	4/16/42		9/ 9/40	15	3/ 1/44	11/ 1/43	7/15/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD583
DD584 HALLIGAN	Boston	A-1-b	1403	78	P.O. 462	4.7	0.2			9/ 9/40	8	5/ 1/44	12/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD584
DD585 HARADEN	Boston	A-1-b	1433	82	P.O. 463	4.7	0.2			9/ 9/40	8-1/2	7/ 1/44	1/ 1/44	9/15/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD585
DD586 NEWCOMB	Boston	A-1-b	1441	93	P.O. 464	3.7	0.2			9/ 9/40	9-1/2	9/ 1/44	2/ 1/44	11/ 1/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD586
DD587 BELL	Charleston	A-1-b	1235	49	P.O. 465	25.2	1.2	12/30/41		9/ 9/40	16	8/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD587
DD588 BURNS	Charleston	A-1-b	1322	63	P.O. 466	18.0	5.5	5/ 9/42		9/ 9/40	13-2/3	11/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD588
DD589 IZARD	Charleston	A-1-b	1336	72	P.O. 467	18.0	5.5	5/ 9/42		9/ 9/40	14-2/3	2/ 1/44	11/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD589
DD590 PAUL HAMILTON	Charleston	A-1-b	1380	85	P.O. 468	12.0	1.0			9/ 9/40	11	5/ 1/44	1/ 1/44	10/ 1/43	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD590
DD591 TWIGGS	Charleston	A-1-b	1396	95	P.O. 469	12.0	1.0			9/ 9/40	12-1/2	8/ 1/44	3/ 1/44	11/15/43	NYd Charleston	NYd Charleston	DD591
DD592 HOWORTH	Puget Sound	A-1-b	1227	46	P.O. 470	25.0	2.0	11/26/41		9/ 9/40	19-1/6	6/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	NYd Puget Sound	NYd Puget Sound	DD592
DD593 KILLEN	Puget Sound	A-1-b	1241	54	P.O. 471	23.5	1.5	11/26/41		9/ 9/40	20-1/6	8/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	NYd Puget Sound	NYd Puget Sound	DD593
DD594 MANSFIELD	Puget Sound	A-1-b	1404	102	P.O. 472	16.5	1.6			9/ 9/40	13-1/3	10/ 1/43	1/15/45	1/ 1/44	NYd Puget Sound	NYd Puget Sound	DD594
DD595 METCALP	Puget Sound	A-1-b	1434	111	P.O. 473	16.5	1.6			9/ 9/40	15-1/3	12/ 1/43	3/15/45	3/ 1/44	NYd Puget Sound	NYd Puget Sound	DD595
DD596 SHIELDS	Puget Sound	A-1-b	1487	129	P.O. 474	16.5	1.6			9/ 9/40	14-1/6	2/ 1/44	7/15/45	5/15/44	NYd Puget Sound	NYd Puget Sound	DD596
DD597 WILEY	Puget Sound	A-1-b	1492	132	P.O. 475	16.5	1.6			9/ 9/40	15-1/6	4/ 1/44	9/15/45	6/15/44	NYd Puget Sound	NYd Puget Sound	DD597
DD629 ABBOT	Bath Iron Wks.	A-1-b	1329	68	NOD1506	10.1	1.1			12/16/40	9-1/2	2/ 1/44	7/30/43	8/12/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD629
DD630 BRAINE	Bath Iron Wks.	A-1-b	1339	75	NOD1506	10.0	1.3			12/16/40	9-1/2	3/ 1/44	8/30/43	9/ 9/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD630
DD631 ERBEN	Bath Iron Wks.	A-1-b	1351	83	NOD1506	9.6	1.1			12/16/40	9-1/2	4/ 1/44	9/30/43	10/ 7/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD631
DD642 HALE	Bath Iron Wks.	A-1-b	1388	88	NOD1506	9.5	1.2			12/16/40	9-1/2	8/ 1/44	10/30/43	11/ 4/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD642
DD643 SIGOURNEY	Bath Iron Wks.	A-1-b	1397	97	NOD1506	9.3	1.3			12/16/40	9-1/2	11/ 1/44	11/30/43	12/ 2/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD643

§ Revised Estimate.

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Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
			Master	Type		June 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
DD644	DESTROYERS (2100 ton) (Cont'd)																
DD649	STEMBEL	A-1-b	1407	105	NObs1506	9.1	1.3			12/16/40	9-2/5	12/30/44	12/30/43	12/30/43	NYd Boston	NYd Boston	DD644
DD650	ALBERT W. GRANT	A-1-b	1435	112	P.O. 1170	3.0	0.0			12/15/41	11		1/ 1/44#	2/ 1/44#		NYd Charleston	DD649
DD651	CAPERTON	A-1-b	1438	113	NObs83	4.2	0.2			12/15/41	9-2/5		1/30/44#	1/27/44		NYd Boston	DD650
DD652	COGSWELL	A-1-b	1444	117	NObs83	4.2	0.2			12/15/41	9-2/5		2/27/44#	2/24/44		NYd Boston	DD651
DD653	INGERSOLL	A-1-b	1454	121	NObs83	4.2	0.2			12/15/41	9-1/2		3/30/44#	3/23/44		NYd Boston	DD652
DD654	KNAPP	A-1-b	1481	125	NObs83	4.2	0.2			12/15/41	9-2/5		4/30/44#	4/20/44		NYd Boston	DD653
DD655	BEARSS	A-1-b	1447	113a	NObs84	1.0	0.4			12/15/41	19		3/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44		NYd Charleston	DD654
DD656	HOOD	A-1-b	1479	122	NObs84	1.0	0.4			12/15/41	18-1/2		4/15/44#	4/15/44		NYd Charleston	DD655
DD657	VAN VALKENBURGH	A-1-b	1487b	126	NObs84	1.0	0.4			12/15/41	18		5/31/44#	5/31/44		NYd Charleston	DD656
DD658	CHARLES J. BADGER	A-1-b	1443	116	NObs85					12/15/41	16		2/15/44#	2/15/44		NYd New York	DD657
DD659	COLAHAN	A-1-b	1453	120	NObs85					12/15/41	15-1/4		3/15/44#	3/15/44		NYd New York	DD658
DD660	DASHIELL	A-1-b	1327	66	NObs86					12/15/41	8-1/3		7/15/43#	7/15/43		NYd New York	DD659
DD661	BULLARD	A-1-b	1343	71	NObs86					12/15/41	7-1/2		9/ 1/43#	8/ 2/43		NYd New York	DD660
DD662	KIDD	A-1-b	1344	74	NObs86					12/15/41	8		9/ 1/43#	8/16/43		NYd New York	DD661
DD663	BENNION	A-1-b	1448	96	P.O. 1171	1.2	0.2			12/18/41	10		3/ 1/44#	11/15/43		NYd Boston	DD662
DD664	KEYWOOD L. EDWARDS	A-1-b	1477	103	P.O. 1171	1.0	0.2			12/18/41	8		4/ 1/44#	12/15/43		NYd Boston	DD663
DD665	RICHARD P. LEAHY	A-1-b	1485	109	P.O. 1171	1.0	0.2			12/18/41	8-1/2		5/ 1/44#	12/31/43		NYd Boston	DD664
DD666	BRYANT	A-1-b	1441a	115	P.O. 1170	3.0	0.0			1/ 8/42	12-1/2			3/15/44#		NYd Charleston	DD665
DE51	ESCORT VESSELS																
DE52	(a) †									1/ 10/42			4/22/43				DE51
DE53	(a) †									1/10/42			5/21/43				DE52
DE54	(a) †									1/10/42			6/25/43				DE53
DE55	(a) †									1/10/42			7/23/43				DE54
DE56	(a) †									1/10/42			8/ 4/43				DE55

‡ Revised Estimate.
 # First estimate submitted
 subsequent to 11/ 1/41

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L-100.9 (9/27/58)

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Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Pitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
			Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
ESCORT VESSELS	(Cont'd)																
DE56	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		8/17/43					DE56
DE57	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		8/30/43					DE57
DE58	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		9/12/43					DE58
DE59	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		9/26/43					DE59
DE60	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		10/ 7/43					DE60
DE61	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		10/16/43					DE61
DE62	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		10/27/43					DE62
DE63	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		11/ 6/43					DE63
DE64	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		11/16/43					DE64
DE65	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		11/27/43					DE65
DE66	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		12/ 9/43					DE66
DE67	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		12/22/43					DE67
DE68	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		12/29/43					DE68
DE69	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		1/ 5/44					DE69
DE70	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		1/11/44					DE70
DE71	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		1/17/44					DE71
DE72	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		1/24/44					DE72
DE73	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		2/ 1/44					DE73
DE74	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		2/ 7/44					DE74
DE75	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		2/13/44					DE75
DE76	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		2/19/44					DE76
DE77	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		2/25/44					DE77
DE78	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		3/ 2/44					DE78
DE79	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		3/ 8/44					DE79
DE80	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		3/14/44					DE80
DE81	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		3/20/44					DE81
DE82	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		3/26/44					DE82
DE83	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		4/ 5/44					DE83
DE84	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		4/11/44					DE84
DE85	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b		NObs376					1/10/42		4/17/44					DE85

(s) Steel Hulls.

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel
program upon request of the British.

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As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
				Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
ESCORT VESSELS		(Cont'd)																
DE86	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		4/23/44				DE86	
DE87	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		4/29/44				DE87	
DE88	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		5/ 5/44				DE88	
DE89	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		5/11/44				DE89	
DE90	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		5/17/44				DE90	
DE91	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		5/23/44				DE91	
DE92	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		5/29/44				DE92	
DE93	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		6/ 4/44				DE93	
DE94	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		6/10/44				DE94	
DE95	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		6/16/44				DE95	
DE96	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		6/22/44				DE96	
DE97	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		6/28/44				DE97	
DE98	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard	A-1-b			NObs376					1/10/42		7/ 4/44				DE98	
DE99	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	5/17/43#	5/17/43			DE99	
DE100	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	6/ 7/43#	6/ 7/43			DE100	
DE101	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-2/5	6/26/43#	6/26/43			DE101	
DE102	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	7/14/43#	7/14/43			DE102	
DE103	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	7/26/43#	7/26/43			DE103	
DE104	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	8/15/43#	8/15/43			DE104	
DE105	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	8/31/43#	8/31/43			DE105	
DE106	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	9/14/43#	9/14/43			DE106	
DE107	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	9/29/43#	9/29/43			DE107	
DE108	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	10/14/43#	10/14/43			DE108	
DE109	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	10/29/43#	10/29/43			DE109	
DE110	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	11/13/43#	11/13/43			DE110	
DE111	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-2/5	11/27/43#	11/27/43			DE111	
DE112	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-2/5	12/13/43#	12/13/43			DE112	
DE113	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/2	12/28/43#	12/28/43			DE113	
DE114	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/3	1/12/44#	1/12/44			DE114	
DE115	(s) †	Dravo Corp.	A-1-b			NObs377					1/10/42	8-1/3	1/27/44#	1/27/44			DE115	

(s) Steel Hulls

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.

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N.B.S.(745)

As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Priority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Pitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
			Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
DE116	ESCORT VESSELS	(s)	†	(Cont'd)													
DE117	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/3		2/11/44#	2/11/44			DE116
DE118	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/3		2/26/44#	2/26/44			DE117
DE119	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/3		3/11/44#	3/11/44			DE118
DE120	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/3		3/27/44#	3/27/44			DE119
				Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/3		4/10/44#	4/10/44			DE120
DE121	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/4		4/22/44#	4/22/44			DE121
DE122	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/4		5/ 6/44#	5/ 6/44			DE122
DE123	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/3		5/22/44#	5/22/44			DE123
DE124	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/4		6/ 5/44#	6/ 5/44			DE124
DE125	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/5		6/19/44#	6/19/44			DE125
DE126	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/4		7/ 3/44#	7/ 3/44			DE126
DE127	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/4		7/17/44#	7/17/44			DE127
DE128	(s)	†		Dravo Corp.	A-1-b					1/10/42	8-1/6		7/31/44#	7/31/44			DE128
DE129	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	9-4/5		3/10/43#	4/25/43			DE129
DE130	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	9-2/3		3/15/43#	4/25/43			DE130
DE131	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	10-1/2		3/20/43#	5/25/43			DE131
DE132	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	10-1/3		3/25/43#	5/25/43			DE132
DE133	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	11-1/6		4/ 1/43#	6/25/43			DE133
DE134	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	11		4/ 5/43#	6/25/43			DE134
DE135	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	9-1/6		7/10/43#	7/25/43			DE135
DE136	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	9		7/20/43#	7/25/43			DE136
DE137	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	9-5/6		8/ 1/43#	8/25/43			DE137
DE138	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	9-2/3		8/10/43#	8/25/43			DE138
DE139	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	10-1/2		8/20/43#	9/25/43			DE139
DE140	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	10-1/3		9/ 1/43#	9/25/43			DE140
DE141	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	11-4/5		7/ 1/43#	10/25/43			DE141
DE142	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	11-1/2		7/ 5/43#	10/25/43			DE142
DE143	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	12-1/6		7/10/43#	11/25/43			DE143
DE144	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	11-5/6		7/15/43#	11/25/43			DE144
DE145	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	12-1/2		7/20/43#	12/25/43			DE145
DE146	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	12-1/6		7/25/43#	12/25/43			DE146
DE147	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	10-1/2		11/20/43#	1/25/44			DE147
DE148	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	10-1/3		11/25/43#	1/25/44			DE148
DE149	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	11-1/6		12/ 1/43#	2/25/44			DE149
DE150	(s)	†		Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	11		12/ 5/43#	2/25/44			DE150

(s) Steel Hulls

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.

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N.B.S.(745)

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As of June 1, 1942

Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
				Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
ESCORT VESSELS (Cont'd)																		
DE151	(s) †	Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b			NObs378	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	11-5/6		12/10/43#	3/25/44		DE151	
DE152	(s) †	Consolidated Steel Co.	A-1-b			NObs378	0.5	0.5			1/10/42	11-2/3		12/15/43#	3/25/44		DE152	
DE153	(s) †	Norfolk Navy Yard	A-1-b	968a		P.O.1261					1/10/42	10		12/30/42#	10/30/43#		DE153	
DE154	(s) †	Norfolk Navy Yard	A-1-b	976a		P.O.1261					1/10/42	7		1/ 6/43#	11/15/43#		DE154	
DE155	(s) †	Norfolk Navy Yard	A-1-b	988a		P.O.1261					1/10/42	6		1/20/43#	11/31/43#		DE155	
DE156	(s) †	Norfolk Navy Yard	A-1-b	1119a		P.O.1261					1/10/42	5-1/6		3/15/43#	12/15/43#		DE156	
DE157	(s) †	Norfolk Navy Yard	A-1-b	1121a		P.O.1261					1/10/42	4-1/6		3/22/43#	12/25/43#		DE157	
DE158	(s) †	Norfolk Navy Yard	A-1-b	1131a		P.O.1261					1/10/42	3-1/3		4/ 6/43#	1/15/44#		DE158	
DE159	(s) †	Norfolk Navy Yard	A-1-b	1218a		P.O.1261					1/10/42	5		5/15/43#	4/15/44#		DE159	
DE160	(s) †	Norfolk Navy Yard	A-1-b	1232a		P.O.1261					1/10/42	4-3/8		5/29/43#	5/15/44#		DE160	
DE161	(s) †	Norfolk Navy Yard	A-1-b	1244a		P.O.1261					1/10/42	4-1/4		6/15/43#	6/15/44#		DE161	
DE162	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-1/2		4/15/43#	8/12/43#		DE162	
DE163	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-2/3		4/22/43#	8/19/43#		DE163	
DE164	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-1/2		4/29/43#	8/26/43#		DE164	
DE165	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-2/3		5/ 6/43#	9/ 2/43#		DE165	
DE166	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-1/2		5/13/43#	9/ 9/43#		DE166	
DE167	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-2/3		5/20/43#	9/16/43#		DE167	
DE168	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-1/2		5/27/43#	9/23/43#		DE168	
DE169	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-2/3		6/ 3/43#	9/30/43#		DE169	
DE170	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-1/2		6/10/43#	10/ 7/43#		DE170	
DE171	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-2/3		6/17/43#	10/14/43#		DE171	
DE172	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-1/2		6/24/43#	10/21/43#		DE172	
DE173	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	7-2/3		7/ 1/43#	10/28/43#		DE173	
DE174	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	6		8/19/43#	12/16/43#		DE174	
DE175	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	6-1/3		8/26/43#	12/23/43#		DE175	
DE176	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	6		9/ 2/43#	12/30/43#		DE176	
DE177	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	6-1/4		9/ 9/43#	1/ 6/44#		DE177	
DE178	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	6		9/16/43#	1/13/44#		DE178	
DE179	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	6-1/4		9/23/43#	1/20/44#		DE179	
DE180	(s) †	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b			NObs401					1/18/42	6		9/30/43#	1/27/44#		DE180	

(s) Steel Hulls.

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

Revised Estimate.

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.

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N.B.S.(745)

As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Pitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
				Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
ESCORT VESSELS (Cont'd)																		
DE181	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	6-1/4		10/ 7/43#	2/ 3/44\$		DE181	
DE182	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	6		10/14/43#	2/10/44\$		DE182	
DE183	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	6-1/4		10/21/43#	2/17/44\$		DE183	
DE184	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	6		10/28/43#	2/24/44\$		DE184	
DE185	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	6-1/3		11/ 4/43#	3/ 2/44\$		DE185	
DE186	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-1/2		11/18/43#	3/16/44\$		DE186	
DE187	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-2/3		11/25/43#	3/23/44\$		DE187	
DE188	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-1/2		12/ 2/43#	3/30/44\$		DE188	
DE189	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-2/3		12/ 9/43#	4/ 6/44\$		DE189	
DE190	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-1/2		12/16/43#	4/13/44\$		DE190	
DE191	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-2/3		12/23/43#	4/20/44\$		DE191	
DE192	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-1/2		12/30/43#	4/27/44\$		DE192	
DE193	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-2/3		1/ 6/44#	5/ 4/44\$		DE193	
DE194	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-1/2		1/13/44\$	5/11/44\$		DE194	
DE195	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-2/3		1/20/44#	5/18/44\$		DE195	
DE196	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-1/2		1/27/44#	5/25/44\$		DE196	
DE197	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.	A-1-b		NObs401					1/18/42	4-2/3		2/ 3/44#	6/ 1/44\$		DE197	
DE198	(s)	†	(b)			NObs402											DE198	
DE199	(s)	†	(b)			NObs402											DE199	
DE200	(s)	†	(b)			NObs402											DE200	
DE201	(s)	†	(b)			NObs402											DE201	
DE202	(s)	†	(b)			NObs402											DE202	
DE203	(s)	†	(b)			NObs402											DE203	
DE204	(s)	†	(b)			NObs402											DE204	
DE205	(s)	†	(b)			NObs402											DE205	

(s) Steel Hulls.

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

(b) Assignment to builder pending. Vessels previously awarded James River S.B. Corp. Cont. NObs402 cancelled.

\$ Revised Estimate.
First estimate submitted
subsequent to 11/ 1/41

a47aL15

As of June 1, 1942

B-6

Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Pitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
				Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
ESCORT VESSELS (Cont'd)																		
DE206	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE206	
DE207	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE207	
DE208	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE208	
DE209	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE209	
DE210	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE210	
DE211	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE211	
DE212	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE212	
DE213	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE213	
DE214	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE214	
DE215	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE215	
DE216	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE216	
DE217	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE217	
DE218	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE218	
DE219	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE219	
DE220	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE220	
DE221	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE221	
DE222	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE222	
DE223	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE223	
DE224	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE224	
DE225	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE225	
DE226	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE226	
DE227	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE227	
DE228	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE228	
DE229	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE229	
DE230	(a)	†		(b)		NOba402											DE230	

(a) Steel Hulls.

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program
upon request of the British.(b) Assignment to builder pending.
Vessels previously awarded James
River S.B. Corp., Cont. NOba402
cancelled.

a47aL16

As of June 1, 1942

Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
				Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
ESCORT VESSELS (Cont'd)																		
DE231	(s) †	(b)				NObS402											DE231	
DE232	(s) †	(b)				NObS402											DE232	
DE233	(s) †	(b)				NObS402											DE233	
DE234	(s) †	(b)				NObS402											DE234	
DE235	(s) †	(b)				NObS402											DE235	
DE236	(s) †	(b)				NObS402											DE236	
DE237	(s) †	(b)				NObS402											DE237	
DE238	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403	0.5	0.5			1/18/42	11		6/ 1/43#	6/ 1/43		DE238	
DE239	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403	0.5	0.5			1/18/42	11-1/2		7/ 1/43#	7/ 1/43		DE239	
DE240	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403	0.5	0.5			1/18/42	11-4/5		7/24/43#	7/24/43		DE240	
DE241	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403	0.5	0.5			1/18/42	12		8/15/43#	8/15/43		DE241	
DE242	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403	0.5	0.5			1/18/42	12		9/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43		DE242	
DE243	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403	0.5	0.5			1/18/42	12		9/15/43#	9/15/43		DE243	
DE244	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403	0.5	0.5			1/18/42	10		10/ 1/43#	10/ 1/43		DE244	
DE245	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403					1/18/42	10		10/15/43#	10/15/43		DE245	
DE246	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403	0.5	0.5			1/18/42	10		11/ 1/43#	11/ 1/43		DE246	
DE247	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403	0.5	0.5			1/18/42	10		11/15/43#	11/15/43		DE247	
DE248	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403	0.5	0.5			1/18/42	10		12/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43		DE248	
DE249	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403	0.5	0.5			1/18/42	10		12/15/43#	12/15/43		DE249	
DE250	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403					1/18/42	8		1/ 1/44#	1/ 1/44		DE250	
DE251	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403					1/18/42	8		1/15/44#	1/15/44		DE251	
DE252	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403					1/18/42	8		2/ 1/44#	2/ 1/44		DE252	
DE253	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403					1/18/42	8		2/15/44#	2/15/44		DE253	
DE254	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403					1/18/42	8		3/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44		DE254	
DE255	(s) †	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	A-1-b			NObS403					1/18/42	8		3/15/44#	3/15/44		DE255	

(s) Steel Hulls.

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program
upon request of the British.(b) Assignment to builder pending.
Vessels previously awarded James
River S.B. Corp. Cont. NObS402
cancelled.# First estimate submitted subsequent
to 11/ 1/41.

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N.B.S.(745)

As of June 1, 1942

B-6

Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
				Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
ESCORT VESSELS (Cont'd)																		
DE256	(s)	†	A-1-b	1383a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-1/2		10/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43\$			DE256	
DE257	(s)	†	A-1-b	1383b	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-2/5		10/10/43#	12/ 8/43\$			DE257	
DE258	(s)	†	A-1-b	1387a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	7		10/25/43#	12/15/43\$			DE258	
DE259	(s)	†	A-1-b	1394a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	7-1/4		11/ 5/43#	12/23/43\$			DE259	
DE260	(s)	†	A-1-b	1396a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-1/2		11/15/43#	1/15/44\$			DE260	
DE261	(s)	†	A-1-b	1396b	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-2/3		11/25/43#	1/23/44\$			DE261	
DE262	(s)	†	A-1-b	1405a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-1/2		12/10/43#	2/ 1/44\$			DE262	
DE263	(s)	†	A-1-b	1406a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-2/5		12/20/43#	2/ 8/44\$			DE263	
DE264	(s)	†	A-1-b	1435a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	7		1/ 1/44#	2/15/44\$			DE264	
DE265	(s)	†	A-1-b	1437a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	7-1/4		1/10/44#	2/23/44\$			DE265	
DE266	(s)	†	A-1-b	1437b	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	7-1/2		1/25/44#	3/ 1/44\$			DE266	
DE267	(s)	†	A-1-b	1441b	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	7-4/5		2/ 5/44#	3/ 8/44\$			DE267	
DE268	(s)	†	A-1-b	1443a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-1/2		2/15/44#	3/15/44\$			DE268	
DE269	(s)	†	A-1-b	1443b	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-2/3		2/25/44#	3/23/44\$			DE269	
DE270	(s)	†	A-1-b	1451a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-1/2		3/10/44#	4/ 1/44\$			DE270	
DE271	(s)	†	A-1-b	1453a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-4/5		3/20/44#	4/ 8/44\$			DE271	
DE272	(s)	†	A-1-b	1478a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	7		4/ 1/44#	4/15/44\$			DE272	
DE273	(s)	†	A-1-b	1478b	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-1/4		4/10/44#	4/23/44\$			DE273	
DE274	(s)	†	A-1-b	1480a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	7-1/2		4/25/44#	5/ 1/44\$			DE274	
DE275	(s)	†	A-1-b	1486a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	7-4/5		5/ 5/44#	5/ 8/44\$			DE275	
DE276	(s)	†	A-1-b	1486b	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-1/2		5/15/44#	5/15/44\$			DE276	
DE277	(s)	†	A-1-b	1487a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-2/3		5/25/44#	5/23/44\$			DE277	
DE278	(s)	†	A-1-b	1491a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-1/2		6/10/44#	6/ 1/44\$			DE278	
DE279	(s)	†	A-1-b	1493a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	6-4/5		6/20/44#	6/ 8/44\$			DE279	
DE280	(s)	†	A-1-b	1511a	P.O. 1194	0.2	0.2			1/25/42	7		7/ 1/44#	6/15/44\$			DE280	
DE281	(s)	†	A-1-b		P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		9/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43\$			DE281	
DE282	(s)	†	A-1-b		P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		9/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43\$			DE282	
DE283	(s)	†	A-1-b		P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		9/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43\$			DE283	
DE284	(s)	†	A-1-b		P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		9/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43\$			DE284	
DE285	(s)	†	A-1-b		P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		10/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43\$			DE285	

(s) Steel Hulls

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.

\$ Revised Estimate.

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N.B.S.(745)

As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Pitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
				Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
ESCORT VESSELS		(Cont'd)																
DE286	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		10/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43		DE286	
DE287	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		12/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43#		DE287	
DE288	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		12/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43#		DE288	
DE289	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		12/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43#		DE289	
DE290	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		12/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43#		DE290	
DE291	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		1/ 1/44#	12/ 1/43		DE291	
DE292	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		1/ 1/44#	12/ 1/43		DE292	
DE293	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		1/ 1/44#	3/15/44#		DE293	
DE294	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		1/ 1/44#	3/15/44#		DE294	
DE295	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		3/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44#		DE295	
DE296	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		3/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44#		DE296	
DE297	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		3/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44#		DE297	
DE298	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		3/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44#		DE298	
DE299	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		4/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44		DE299	
DE300	(s) †	Charleston Navy Yard	A-1-b			P.O. 1195	0.3	0.1			1/25/42	8		4/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44		DE300	
SUBMARINES		(1526 ton)																
SS217	GUARDPISH	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-a	368	7	NOD1436	Del'd & Comm'd.	5/ 8/42.									SS217	
SS218	ALMACORE	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-a	727	8	NOD1436	100.0	1.8	4/21/41	2/17/42	7/ 1/40	13-5/6	12/ 1/42	7/14/42	6/ 1/42#	Sub.Base N. Lon.	Sub.Base N. London	SS218
SS219	AMBERJACK	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-a	730	10	NOD1436	98.7	2.6	5/15/41	3/ 6/42	7/ 1/40	13-1/6	1/16/43	8/ 6/42	6/19/42#	Sub.Base N. Lon.	Sub.Base N. London	SS219
SS220	BARB	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-a	731	13	NOD1436	96.5	4.3	6/ 7/41	4/ 2/42	7/ 1/40	13-5/6	3/ 1/43	9/ 1/42	8/ 3/42	Sub.Base N. Lon.	Sub.Base N. London	SS220
SS221	BLACKPISH	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-a	734	15	NOD1436	91.3	7.2	7/ 1/41	4/18/42	7/ 1/40	13-3/5	4/16/43	9/21/42	8/18/42	Sub.Base N. Lon.	Sub.Base N. London	SS221
SS222	BLUEPISH	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1356	51	NOD1513	16.8	4.1			9/ 9/40	13-1/2	2/24/44	8/19/43	7/20/43	Sub.Base N. Lon.	Sub.Base N. London	SS222
SS223	BONEPISH	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1359	53	NOD1513	14.6	3.2			9/ 9/40	13-1/4	3/24/44	9/21/43	8/21/43	Sub.Base N. Lon.	Sub.Base N. London	SS223
SS224	COD	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1413	56	NOD1513	13.2	3.0			9/ 9/40	13-1/4	4/24/44	10/21/43	9/21/43	Sub.Base N. Lon.	Sub.Base N. London	SS224
SS225	CERO	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1417	59	NOD1513	11.4	2.6			9/ 9/40	13-1/4	5/24/44	11/20/43	10/21/43	Sub.Base N. Lon.	Sub.Base N. London	SS225
SS226	CORVINA	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1420	64	NOD1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	13-1/5	6/24/44	12/21/43	11/20/43	Sub.Base N. Lon.	Sub.Base N. London	SS226
SS227	DARTER	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1459	66	NOD1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	13-1/4	7/24/44	1/20/44	12/21/43	Sub.Base N. Lon.	Sub.Base N. London	SS227
SS232	HALIBUT*	Portsmouth	A-1-a	369	6	P.O. 307	Completed	5/13/42.									SS232	
SS233	HERRING**	Portsmouth	A-1-a	728	9	P.O. 308	97.0	10.0	1/14/41	1/15/42	6/28/40	10-5/6	4/12/43	7/25/42	6/10/42#	NYd Portam.	NYd Portsmouth	SS233
SS234	KINGFISH***	Portsmouth	A-1-a	733	11	P.O. 309	94.2	11.1	8/29/41	3/ 2/42	6/28/40	9-3/5	6/28/43	9/ 5/42	6/17/42#	NYd Portam.	NYd Portsmouth	SS234
SS235	SHAD	Portsmouth	A-1-a	1004	14	P.O. 310	85.0	11.0	10/24/41	4/15/42	6/28/40	8-2/3	9/12/43	10/17/42	7/15/42#	NYd Portam.	NYd Portsmouth	SS235

(s) Steel Hulls.

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program,
upon request of the British.

* Commissioned 10 April 1942

** Commissioned 4 May 1942.

*** Commissioned 20 May 1942.

First estimate submitted subsequent
to 11/ 1/41.

\$ Revised Estimate.

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As of June 1, 1942

B-6

Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
				Master	Type		June 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
SUBMARINES (1526 Ton) (Cont'd)																		
SS238	WAHOO *	Mare Island	A-1-a	729	12	P.O. 313	94.3	6.1	6/28/41	2/14/42	6/28/40	12	3/28/43	8/ 1/42	6/27/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	SS238
SS239	WHALE	Mare Island	A-1-a	732	16	P.O. 314	88.1	4.4	6/28/41	3/14/42	6/28/40	13	6/28/43	9/ 1/42	8/ 1/42	Mare Island	Mare Island	SS239
SS240	ANGLER	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1461	68	NOD 1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	13-1/4	8/24/44	2/14/44	1/14/44	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS240
SS241	BASHAW	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1463	70	NOD 1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	13-1/6	9/24/44	3/ 7/44	2/ 7/44	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS241
SS242	BLUEGILL	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1494	73	NOD 1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	13-1/3	10/24/44	4/ 1/44	3/ 1/44	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS242
SS243	BREAM	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1496	76	NOD 1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	13-1/6	11/24/44	4/19/44	3/20/44	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS243
SS244	CAVALLA	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1498	77	NOD 1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	13-1/4	12/24/44	5/15/44	4/15/44	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS244
SS245	COBIA	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1499	80	NOD 1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	13-1/6	1/24/45	6/ 7/44	5/ 6/44	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS245
SS246	CROAKER	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1516	82	NOD 1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	13-1/5	2/24/45	7/ 6/44	6/ 7/44	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS246
SS247	DACE	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1416a	62	NOD 1513	14.4	3.6			9/ 9/40	16	3/24/45	8/ 7/44	11/21/43	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS247
SS248	DORADO	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1429a	65	NOD 1513	12.2	2.8			9/ 9/40	15-1/3	4/24/45	9/ 7/44	12/18/43	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS248
SS249	FLASHER	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1460	71	NOD 1513	10.6	2.2			9/ 9/40	14-5/6	5/24/45	10/ 5/44	1/14/44	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS249
SS250	FLIER	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1463a	75	NOD 1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	14-2/5	6/24/45	11/ 7/44	2/10/44	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS250
SS251	FLOUNDER	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1496a	78	NOD 1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	14-1/3	7/24/45	12/ 1/44	3/11/44	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS251
SS252	GABIAN	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1498a	81	NOD 1513	9.8	2.0			9/ 9/40	14	8/24/45	12/21/44	4/ 8/44	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS252
SS253	GUNNEL	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-a	1002	17	NOD 1436	87.1	7.1	7/21/41	5/17/42	7/ 1/40	13-5/6	6/ 1/43	10/15/42	9/17/42	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS253
SS254	GUNNARD	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-a	1005	18	NOD 1436	82.7	9.9	9/ 2/41		7/ 1/40	13	7/16/43	11/ 5/42	10/ 1/42	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS254
SS255	HADDO	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-a	1008	21	NOD 1436	75.0	9.7	10/ 1/41		7/ 1/40	13	9/ 1/43	12/ 7/42	10/31/42	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS255
SS256	HAKE	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-a	1138	25	NOD 1436	66.9	8.4	11/ 1/41		7/ 1/40	13-1/5	10/16/43	1/ 7/43	12/ 7/42	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS256
SS257	HARDER	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1140	29	NOD 1436	55.8	8.1	12/ 1/41		7/ 1/40	13-1/4	12/ 1/43	2/ 6/43	1/ 8/43	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS257
SS258	HOE	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1142	31	NOD 1436	48.4	7.4	1/ 2/42		7/ 1/40	13	1/16/44	3/ 6/43	2/ 6/43	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS258
SS259	JACK	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1254	34	NOD 1513	41.3	9.9	2/ 2/42		9/ 9/40	13	8/24/43	4/ 6/43	3/ 6/43	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS259
SS260	LAPON	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1256	36	NOD 1513	35.7	9.1	2/21/42		9/ 9/40	13-1/3	9/24/43	5/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS260
SS261	MINGO	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1260	39	NOD 1513	31.9	10.4	3/21/42		9/ 9/40	13	10/24/43	5/20/43	4/21/43	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS261
SS262	MUSKALLUNGE	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1264	44	NOD 1513	32.6	15.0	4/ 7/42		9/ 9/40	13-1/4	11/24/43	6/15/43	5/15/43	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS262
SS263	PADDLE	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1353	46	NOD 1513	22.6	7.4	5/ 1/42		9/ 9/40	13-1/6	12/24/43	7/ 6/43	6/ 5/43	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS263
SS264	PARCO	Elec. Boat Co.	A-1-b	1355	49	NOD 1513	18.5	4.7	5/21/42		9/ 9/40	13-1/3	1/24/44	8/ 2/43	7/ 1/43	Sub.Base N.Lon.	Sub.Base N.London	SS264
SS265	PETO	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	A-1-a	1139a	20	NOD 1514	83.8	5.0	6/18/41	4/30/42	9/ 9/40	15-2/5	8/ 4/43	6/ 1/43	10/ 1/42			SS265
SS266	POGY	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	A-1-a	1256a	28	NOD 1514	72.1	11.7	9/15/41		9/ 9/40	14-1/5	11/ 4/43	9/ 1/43	11/21/42			SS266
SS267	POMPON	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1354a	33	NOD 1514	57.0	10.5	11/26/41		9/ 9/40	13-1/2	2/ 4/44	11/24/43	1/10/43			SS267

* Commissioned 15 May 1942.

‡ Revised Estimate.

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Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
				Master	Type		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
SUBMARINES (1526 Ton) (Cont'd)																		
SS268	PUPPER	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	A-1-b*	1412a	37	NOD 1514	35.1	8.5	2/16/42		9/ 9/40	12-2/3	4/ 4/44	2/ 6/44	3/ 7/43\$			SS268
SS269	RASHER	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	A-1-b*	1419a	48	NOD 1514	25.2	8.3	5/ 4/42		9/ 9/40	11-5/6	6/ 4/44	4/18/44	4/30/43\$			SS269
SS270	RATON	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1461a	52	NOD 1514	18.2	7.2	5/29/42		9/ 9/40	12-2/5	1/ 4/45	6/24/44	6/12/43\$			SS270
SS271	RAY	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1496b	58	NOD 1514	11.5	2.0			9/ 9/40	12-3/5	3/ 4/45	9/ 1/44	7/30/43\$			SS271
SS272	REDPIN	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1516a	63	NOD 1514	10.0	0.5			9/ 9/40	12-3/5	5/ 4/45	2/ 6/44	9/18/43\$			SS272
SS273	ROBALO	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1520a	69	NOD 1514	10.0	0.5			9/ 9/40	12-3/5	7/ 4/45	1/ 6/45	11/ 6/43\$			SS273
SS274	ROCK	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1531a	74	NOD 1514	10.0	0.5			9/ 9/40	12-3/5	9/ 4/45	3/ 1/45	12/25/43\$			SS274
SS275	RUNNER	Portsmouth	A-1-a	1007	22	P.O. 511	56.0	14.0	12/ 8/41	5/30/42	9/ 9/40	10-3/5	5/ 1/43	11/28/42	10/31/42	NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS275
SS276	SAWYISH	Portsmouth	A-1-a	1139	24	P.O. 512	45.2	16.3	1/20/42		9/ 9/40	10	7/ 1/43	1/ 9/43	11/20/42	NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS276
SS277	SCAMP	Portsmouth	A-1-a	1141	26	P.O. 513	36.8	13.3	3/ 6/42		9/ 9/40	9-1/6	9/ 1/43	2/20/43	12/10/42	NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS277
SS278	SEAGRION	Portsmouth	A-1-a	1143	27	P.O. 514	28.5	10.3	3/20/42		9/ 9/40	9	11/ 1/43	4/10/43	12/19/42	NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS278
SS279	SKOOK	Portsmouth	A-1-b	1255	30	P.O. 515	24.9	11.8	4/17/42		9/ 9/40	9	1/ 2/44	5/22/43	1/20/43	NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS279
SS280	STEELHEAD	Portsmouth	A-1-b	1259	32	P.O. 516	22.5	11.5			9/ 9/40	8-3/5	3/ 1/44	6/26/43	2/20/43	NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS280
SS281	STUMFISH	Mare Island	A-1-a	1003	19	P.O. 517	75.3	6.2	9/25/41	5/ 2/42	9/ 9/40	11-2/3	10/ 1/43	10/15/42	9/15/42\$	Mare Island	Mare Island	SS281
SS282	TUNNY	Mare Island	A-1-a	1006	23	P.O. 518	70.9	13.3	11/10/41		9/ 9/40	11-1/6	1/ 2/44	12/ 1/42	10/15/42\$	Mare Island	Mare Island	SS282
SS283	TINOSA	Mare Island	A-1-b	1253	35	P.O. 952	35.9	11.8	2/21/42		4/29/41	12-1/3	7/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	3/ 1/43\$	Mare Island	Mare Island	SS283
SS284	TULLIBEE	Mare Island	A-1-b	1257	40	P.O. 953	29.4	8.9	4/ 1/42		4/29/41	12	8/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	4/ 1/43\$	Mare Island	Mare Island	SS284
SS285	BALAO	Portsmouth	A-1-b	1262	38	P.O. 1163	1.9	0.8			12/15/41	9-2/3	6/ 1/43#	4/20/43		NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS285
SS286	BILLFISH	Portsmouth	A-1-b	1265	41	P.O. 1163	1.9	0.8			12/15/41	9-1/4	6/20/43#	5/ 1/43		NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS286
SS287	BOWPIN	Portsmouth	A-1-b	1354	43	P.O. 1163	1.9	0.8			12/15/41	9-1/4	7/15/43#	5/11/43		NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS287
SS288	CABRILLA	Portsmouth	A-1-b	1358	47	P.O. 1163	1.9	0.8			12/24/41	9-1/4	9/ 4/43#	6/11/43		NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS288
SS289	CAPELIN	Portsmouth	A-1-b	1412	50	P.O. 1163	1.9	0.8			12/24/41	9-1/6	10/ 3/43#	7/24/43		NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS289
SS290	CISCO	Portsmouth	A-1-b	1416	54	P.O. 1163	1.9	0.8			12/24/41	9	11/ 2/43#	8/20/43		NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS290
SS291	CREVALLE	Portsmouth	A-1-b	1418	55	P.O. 1163	1.9	0.8			12/24/41	9-5/6	11/24/43#	9/15/43		NYd Portsm.	NYd Portsm.	SS291
SS292	DEVILFISH	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1414	60	NObS 100	11.2	4.2	3/31/42		12/24/41	16	11/ 1/43#	8/ 1/43		NYd Philadelphia	NYd Philadelphia	SS292

* Based on completion by Manitowoc S.B. Co. prior to operation by sub-contractor Electric Boat Co. preparatory to delivery to Government

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.
\$ Revised Estimate.

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As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Pri- ority	Precedence Number		Contract or Project Order Number	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Proposed Fitting Out Yard	Proposed Point of Delivery	Type and Number
				Master	Type		June Y 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL					As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard			
SS293	SUBMARINES (1526 Ton) (Cont'd) DRAGONET	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1458a	67	NObs 100	5.9	2.3	4/28/42		12/24/41	17		1/ 1/44#	10/ 1/43(a)	NYd Philadelphia	SS293	
SS294	ESCOLAR	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1462	72	NObs 100	1.2	0.7			12/24/41	17		3/ 1/44#	12/ 1/43(a)	NYd Philadelphia	SS294	
SS295	HACKLEBACK	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1497	79	NObs 100	0.9	0.4			12/24/41	17		5/ 1/44#	1/15/44(a)	NYd Philadelphia	SS295	
SS296	LANCETPISH	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1500	83	NObs 100	0.2	0.0			12/24/41	17		6/15/44#	3/ 1/44(a)	NYd Philadelphia	SS296	
SS297	LING	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1517	84	NObs 100	0.2	0.0			12/24/41	17		8/ 1/44#	4/15/44(a)	NYd Philadelphia	SS297	
SS298	LIONPISH	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1521	85	NObs 100	0.2	0.0			12/24/41	17		9/15/44#	5/15/44(a)	NYd Philadelphia	SS298	
SS299	MANTA	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1533	86	NObs 100	0.2	0.0			12/24/41	17		11/ 1/44#	6/15/44(a)	NYd Philadelphia	SS299	
SS300	MORAY	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1536	87	NObs 100	0.2	0.0			12/24/41	17		12/ 1/44#	7/15/44(a)	NYd Philadelphia	SS300	
SS301	MONCADOR	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1545	88	NObs 100	0.2	0.0			12/24/41	17		1/ 1/45#	8/15/44(a)	NYd Philadelphia	SS301	
SS302	SABALO	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1547	89	NObs 100	0.2	0.0			12/24/41	17		2/ 1/45#	9/15/44(a)	NYd Philadelphia	SS302	
SS303	SABLEPISH	Cramp S. B. Co.	A-1-b	1549	90	NObs 100	0.2	0.0			12/24/41	17		3/ 1/45#	10/15/44(a)	NYd Philadelphia	SS303	
SS304	SEAHORSE	Mare Island	A-1-b	1258	42	P.O.1174	1.2	0.5			12/15/41	10		5/ 1/43#	5/ 1/43	Mare Island	SS304	
SS305	SKATE	Mare Island	A-1-b	1263	45	P.O.1174	1.2	0.5			12/15/41	10		6/ 1/43#	6/ 1/43	Mare Island	SS305	
SS306	TANG	Mare Island	A-1-b	1411	57	P.O.1174	0.8	0.5			12/15/41	12		10/ 1/43#	10/ 1/43	Mare Island	SS306	
SS307	TILEPISH	Mare Island	A-1-b	1415	61	P.O.1174	0.8	0.5			12/15/41	12		11/ 1/43#	11/ 1/43	Mare Island	SS307	
SS308		Portsmouth	A-1-b			P.O.1163					4/21/42(g)	10-3/5		10/16/43#	10/16/43	NYd Portsmouth	SS308	
SS309		Portsmouth	A-1-b			P.O.1163					4/21/42(g)	10		10/30/43#	10/30/43	NYd Portsmouth	SS309	
SS310		Portsmouth	A-1-b			P.O.1163					4/21/42(g)	10		11/27/43#	11/27/43	NYd Portsmouth	SS310	
SS311		Portsmouth	A-1-b			P.O.1163					4/21/42(g)	10-1/4		12/22/43#	12/22/43	NYd Portsmouth	SS311	
SS312		Portsmouth	A-1-b			P.O.1163					4/21/42(g)	9-3/5		12/30/43#	12/30/43	NYd Portsmouth	SS312	
SS313		Electric Boat Co.				NObs 122					4/10/42(g)					Sub.Base N. London	SS313	
SS314		Electric Boat Co.				NObs 122					4/10/42(g)					Sub.Base N. London	SS314	

(a) Completion of vessels dependent on delivery of main propulsion units.

(g) Date of Award.

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/1/41

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COMBATANT VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY
REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF JUNE 1, 1942

REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF JUNE 1, 1942												
Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead (+) or Behind (-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
			June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
BATTLESHIPS												
BB59	MASSACHUSETTS	Beth. Fore River	Del'd & Comm'd.	5/12/42.								BB59
BB60	ALABAMA	Norfolk	85.8	4.5	2/ 1/40	2/16/42	34	8/ 1/43	10/ 1/43	12/ 1/42	10.0+	BB60
BB61	IOWA	New York	59.5	5.7	6/27/40		33	11/ 1/43	11/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	7.0+	BB61
BB62	NEW JERSEY	Philadelphia	45.5	5.5	9/16/40		33-1/2	5/ 1/44	5/ 1/44	7/ 1/43	10.0+	BB62
BB63	MISSOURI	New York	15.1	0.7	1/ 6/41		52-5/6	6/12/44	11/ 1/44	6/ 1/45\$	7.0-	BB63
BB64	WISCONSIN	Philadelphia	16.2	3.3	1/25/41		43-1/5	6/12/40	6/12/45	9/ 1/44	9.4+	BB64
BB65	ILLINOIS	Philadelphia	4.0	0.2			34	5/ 1/46	5/ 1/46	10/ 1/45	7.0+	BB65
BB66	KENTUCKY	Norfolk	9.1	2.5	3/ 7/42		32-4/5	5/ 1/45	5/ 1/45	12/ 1/44	5.0+	BB66
BB67	MONTANA &	Philadelphia										BB67
BB68	OHIO &	Philadelphia										BB68
BB69	MAINE &	New York										BB69
BB70	NEW HAMPSHIRE &	New York										BB70
BB71	LOUISIANA &	Norfolk										BB71
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS												
CV9	ESSEX	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	42.6	5.5	4/28/41		20	4/15/44	1/15/44	12/31/42	12.5+	CV9
CV10	BON HOMME RICHARD	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	30.8	4.1	12/ 1/41		15	9/15/44	4/15/44	2/28/43	13.6+	CV10
CV11	INTREPID	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	18.3	3.1	12/ 1/41		17	2/15/45	7/15/44	4/30/43	14.5+	CV11
CV12	KEARSARGE	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	9.4	1.8	4/13/42		17-3/5	7/15/45	10/15/44	9/30/43	12.5+	CV12
CV13	FRANKLIN	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	3.8	0.7			17-3/5	12/15/45	6/ 1/45	12/31/43	17.0+	CV13
CV14	HANCOCK	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	3.4	0.5			16-1/2	4/15/46	9/ 1/45	2/23/44	18.1+	CV14
CV15	RANDOLPH	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	3.1	0.6			17-1/4	8/15/46	12/ 1/45	4/30/44	19.0+	CV15
CV16	CABOT	Beth. Fore River	34.5	6.6	7/15/41		18-1/2	5/15/44	2/15/44	1/31/43	12.5+	CV16
CV17	BUNKER HILL	Beth. Fore River	31.2	5.9	9/15/41		18-1/2	8/15/44	6/15/44	3/31/43	14.5+	CV17
CV18	ORISKANY	Beth. Fore River	7.6	2.6	3/18/42		20-2/5	2/15/46	11/ 1/45	11/30/43	23.0+	CV18
CV19	TICONDEROGA	Beth. Fore River	7.0	2.3			20-1/2	4/15/46	12/31/45	5/31/44	19.0+	CV19
CV20	BENNINGTON	New York					26		12/ 1/44#	5/ 1/45\$	5.0-	CV20
CV21	BOXER	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.					16-1/2		6/ 1/45#	6/30/44	11.0+	CV21
CV22	INDEPENDENCE (c)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	60.3	3.6	5/ 1/41		20	12/ 1/42	3/ 1/43	12/30/42	2.1+	CV22
CV23	PRINCETON (e)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	48.7	3.3	5/ 2/41		20-2/5	2/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	2/15/43	3.5+	CV23
CV24	BELLEAU WOOD (f)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	39.9	4.2	8/11/41		19-2/3	4/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	4.0+	CV24
CV25	COMPENS (m)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	34.0	4.5	11/17/41		17-3/5	7/ 1/45	10/ 1/43	5/15/43	4.0+	CV25
CV26	MONTEREY (t)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	25.6	4.1	12/29/41		18	0/ 1/45	12/31/43	7/ 1/43	0.0+	CV26
CV27	CROWN POINT (r)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	7.7	4.4	4/11/42		15-2/3	10/20/43	12/ 9/43	7/31/43	4.3+	CV27
CV28	WILMINGTON (a)	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	20.1	3.8	3/16/42		18	11/ 1/42	2/ 1/44	9/15/43	5.0+	CV28

(c) Former CL59
(e) Former CL61
(f) Former CL76
& Work Suspended.
(n) Former CL77.
(t) Former CL78.
(i) Former CL79.
(r) Former CL85. Construc-
tion changed from

First estimate submitted subsequent
to 11/ 1/41.
\$ Revised Estimate.

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As of June 1, 1942

Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
			June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
As of June 1, 1942												
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (Cont'd.)												
CV29	BUFFALO (b)	N.Y.S.B. Corp.	10.2	0.8			18	12/30/45	10/15/44	2/15/44	8.0+	CV29
CV30	NEWARK (d)	N.Y.S.B. Corp.	9.7	1.2			18	3/ 1/46	12/ 1/44	4/ 1/44	8.0+	CV30
LARGE CRUISERS												
CB1	ALASKA	N.Y. S.B. Corp	15.1	4.1	12/17/41		30	4/ 1/45	1/ 1/45	6/15/44	6.5+	CB1
CB2	GUAM	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	11.1	3.4	2/ 2/42		30-2/5	8/ 1/45	3/ 1/45	8/15/44	6.6+	CB2
CB3	HAWAII	N.Y. S.B. Corp.										CB3
CB4	PHILIPPINES	N.Y. S.B. Corp.										CB4
CB5	PUERTO RICO	N.Y. S.B. Corp.										CB5
CB6	SAMOA	N.Y. S.B. Corp.										CB6
HEAVY CRUISERS												
CA68	BALTIMORE	Beth. Fore River	53.6	9.3	5/26/41		21-1/6	6/14/43	4/ 1/43	3/ 1/43	1.0+	CA68
CA69	BOSTON	Beth. Fore River	46.6	7.1	6/30/41		21-1/2	8/14/43	6/ 1/43	4/15/43	1.5+	CA69
CA70	PITTSBURGH	Beth. Fore River	37.6	6.7	9/ 3/41		22	12/14/43	8/15/43	7/ 1/43	1.5+	CA70
CA71	ST. PAUL	Beth. Fore River	34.6	6.3	10/ 9/41		26-1/5	4/14/44	12/15/43	12/15/43	0.0	CA71
CA72	ALBANY	Beth. Fore River	5.4	1.2			21-1/2	7/14/45	12/ 1/44	9/ 1/44	3.0+	CA72
CA73	ROCHESTER	Beth. Fore River	5.3	1.2			22-1/2	8/14/45	1/15/45	10/ 1/44	3.5+	CA73
CA74	COLUMBUS	Beth. Fore River	5.3	1.2			21	9/14/45	3/ 1/45	11/15/44	3.5+	CA74
CA75	DES MOINES	Beth. Fore River	4.9	1.0			21	10/14/45	5/ 1/45	12/15/44	4.6+	CA75
LIGHT CRUISERS (6000 ton)												
CL95	OAKLAND	Beth. San Francisco	29.5	3.6	7/15/41		21-1/2	6/ 9/43	5/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	0.0	CL95
CL96	RENO	Beth. San Francisco	25.7	2.8	8/ 1/41		23	8/ 9/43	7/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	0.0	CL96
CL97	SPOKANE	Beth. San Francisco	5.7	0.5			22	10/ 9/44	8/ 1/44	8/ 1/44	0.0	CL97
CL98	TUCSON	Beth. San Francisco	5.1	0.3			22-1/2	12/ 9/44	10/ 1/44	10/ 1/44	0.0	CL98
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library												
L-100-1000-1000 (8/ 7/50)												

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

L.S. 3200.1 (9/7/50)

& Work suspended.

(b) Former CL99.

(d) Former CL100.

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As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
			June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
LIGHT CRUISERS		(10,000 ton)										
CL55	CLEVELAND	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	96.7	5.3	7/ 1/40	11/ 1/41	23-1/2	3/23/43	7/ 1/42	6/15/42\$.5+	CL55
CL56	COLUMBIA	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	90.5	6.3	8/19/40	12/17/41	22-5/6	6/23/43	9/ 1/42	7/15/42	1.6+	CL56
CL57	MONTPELIER	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	76.0	6.4	12/ 2/40	2/12/42	21-2/5	6/27/43	11/ 1/42	9/15/42	1.5+	CL57
CL58	DENVER	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	72.5	5.6	12/26/40	4/ 4/42	22-1/6	9/27/43	12/30/43	11/ 1/42	13.9+	CL58
CL60	SANTA PE	N.Y. S.B. Corp.	54.0	3.9	6/ 7/41		17-4/5	1/16/44	4/15/43	12/ 1/42	4.5+	CL60
CL62	BIRMINGHAM	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	72.1	4.7	2/17/41	3/20/42	21	3/ 3/43	3/ 3/43	11/20/42	3.4+	CL62
CL63	MOBILE	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	60.8	6.7	4/14/41	5/15/42	22-1/6	6/ 3/43	6/ 3/43	2/19/43	3.5+	CL63
CL64	FLINT	Beth. Fore River	22.4	2.4	3/ 7/42		17-4/5	12/ 1/43	10/15/43	9/ 1/43	1.5+	CL64
CL65	PASADENA	Beth. Fore River	17.3	0.8			21	6/ 1/44	4/15/44	6/ 1/44	1.5-	CL65
CL66	SPRINGFIELD	Beth. Fore River	15.3	0.8			22	9/ 1/44	8/15/44	9/ 1/44	.6-	CL66
CL67	TOPEKA	Beth. Fore River	14.9	0.6			21-1/2	11/ 1/44	10/15/44	11/ 1/44	.6-	CL67
CL80	BILOXI	N.N.S.B. & D.D. Co.	42.3	4.5	7/ 9/41		22-2/5	11/ 9/43	9/ 3/43	5/21/43	3.4+	CL80
CL81	VICKSBURG	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.	31.2	3.7	8/ 4/41		24-1/2	3/ 9/44	2/ 1/44	8/20/43	5.4+	CL81
CL82	PROVIDENCE	Beth. Fore River	4.7	0.9			21	12/9/45	7/ 1/45	2/15/45	4.5+	CL82
CL83	MANCHESTER	Beth. Fore River	4.6	0.8			21-1/2	2/ 9/46	9/ 1/45	10/ 1/45	1.0-	CL83
CL86	CHEYENNE (c)	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.					18-1/4		7/ 8/44	12/30/43	6.3+	CL86
CL87	DULUTH (c)	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.					19		12/30/44	2/29/44	10.0+	CL87
CL89	MIAMI	Cramp S.B. Co.	43.4	5.3	8/ 2/41		24	1/ 1/44	11/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	3.0+	CL89
CL90	WILKES-BARRE	Cramp S.B. Co.	32.9	4.0	9/ 6/41		23-5/6	7/ 1/44	3/20/44	9/ 1/43	6.6+	CL90
CL91	OKLAHOMA CITY	Cramp S.B. Co.	10.8	1.7			24	1/ 1/45	8/15/44	11/ 1/44	2.6-	CL91
CL92	LITTLE ROCK	Cramp S.B. Co.	8.6	1.3			23	5/ 1/45	1/ 7/45	12/ 1/44	1.2+	CL92
CL93	GALVESTON	Cramp S.B. Co.	7.2	0.4			23	9/ 1/45	6/ 8/45	1/ 1/46	6.8-	CL93
CL94	YOUNGSTOWN	Cramp S.B. Co.	7.1	0.4			23	12/31/45	10/ 1/45	2/ 1/46	4.0-	CL94
CL101	AMSTERDAM	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.					20-2/5		3/ 1/44#	4/30/44	2.0-	CL101
CL102	PORTSMOUTH	N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.					19-3/5		6/ 1/44#	7/31/44	2.0-	CL102

(c) Construction changed from Fed. S.B. & D.D. Co. to N.N. S.B. & D.D. Co.

CL77 changed to CV25
CL78 changed to CV26
CL85 changed to CV27CL91 changed to CV23
CL92 changed to CV29
CL100 changed to CV30CL59 changed to CV22
CL61 changed to CV23
CL76 changed to CV24

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41. Cruisers CL84 and CL88 cancelled 16 December 1940.

\$ Revised estimate.

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As of June 1, 1942

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
DD462 DESTROYERS (1620 and 1630 ton)	FITCH * Boston	Completed 5/5/42.									DD462
DD487 LARDNER	Ped. S.B. & D.D. Co.	Del'd 5/12/42.	Comm'd 5/13/42.								DD487
DD488 MC CALLA	Ped. S.B. & D.D. Co.	Del'd 5/26/42.	Comm'd 5/27/42.								DD488
DD489 MERVINE	Ped. S.B. & D.D. Co.	96.0	10.0	11/ 3/41	5/ 3/42	7-2/5	3/ 9/44	7/15/42	6/16/42\$	1.0+	DD489
DD490 QUICK	Ped. S.B. & D.D. Co.	92.0	9.2	11/ 3/41	5/ 3/42	8	4/ 9/44	8/ 1/42	6/30/42	1.0+	DD490
DD492 BAILEY	Beth. Staten Island	Del'd 5/9/42.	Comm'd 5/11/42.								DD492
DD493 CARMICK	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	72.3	5.0	5/29/41	3/ 8/42	17	2/ 1/43	11/ 2/42	11/ 2/42	0.0	DD493
DD494 DOYLE	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	69.4	6.1	5/26/41	3/17/42	17-2/3	2/15/43	11/16/42	11/16/42	0.0	DD494
DD495 ENDICOTT	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	66.5	8.9	5/ 1/41	4/ 5/42	19	3/ 1/43	11/28/42	11/28/42	0.0	DD495
DD496 MC COOK	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	60.4	9.3	5/ 1/41	4/30/42	19-2/5	3/15/43	12/14/42	12/14/42	0.0	DD496
DD497 FRANKFORD	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	56.2	9.8	6/ 5/41	5/17/42	18-4/5	3/31/43	12/29/42	12/29/42	0.0	DD497
DD599 BARTON	Beth. Fore River	Del'd & Comm'd 5/29/42.									DD599
DD600 BOYLE	Beth. Fore River	68.2	7.6	12/31/41		10-1/2	12/ 1/43	11/15/42	11/15/42	0.0	DD600
DD601 CHAMPLIN	Beth. Fore River	60.2	4.8	1/31/42		11	12/31/43	12/31/42	12/31/42	0.0	DD601
DD602 MEADE	Beth. Staten Island	96.3	10.0	3/25/41	2/15/42	14-5/6	9/15/42	8/ 1/42	6/20/42\$	1.4+	DD602
DD603 MURPHY	Beth. Staten Island	87.4	10.9	5/19/41	4/29/42	14-1/5	11/ 1/42	9/15/42	7/ 25/42\$	1.7+	DD603
DD604 PARKER	Beth. Staten Island	81.5	9.8	6/ 9/41	5/12/42	14-2/3	12/31/42	11/ 1/42	8/29/42\$	2.1+	DD604
DD605 CALDWELL	Beth. San Francisco	89.7	13.0	3/24/41	1/15/42	14-1/2	8/ 1/42	6/15/42	6/10/42\$.2+	DD605
DD606 COGHLAN	Beth. San Francisco	77.6	5.7	3/28/41	2/12/42	15-3/5	9/ 1/42	7/15/42	7/15/42	0.0	DD606
DD607 PHAZIER	Beth. San Francisco	72.2	5.9	7/ 5/41	3/17/42	14-1/3	10/ 1/42	9/15/42	8/15/42	1.0+	DD607
DD608 GANSEVOORT	Beth. San Francisco	68.1	6.9	6/16/41	4/11/42	14	10/15/42	8/15/42	9/15/42	1.0-	DD608
DD609 GILLESPIE	Beth. San Francisco	64.3	7.5	6/16/41	5/ 8/42	16	11/ 1/42	10/15/42	10/15/42	0.0	DD609
DD610 DOBBY	Beth. San Francisco	56.9	8.1	6/30/41		16-1/2	12/ 1/42	11/15/42	11/15/42	0.0	DD610
DD611 KALK	Beth. San Francisco	52.5	7.2	6/30/41		17-1/2	12/31/42	12/15/42	12/15/42	0.0	DD611
DD612 KENDRICK	Beth. San Pedro	76.6	6.3	5/ 1/41	4/ 2/42	17	11/ 1/42	10/ 1/42	10/ 1/42	0.0	DD612
DD613 LAUB	Beth. San Pedro	69.8	6.9	5/ 1/41	4/28/42	18	12/ 1/42	11/ 1/42	11/ 1/42	0.0	DD613
DD614 MAC KENZIE	Beth. San Pedro	66.0	7.3	5/29/41		18	1/15/43	12/ 1/42	12/ 1/42	0.0	DD614
DD615 MC LANAHAN	Beth. San Pedro	62.5	7.2	5/29/41		19	2/15/43	12/28/42	12/28/42	0.0	DD615
DD616 NIELDS	Beth. Fore River (h)	35.5	4.4			10-1/2	6/15/43(x)		6/ 1/43	0.0	DD616
DD617 ORDUNAUX	Beth. Fore River (h)	33.7	4.4			10-1/2	7/15/43(x)		7/ 1/43	0.0	DD617

* Commissioned 3 February 1942.

(h) DD616 and DD617 transferred from Beth. San Pedro to Beth. Fore River October 7, 1941.

(x) Contract completion dates of DD616 and DD617 changed October 7, 1941.
\$ Revised Estimate.Frank
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As of June 1, 1942

Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	As of June 1, 1942 No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
			June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
DD618	DESTROYERS (1620 and 1630 ton) (Cont'd)											
DD619	DAVISON	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	54.0	13.0	2/26/42		6-2/3	12/31/43	10/30/42	9/15/42	1.5+	DD618
DD620	EDWARDS	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	51.0	10.5	2/26/42		7-1/6	12/31/43	11/27/42	9/30/42	1.9+	DD619
DD621	GLENNON	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	44.5	8.5	3/25/42		6-2/3	12/31/43	12/15/42	10/14/42	2.0+	DD620
DD622	JEFFERS	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	41.3	6.8	3/25/42		7-1/6	12/31/43	12/31/42	10/30/42	2.0+	DD621
DD622	MADDOX	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	36.5	10.0	5/ 7/42		6-1/4	12/31/43	2/20/43	11/14/42	3.2+	DD622
DD623	NELSON	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	35.0	9.6	5/ 7/42		6-4/5	12/31/43	3/13/43	11/30/42	3.4+	DD623
DD624	BALDWIN	Seattle Tacoma S. B. Co.	46.8	10.4	7/19/41		18	12/31/43	3/15/43	1/15/43	2.0+	DD624
DD625	HARDING	Seattle Tacoma S. B. Co.	40.9	8.2	7/22/41		18-1/4	12/31/43	4/ 1/43	1/30/43	2.1+	DD625
DD626	SATTERLEE	Seattle Tacoma S. B. Co.	37.1	8.5	9/10/41		17-1/6	12/31/43	4/15/43	2/15/43	2.0+	DD626
DD627	THOMPSON	Seattle Tacoma S. B. Co.	34.8	8.6	9/22/41		17-1/5	12/31/43	5/ 1/43	2/28/43	2.1+	DD627
DD628	WELLES	Seattle Tacoma S. B. Co.	32.0	8.0	9/27/41		17-3/5	12/31/43	5/15/43	3/15/43	2.0+	DD628
DD632	COWIE	Boston	89.3	7.0	3/18/41	9/27/41	16-2/5	8/ 1/42	6/15/42	7/31/42	1.5-	DD632
DD633	KNIGHT	Boston	82.2	6.5	3/18/41	9/27/41	16-5/6	9/ 1/42	7/15/42	8/15/42	1.0-	DD633
DD634	DORAN	Boston	72.6	11.7	6/14/41	12/10/41	15	12/ 1/42	9/15/42	9/15/42	0.0	DD634
DD635	EARLE	Boston	67.6	9.3	6/14/41	12/10/41	16	1/ 1/43	10/15/42	10/15/42	0.0	DD635
DD636	BUTLER	Philadelphia	70.4	20.0	9/16/41	2/12/42	12-1/2	4/ 1/43	12/ 1/42	10/ 1/42	2.0+	DD636
DD637	GHERARDI	Philadelphia	70.4	20.0	9/16/41	2/12/42	13-1/2	5/ 1/43	12/31/42	10/31/42	2.0+	DD637
DD638	HERNDON	Norfolk	66.9	8.9	8/26/41	2/ 5/42	17-1/6	5/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	2/ 1/43	3.0+	DD638
DD639	SHUBRICK	Norfolk	59.5	8.0	2/17/42	4/18/42	12-1/2	6/15/43	6/15/43	3/ 1/43	3.5+	DD639
DD640	BEATTY	Charleston	97.0	9.0	5/ 1/41	12/20/41	14	7/ 1/42	7/ 1/42	7/ 1/42	0.0	DD640
DD641	TILLMAN	Charleston	91.4	9.0	5/ 1/41	12/20/41	15	9/ 1/42	9/ 1/42	8/ 1/42	1.0+	DD641
DD645	STEVENSON	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	11.5	1.8			6	2/15/44	5/12/43	2/ 4/43	3.3+	DD645
DD646	STOCKTON	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	11.2	1.8			6-1/2	3/15/44	6/ 1/43	2/18/43	3.4+	DD646
DD647	THORN	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	10.9	1.6			6	4/15/44	8/20/43	6/14/43	2.2+	DD647
DD648	TURNER	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	10.9	1.6			6-1/2	5/15/44	9/ 9/43	6/30/43	2.3+	DD648

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DD641

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Revised Estimate.

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As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead (+) or Behind (-) 11/ 1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
			June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
DESTROYERS (2100 ton)												
DD445	FLETCHER	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	94.0	15.0	10/ 2/41	5/ 3/42	8-2/3	6/ 9/43	8/ 19/42	6/22/42	2.0+	DD445
DD446	RADFORD	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	89.0	12.5	10/ 2/41	5/ 3/42	9-2/5	7/ 9/43	9/15/42	7/15/42	2.0+	DD446
DD447	JENKINS	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	76.0	12.8	11/27/41		8-3/5	8/ 9/43	10/15/42	8/15/42	2.0+	DD447
DD448	LA VALLETTE	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	71.7	12.2	11/27/41		9-1/6	9/ 9/43	10/17/42	9/ 2/42	1.5+	DD448
DD449	NICHOLAS	Bath Iron Wks.	99.0	7.5	3/ 3/41	2/19/42	15	1/ 9/43	4/25/42	6/ 4/42\$	1.3-	DD449
DD450	O'BANNON	Bath Iron Wks.	91.0	7.8	3/ 3/41	3/14/42	15-2/3	2/24/43	5/26/42	6/25/42	1.0-	DD450
DD451	CHEVALIER	Bath Iron Wks.	83.4	11.1	4/30/41	4/11/42	14-2/3	3/24/43	6/30/42	7/20/42	.6-	DD451
DD452	PERCIVAL	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.					10	10/ 1/43	3/ 1/44	3/15/44	.5-	DD452
DD465	SAUPLEY	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	64.8	11.8	1/27/42		7-3/5	10/ 9/43	1/11/43	9/15/42	3.9+	DD465
DD466	WALLER	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	60.0	10.5	2/12/42		7-2/3	11/ 9/43	1/30/43	10/ 1/42	3.9+	DD466
DD467	STRONG	Bath Iron Wks.	77.0	10.8	4/30/41	5/17/42	15-2/5	4/24/43	5/30/42	8/13/42	2.5-	DD467
DD468	TAYLOR	Bath Iron Wks.	67.7	6.2	8/28/41		12-1/4	6/ 9/43	6/30/42	9/ 5/42	2.2-	DD468
DD469	DE HAVEN	Bath Iron Wks.	64.6	5.2	9/27/41		12-1/6	8/ 9/43	7/30/42	10/ 1/42	2.1-	DD469
DD470	BACHE	Beth. Staten Island	41.5	13.1	11/19/41		11-5/6	8/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	11/14/42\$	4.6+	DD470
DD471	BEALE	Beth. Staten Island	37.8	11.6	12/19/41		12-1/3	10/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	12/28/42\$	5.1+	DD471
DD472	GUEST	Boston	49.4	0.5	9/27/41	2/20/42	16	3/ 1/43	3/ 1/43	2/ 1/43	1.0+	DD472
DD473	BENNETT	Boston	37.3	5.5	12/10/41	4/16/42	14-2/3	5/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	3/ 1/43	2.0+	DD473
DD474	FULLAM	Boston	37.3	5.5	12/10/41	4/16/42	15-1/6	7/ 1/43	6/15/43	3/15/43	3.0+	DD474
DD475	HUDSON	Boston	30.3	9.0	2/20/42		14-1/3	9/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	3.0+	DD475
DD476	HUTCHINS	Boston	51.4	6.0	9/27/41	2/20/42	15	1/ 1/43	1/31/43	12/31/42	1.0+	DD476
DD477	PRINGLE	Charleston	50.0	6.0	7/31/41	5/ 2/42	16-1/2	1/ 1/43	1/ 1/43	12/15/42\$.6+	DD477
DD478	STANLY	Charleston	49.0	5.0	9/15/41	5/ 2/42	16	3/ 1/43	3/ 1/43	1/15/43\$	1.6+	DD478
DD479	STEVENS	Charleston	28.5	3.5	12/30/41		15	5/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	4/ 1/43\$	1.0+	DD479
DD480	HALFORD	Puget Sound	32.5	1.5	6/ 3/41		23	2/ 1/43	2/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	3.0-	DD480
DD481	LEUTZE	Puget Sound	31.0	0.4	6/ 3/41		24	4/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	2.0-	DD481

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Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
			June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
DESTROYERS (2100 Ton)(Cont'd)												
DD482	WATSON	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.					11	11/ 1/43	4/ 1/44	4/15/44	.5-	DD482
DD498	PHILIP	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	30.5	9.0	5/ 7/42		8-1/4	6/ 9/44	4/ 2/43	1/15/43	2.6+	DD498
DD499	RENSHAW	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	28.0	9.5	5/ 7/42		8-5/6	7/ 9/44	4/22/43	2/ 2/43	2.7+	DD499
DD500	RINGGOLD	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	20.2	2.7			7-4/5	1/ 9/45	6/21/43	2/15/43	4.2+	DD500
DD501	SCHROEDER	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	18.3	1.8			8-1/3	2/ 9/45	7/10/43	3/ 1/43	4.3+	DD501
DD502	SIGSBEE	Ped. S. B. & D. D. Co.	17.0	1.0			7-5/6	3/ 9/45	7/31/43	7/ 1/43	1.0+	DD502
DD507	CONWAY	Bath Iron Wks.	52.0	7.4	11/5/41		11-2/3	3/ 1/43	8/27/42	10/26/42	2.0-	DD507
DD508	CONY	Bath Iron Wks.	50.2	7.4	12/24/41		10-5/6	4/ 1/43	9/30/42	11/19/42	1.6-	DD508
DD509	CONVERSE	Bath Iron Wks.	38.2	7.8	2/23/42		9-2/3	10/ 1/43	10/30/42	12/14/42	1.5-	DD509
DD510	EATON	Bath Iron Wks.	35.9	7.8	3/17/42		9-2/3	11/ 1/43	11/30/42	1/ 7/43	1.2-	DD510
DD511	FOOTE	Bath Iron Wks.	29.8	5.9	4/14/42		9-3/5	12/31/43	12/30/42	2/ 1/43	1.1-	DD511
DD512	SPENCE	Bath Iron Wks.	25.9	4.3	5/18/42		9-1/4	12/31/43	1/30/43	2/25/43	.9-	DD512
DD513	TERRY	Bath Iron Wks.	21.7	4.5			9-1/2	12/31/43	2/25/43	3/25/43	1.0-	DD513
DD514	THATCHER	Bath Iron Wks.	19.4	3.2			9-1/2	12/31/43	3/30/43	4/22/43	.8-	DD514
DD515	ANTHONY	Bath Iron Wks.	16.3	1.4			9-1/2	12/31/43	4/30/43	5/20/43	.6-	DD515
DD516	WADSWORTH	Bath Iron Wks.	16.2	1.4			9-1/2	12/31/43	5/27/43	6/17/43	.7-	DD516
DD517	WALKER	Bath Iron Wks.	15.8	1.1			9-1/2	1/ 3/44	6/30/43	7/15/43	.5-	DD517
DD518	BROWNSON	Beth. Staten Island	22.6	5.4	2/15/42		16	11/15/43	7/15/43	6/15/43	1.0+	DD518
DD519	DALY	Beth. Staten Island	17.7	4.4	4/29/42		14-1/2	12/31/43	9/ 1/43	7/15/43	1.6+	DD519
DD520	ISHERWOOD	Beth. Staten Island	15.9	3.9	5/12/42		15-2/3	2/15/44	10/15/43	9/ 1/43	1.5+	DD520
DD521	KIMBERLY	Beth. Staten Island	8.5	2.9			16-1/4	7/ 1/44	12/ 1/43	12/ 1/43	0.0	DD521
DD522	LUCE	Beth. Staten Island	8.4	2.8			16-1/3	8/15/44	1/15/44	12/31/43	.5+	DD522
DD526	ABNER READ	Beth. San Francisco	26.2	5.6	10/30/41		16	7/ 1/43	3/ 1/43	3/ 1/43	0.0	DD526
DD527	AMMEN	Beth. San Francisco	22.6	5.4	11/29/41		16	7/15/43	4/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	0.0	DD527
DD528	MULLANY	Beth. San Francisco	18.3	5.1	1/15/42		16-1/2	8/15/43	6/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	0.0	DD528
DD529	BUSH	Beth. San Francisco	15.0	4.1	2/12/42		17-2/3	9/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	0.0	DD529
DD530	TRATHEN	Beth. San Francisco	11.9	3.2	3/17/42		17-1/2	10/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	0.0	DD530
DD531	HAZELWOOD	Beth. San Francisco	11.1	3.4	4/11/42		17-2/3	11/ 1/43	10/ 1/43	10/ 1/43	0.0	DD531
DD532	MEERMANN	Beth. San Francisco	9.8	3.4	5/ 8/42		17-4/5	11/15/43	11/ 1/43	11/ 1/43	0.0	DD532
DD533	HOEL	Beth. San Francisco	6.5	0.8			18	12/ 1/43	12/ 1/43	12/ 1/43	0.0	DD533

Destroyers DD523 to DD525, inclusive, cancelled 16 December 1940.

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Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
			June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
DESTROYERS (2100 Ton)(Cont'd)												
DD534	MC CORD	Beth. San Francisco	6.1	0.9			18-1/2	12/31/43	12/31/43	12/31/43	0.0	DD534
DD535	MILLER	Beth. San Francisco	5.0	0.2			16-1/2	6/ 1/44	2/ 1/44	2/ 1/44	0.0	DD535
DD536	OWEN	Beth. San Francisco	4.8	1.1			16-1/2	7/ 1/44	3/ 1/44	3/ 1/44	0.0	DD536
DD537	PUTNAM	Beth. San Francisco	4.7	1.1			20	8/ 1/44	4/ 1/44	4/ 1/44	0.0	DD537
DD538	STEPHEN POTTER	Beth. San Francisco	4.1	0.5			16	8/15/44	5/ 1/44	5/ 1/44	0.0	DD538
DD539	TINGEY	Beth. San Francisco	3.7	0.7			15-1/2	10/15/44	6/ 1/44	6/ 1/44	0.0	DD539
DD540	TWINING	Beth. San Francisco	3.7	0.7			15-1/2	11/ 1/44	7/ 1/44	7/ 1/44	0.0	DD540
DD541	YARNELL	Beth. San Francisco	3.7	0.7			18	12/15/44	9/ 1/44	9/ 1/44	0.0	DD541
DD544	BOYD	Beth. San Pedro	11.5	3.5	4/ 2/42		18	4/ 1/44	10/ 1/43	10/ 1/43	0.0	DD544
DD545	BRADFORD	Beth. San Pedro	10.5	3.0	4/28/42		18	5/ 1/44	11/ 1/43	11/ 1/43	0.0	DD545
DD546	BROWN	Beth. San Pedro	9.0	3.0			17-1/6	12/15/43(x)	12/ 1/43	12/ 1/43	0.0	DD546
DD547	COWELL	Beth. San Pedro	7.8	2.3			18	1/15/44(x)	12/31/43	12/31/43	0.0	DD547
DD550	CAPPS	Gulf S. B. Co.	51.3	5.3	6/12/41	5/31/42	24	7/ 9/43	6/15/43	6/15/43	0.0	DD550
DD551	DAVID W. TAYLOR	Gulf S. B. Co.	47.5	5.0	6/12/41		26	1/ 9/44	8/15/43	8/15/43	0.0	DD551
DD552	EVANS	Gulf S. B. Co.	27.0	4.5	7/21/41		26-4/5	6/ 9/44	10/15/43	10/15/43	0.0	DD552
DD553	JOHN D. HENLEY	Gulf S. B. Co.	27.0	4.5	7/21/41		28-4/5	11/ 9/44	12/15/43	12/15/43	0.0	DD553
DD554	FRANKS	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	15.0	3.0	3/ 8/42		16-4/5	6/30/43	10/15/43	8/ 1/43	2.5+	DD554
DD555	HAGGARD	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	14.0	2.7	3/27/42		16-5/6	7/15/43	11/15/43	8/15/43	3.2+	DD555
DD556	HAILEY	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	11.5	2.4	4/11/42		16-2/3	7/31/43	12/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	3.0+	DD556
DD557	JOHNSTON	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	10.0	1.5	5/ 6/42		16-1/3	8/16/43	1/ 3/44	9/15/43	3.8+	DD557
DD558	LAWS	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	10.0	1.5	5/19/42		16-2/5	8/31/43	2/ 1/44	10/ 1/43	4.0+	DD558
DD559	LONGSHAW	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	6.8	0.4			16-1/5	12/ 1/43	2/15/44	11/ 1/43	3.5+	DD559
DD560	MORRISON	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	6.8	0.4			16	12/15/43	3/15/44	11/15/43	4.0+	DD560
DD561	PRICHETT	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	6.8	0.4			15-2/3	1/ 3/44	4/ 1/44	11/30/43	4.0+	DD561
DD562	ROBINSON	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	6.8	0.4			15-5/6	1/15/44	5/ 1/44	12/15/43	4.6+	DD562
DD563	ROSS	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	6.8	0.4			16	1/31/44	6/ 1/44	12/30/43	5.1+	DD563
DD564	ROWE	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	6.6	0.2			17	10/31/44	6/15/44	6/15/44	0.0	DD564
DD565	SMALLEY	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	6.6	0.2			17-1/2	11/15/44	7/15/44	7/15/44	0.0	DD565
DD566	STODDARD	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	6.6	0.2			18	11/30/44	8/15/44	8/15/44	0.0	DD566
DD567	WATTS	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	6.6	0.2			18	12/15/44	9/ 1/44	* 9/ 1/44	0.0	DD567

Destroyers DD542, DD543, DD548, and DD549 cancelled 16 December 1940.

(x) Contract completion dates of DD546 and DD547 changed October 7, 1941.

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Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+), or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
DD568	DESTROYERS (2100 ton) (Cont'd.)										
DD569	WREN	Seattle Tacoma S.B. Co.	6.6	0.2		18-3/5	12/30/44	10/ 2/44	10/ 2/44	0.0	DD568
DD570	AULICK	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	55.9	4.5	5/14/41	3/ 2/42	7/ 9/43	10/28/42	10/28/42	0.0	DD569
DD571	CHAS. F. AUSBURNE	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	53.6	5.7	5/14/41	3/16/42	8/24/43	11/11/42	11/11/42	0.0	DD570
DD572	CLAXTON	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	51.4	7.0	6/25/41	4/ 1/42	10/ 9/43	11/24/42	11/24/42	0.0	DD571
DD573	DYSON	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	47.9	7.2	6/25/41	4/15/42	11/24/43	12/ 8/42	12/ 8/42	0.0	DD572
DD574	HARRISON	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	44.4	7.4	7/25/41	5/ 7/42	1/ 9/44	12/20/42	12/20/42	0.0	DD573
DD575	JOHN RODGERS	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	40.7	6.9	7/25/41	5/ 7/42	2/24/44	12/31/42	12/31/42	0.0	DD574
DD576	MC KEE	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	28.1	5.5	3/ 2/42	14	4/ 9/44	5/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	0.0	DD575
DD577	MURRAY	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	25.4	7.5	3/1 6/42	14	5/24/44	5/15/43	5/15/43	0.0	DD576
DD578	SPROSTON	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	22.6	9.5	4/ 1/42	14	7/ 9/44	6/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	0.0	DD577
DD579	WICKES	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	17.9	7.2	4/15/42	14	8/24/44	6/15/43	6/15/43	0.0	DD578
DD580	WILLIAM D. PORTER	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	13.1	4.9	5/ 7/42	13-4/5	10/ 9/44	7/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	0.0	DD579
DD581	YOUNG	Con. Steel Corp. (Orange)	10.7	3.1	5/ 7/42	14-1/4	11/24/44	7/15/43	7/15/43	0.0	DD580
DD582	CHARRETTE	Boston	27.9	9.0	2/20/42	14-5/6	11/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	5/15/43	3.6+	DD581
DD583	CONNOR	Boston	11.6	5.3	4/16/42	14-1/2	1/ 2/44	10/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	3.0+	DD582
DD584	HALL	Boston	11.6	5.3	4/16/42	15	3/ 1/44	11/ 1/43	7/15/43	3.6+	DD583
DD585	HALLIGAN	Boston	4.7	0.2		8	5/ 1/44	12/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	3.0+	DD584
DD586	HARADEN	Boston	4.7	0.2		8-1/2	7/ 1/44	1/ 1/44	9/15/43	3.5+	DD585
DD587	NEWCOMB	Boston	3.7	0.2		9-1/2	9/ 1/44	2/ 1/44	11/ 1/43	3.0+	DD586
DD588	BELL	Charleston	25.2	1.2	12/30/41	16	8/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	2.0+	DD587
DD589	BURNS	Charleston	18.0	5.5	5/ 9/42	13-2/3	11/ 1/43	9/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	2.0+	DD588
DD590	IZARD	Charleston	18.0	5.5	5/ 9/42	14-2/3	2/ 1/44	11/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	3.0+	DD589
DD591	PAUL HAMILTON	Charleston	12.0	1.0		11	5/ 1/44	1/ 1/44	10/ 1/43	3.0+	DD590
DD592	TWIGGS	Charleston	12.0	1.0		12-1/2	8/ 1/44	3/ 1/44	11/15/43	3.5+	DD591
DD593	HOWORTH	Puget Sound	25.0	2.0	11/26/41	19-1/6	6/ 1/43	6/ 1/43	7/ 1/43	1.0-	DD592
DD594	KILLEN	Puget Sound	23.5	1.5	11/26/41	20-1/6	8/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	8/ 1/43	0.0	DD593
DD595	MANSFIELD	Puget Sound	16.5	1.6		13-1/3	10/ 1/43	1/15/45	1/ 1/44	11.6+	DD594
DD596	METCALF	Puget Sound	16.5	1.6		15-1/3	12/ 1/43	3/15/45	3/ 1/44	11.6+	DD595
DD597	SHIELDS	Puget Sound	16.5	1.6		14-1/6	2/ 1/44	7/15/45	5/15/44	14.0+	DD596
DD629	WILEY	Puget Sound	16.5	1.6		15-1/6	4/ 1/44	9/15/45	6/15/44	15.0+	DD597
DD630	ARBOT	Bath Iron Wks.	10.1	1.1		9-1/2	2/ 1/44	7/30/43	8/12/43	0.4-	DD629
DD631	BRAINE	Bath Iron Wks.	10.0	1.3		9-1/2	3/ 1/44	8/30/43	9/ 9/43	0.2-	DD630
DD642	ERBEN	Bath Iron Wks.	9.6	1.1		9-1/2	4/ 1/44	9/30/43	10/ 7/43	0.2-	DD631
DD643	HALE	Bath Iron Wks.	9.5	1.2		9-1/2	8/ 1/44	10/30/43	11/ 4/43	0.2-	DD642
DD643	SIGOURNEY	Bath Iron Wks.	9.3	1.3		9-1/2	11/ 1/44	11/30/43	12/ 2/43	0.1-	DD643

* Revised Estimate.

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As of June 1, 1942

Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+), or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
			June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
DESTROYERS (2100 ton) (Cont'd)												
DD644	STEMBEL	Bath Iron Wks.	9.1	1.3			9-2/5	12/30/44	12/30/43	12/30/43	0.0	DD644
DD649	ALBERT W. GRANT	Charleston	3.0	0.0			11		1/1/44#	2/1/44#	1.0-	DD649
DD650	CAPERTON	Bath Iron Wks.	4.2	0.2			9-2/5		1/30/44#	1/27/44	0.1+	DD650
DD651	COGSWELL	Bath Iron Wks.	4.2	0.2			9-2/5		2/27/44#	2/24/44	0.1+	DD651
DD652	INGERSOLL	Bath Iron Wks.	4.2	0.2			9-1/2		3/30/44#	3/23/44	0.2+	DD652
DD653	KNAPP	Bath Iron Wks.	4.2	0.2			9-2/5		4/30/44#	4/20/44	0.3+	DD653
DD654	BEARSS	Gulf S.B. Corp.	1.0	0.4			19		3/1/44#	3/1/44	0.0	DD654
DD655	HOOD	Gulf S.B. Corp.	1.0	0.4			18-1/2		4/15/44#	4/15/44	0.0	DD655
DD656	VAN VALKENBURGH	Gulf S.B. Corp.	1.0	0.4			18		5/31/44#	5/31/44	0.0	DD656
DD657	CHARLES J. BADGER	Beth. Staten Island					16		2/15/44#	2/15/44	0.0	DD657
DD658	COLAHAN	Beth. Staten Island					15-1/4		3/15/44#	3/15/44	0.0	DD658
DD659	DASHIELL	Fed. S.B. & D.D. Co.					8-1/3		7/15/43#	7/15/43	0.0	DD659
DD660	BULLARD	Fed. S.B. & D.D. Co.					7-1/2		9/1/43#	8/2/43	1.0+	DD660
DD661	KIDD	Fed. S.B. & D.D. Co.					8		9/1/43#	8/16/43	0.5+	DD661
DD662	BENNION	Boston	1.2	0.2			10		3/1/44#	11/15/43	3.5+	DD662
DD663	HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS	Boston	1.0	0.2			8		4/1/44#	12/15/43	3.5+	DD663
DD664	RICHARD P. LEARY	Boston	1.0	0.2			8-1/2		5/1/44#	12/31/43	4.0+	DD664
DD665	BRYANT	Charleston	3.0	0.0			12-1/2			3/15/44#	0.0	DD665
ESCORT VESSELS												
DE51	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						4/22/43				DE51
DE52	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						5/21/43				DE52
DE53	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						6/25/43				DE53
DE54	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						7/23/43				DE54
DE55	(s) †	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						8/4/43				DE55

\$ Revised Estimate.
 # First estimate submitted
 subsequent to 11/1/41

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N.B.S.(745)

As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Predictions	Type and Number
		June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
DE56	ESCORT VESSELS	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard			8/17/43				DE56
DE57	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				8/30/43				DE57
DE58	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				9/12/43				DE58
DE59	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				9/26/43				DE59
DE60	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				10/ 7/43				DE60
DE61	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				10/16/43				DE61
DE62	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				10/27/43				DE62
DE63	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				11/ 6/43				DE63
DE64	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				11/16/43				DE64
DE65	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				11/27/43				DE65
DE66	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				12/ 9/43				DE66
DE67	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				12/22/43				DE67
DE68	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				12/29/43				DE68
DE69	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				1/ 5/44				DE69
DE70	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				1/11/44				DE70
DE71	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				1/17/44				DE71
DE72	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				1/24/44				DE72
DE73	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				2/ 1/44				DE73
DE74	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				2/ 7/44				DE74
DE75	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				2/13/44				DE75
DE76	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				2/19/44				DE76
DE77	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				2/25/44				DE77
DE78	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				3/ 2/44				DE78
DE79	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				3/ 8/44				DE79
DE80	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				3/14/44				DE80
DE81	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				3/20/44				DE81
DE82	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				3/26/44				DE82
DE83	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				4/ 5/44				DE83
DE84	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				4/11/44				DE84
DE85	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard				4/17/44				DE85

(s) Steel Hulls.

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

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As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name			Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+ or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
				June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
ESCORT VESSELS			(Cont'd)										
DE86	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						4/23/44				DE86
DE87	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						4/29/44				DE87
DE88	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						5/ 5/44				DE88
DE89	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						5/11/44				DE89
DE90	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						5/17/44				DE90
DE91	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						5/23/44				DE91
DE92	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						5/29/44				DE92
DE93	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						6/ 4/44				DE93
DE94	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						6/10/44				DE94
DE95	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						6/16/44				DE95
DE96	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						6/22/44				DE96
DE97	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						6/28/44				DE97
DE98	(s)	†	Beth.Steel Co., Hingham Yard						7/ 4/44				DE98
DE99	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		5/17/43#	5/17/43	0.0	DE99
DE100	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		6/ 7/43#	6/ 7/43	0.0	DE100
DE101	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-2/5		6/26/43#	6/26/43	0.0	DE101
DE102	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		7/14/43#	7/14/43	0.0	DE102
DE103	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		7/26/43#	7/26/43	0.0	DE103
DE104	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		8/15/43#	8/15/43	0.0	DE104
DE105	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		8/31/43#	8/31/43	0.0	DE105
DE106	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		9/14/43#	9/14/43	0.0	DE106
DE107	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		9/29/43#	9/29/43	0.0	DE107
DE108	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		10/14/43#	10/14/43	0.0	DE108
DE109	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		10/29/43#	10/29/43	0.0	DE109
DE110	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		11/13/43#	11/13/43	0.0	DE110
DE111	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-2/5		11/27/43#	11/27/43	0.0	DE111
DE112	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-2/5		12/13/43#	12/13/43	0.0	DE112
DE113	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/2		12/28/43#	12/28/43	0.0	DE113
DE114	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/3		1/12/44#	1/12/44	0.0	DE114
DE115	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/3		1/27/44#	1/27/44	0.0	DE115

(s) Steel Hulls

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.

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As of June 1, 1942

Type, Number and Name			Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
				June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
ESCORT VESSELS			(Cont'd)										
DE116	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/3		2/11/44#	2/11/44	0.0	DE116
DE117	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/3		2/26/44#	2/26/44	0.0	DE117
DE118	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/3		3/11/44#	3/11/44	0.0	DE118
DE119	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/3		3/27/44#	3/27/44	0.0	DE119
DE120	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/3		4/10/44#	4/10/44	0.0	DE120
DE121	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/4		4/22/44#	4/22/44	0.0	DE121
DE122	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/4		5/ 6/44#	5/ 6/44	0.0	DE122
DE123	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/3		5/22/44#	5/22/44	0.0	DE123
DE124	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/4		6/ 5/44#	6/ 5/44	0.0	DE124
DE125	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/5		6/19/44#	6/19/44	0.0	DE125
DE126	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/4		7/ 3/44#	7/ 3/44	0.0	DE126
DE127	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/4		7/17/44#	7/17/44	0.0	DE127
DE128	(s)	†	Dravo Corp.					8-1/6		7/31/44#	7/31/44	0.0	DE128
DE129	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			9-4/5		3/10/43#	4/25/43	1.5-	DE129
DE130	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			9-2/3		3/15/43#	4/25/43	1.3-	DE130
DE131	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			10-1/2		3/20/43#	5/25/43	2.2-	DE131
DE132	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			10-1/3		3/25/43#	5/25/43	2.0-	DE132
DE133	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			11-1/6		4/ 1/43#	6/25/43	2.8-	DE133
DE134	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			11		4/ 5/43#	6/25/43	2.7-	DE134
DE135	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			9-1/6		7/10/43#	7/25/43	0.5-	DE135
DE136	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			9		7/20/43#	7/25/43	0.2-	DE136
DE137	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			9-5/6		8/ 1/43#	8/25/43	0.8-	DE137
DE138	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			9-2/3		8/10/43#	8/25/43	0.5-	DE138
DE139	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			10-1/2		8/20/43#	9/25/43	1.8-	DE139
DE140	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			10-1/3		9/ 1/43#	9/25/43	0.8-	DE140
DE141	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			11-4/5		7/ 1/43#	10/25/43	3.8-	DE141
DE142	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			11-1/2		7/ 5/43#	10/25/43	3.6-	DE142
DE143	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			12-1/6		7/10/43#	11/25/43	4.5-	DE143
DE144	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			11-5/6		7/15/43#	11/25/43	4.4-	DE144
DE145	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			12-1/2		7/20/43#	12/25/43	5.2-	DE145
DE146	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			11-1/6		7/25/43#	12/25/43	5.0-	DE146
DE147	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			10-1/2		11/20/43#	1/25/44	2.1-	DE147
DE148	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			10-1/3		11/25/43#	1/25/44	2.0-	DE148
DE149	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			11-1/6		12/ 1/43#	2/25/44	2.8-	DE149
DE150	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			11		12/ 5/43#	2/25/44	2.7-	DE150

(s) Steel Hulls

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

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LUB L-11 5200.9 (3/27/41)

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.

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DE 151

LNU L 11 5200.9 (9/27/53)

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As of June 1, 1942

Type, Number and Name			Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
				June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
ESCORT VESSELS (Cont'd)													
DE151	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			11-5/6		12/10/43#	3/25/44	3.5-	DE151
DE152	(s)	†	Consolidated Steel Co.	0.5	0.5			11-2/3		12/15/43#	3/25/44	3.4-	DE152
DE153	(s)	†	Norfolk Navy Yard					10		12/30/42#	10/30/43\$	10.0-	DE153
DE154	(s)	†	Norfolk Navy Yard					7		1/ 6/43\$	11/1/43\$	10.3-	DE154
DE155	(s)	†	Norfolk Navy Yard					6		1/20/43\$	11/30/43\$	10.4-	DE155
DE156	(s)	†	Norfolk Navy Yard					5-1/6		3/15/43#	12/15/43\$	9.0-	DE156
DE157	(s)	†	Norfolk Navy Yard					4-1/6		3/22/43#	12/25/43\$	9.0-	DE157
DE158	(s)	†	Norfolk Navy Yard					3-1/3		4/ 6/43#	1/15/44\$	9.3-	DE158
DE159	(s)	†	Norfolk Navy Yard					5		5/15/43#	4/15/44\$	11.0-	DE159
DE160	(s)	†	Norfolk Navy Yard					4-3/5		5/29/43#	5/15/44\$	11.2-	DE160
DE161	(s)	†	Norfolk Navy Yard					4-1/4		6/15/43#	6/15/44\$	12.0-	DE161
DE162	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-1/2		4/15/43#	8/12/43\$	3.9-	DE162
DE163	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-2/3		4/22/43#	8/19/43\$	3.9-	DE163
DE164	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-1/2		4/29/43#	8/26/43\$	3.9-	DE164
DE165	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-2/3		5/ 6/43#	9/ 2/43\$	3.9-	DE165
DE166	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-1/2		5/13/43#	9/ 9/43\$	3.2-	DE166
DE167	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-2/3		5/20/43#	9/16/43\$	3.9-	DE167
DE168	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-1/2		5/27/43#	9/23/43\$	3.9-	DE168
DE169	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-2/3		6/ 3/43#	9/30/43\$	3.9-	DE169
DE170	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-1/2		6/10/43#	10/ 7/43\$	4.0-	DE170
DE171	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-2/3		6/17/43#	10/14/43\$	4.0-	DE171
DE172	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-1/2		6/24/43#	10/21/43\$	3.9-	DE172
DE173	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					7-2/3		7/ 1/43#	10/28/43\$	3.9-	DE173
DE174	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6		8/19/43#	12/16/43\$	4.0-	DE174
DE175	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6-1/3		8/26/43#	12/23/43\$	3.8-	DE175
DE176	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6		9/ 2/43#	12/30/43\$	3.9-	DE176
DE177	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6-1/4		9/ 9/43#	1/ 6/44\$	3.9-	DE177
DE178	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6		9/16/43#	1/13/44\$	3.9-	DE178
DE179	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6-1/4		9/23/43#	1/20/44\$	3.9-	DE179
DE180	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6		9/30/43#	1/27/44\$	3.9-	DE180

(s) Steel Hulls.

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

\$ Revised Estimate.

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.

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N.B.S. (745)-9 (9/27/53)

As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name			Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
				June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
ESCORT VESSELS (Cont'd)													
DE181	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6-1/4		10/ 7/43#	2/ 3/44\$	3.9-	DE181
DE182	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6		10/14/43#	2/10/44\$	3.9-	DE182
DE183	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6-1/4		10/21/43#	2/17/44\$	3.9-	DE183
DE184	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6		10/28/43#	2/24/44\$	3.9-	DE184
DE185	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					6-1/3		11/ 4/43#	3/ 2/44\$	3.9-	DE185
DE186	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-1/2		11/18/43#	3/16/44\$	3.9-	DE186
DE187	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-2/3		11/25/43#	3/23/44\$	3.9-	DE187
DE188	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-1/2		12/ 2/43#	3/30/44\$	3.9-	DE188
DE189	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-2/3		12/ 9/43#	4/ 6/44\$	3.9-	DE189
DE190	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-1/2		12/16/43#	4/13/44\$	3.9-	DE190
DE191	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-2/3		12/23/43#	4/20/44\$	3.9-	DE191
DE192	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-1/2		12/30/43#	4/27/44\$	3.9-	DE192
DE193	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-2/3		1/ 6/44#	5/ 4/44\$	3.9-	DE193
DE194	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-1/2		1/13/44#	5/11/44\$	3.9-	DE194
DE195	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-2/3		1/20/44#	5/18/44\$	3.9-	DE195
DE196	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-1/2		1/27/44#	5/25/44\$	3.9-	DE196
DE197	(s)	†	Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.					4-2/3		2/ 3/44#	6/ 1/44\$	3.9-	DE197
DE198	(s)	†	(b)										DE198
DE199	(s)	†	(b)										DE199
DE200	(s)	†	(b)										DE200
DE201	(s)	†	(b)										DE201
DE202	(s)	†	(b)										DE202
DE203	(s)	†	(b)										DE203
DE204	(s)	†	(b)										DE204
DE205	(s)	†	(b)										DE205

(s) Steel Hulls.

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

(b) Assignment to builder pending. Vessels previously awarded James River S.B. Corp. Cont. NObs402 cancelled.

\$ Revised Estimate.

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41

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N.B.S.(745)

As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name			Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
				June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
ESCORT VESSELS (Cont'd)													
DE206	(s)	†	(b)										DE206
DE207	(s)	†	(b)										DE207
DE208	(s)	†	(b)										DE208
DE209	(s)	†	(b)										DE209
DE210	(s)	†	(b)										DE210
DE211	(s)	†	(b)										DE211
DE212	(s)	†	(b)										DE212
DE213	(s)	†	(b)										DE213
DE214	(s)	†	(b)										DE214
DE215	(s)	†	(b)										DE215
DE216	(s)	†	(b)										DE216
DE217	(s)	†	(b)										DE217
DE218	(s)	†	(b)										DE218
DE219	(s)	†	(b)										DE219
DE220	(s)	†	(b)										DE220
DE221	(s)	†	(b)										DE221
DE222	(s)	†	(b)										DE222
DE223	(s)	†	(b)										DE223
DE224	(s)	†	(b)										DE224
DE225	(s)	†	(b)										DE225
DE226	(s)	†	(b)										DE226
DE227	(s)	†	(b)										DE227
DE228	(s)	†	(b)										DE228
DE229	(s)	†	(b)										DE229
DE230	(s)	†	(b)										DE230

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(s) Steel Hulls.

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

(b) Assignment to builder pending. Vessels previously awarded James River S.B. Corp., Cont. NObs402 cancelled.

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As of June 1, 1942

As of June 1, 1942													
Type, Number and Name			Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1 '41 Prediction	Type and Number
				June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
ESCORT VESSELS (Cont'd)													
DE231	(s)	†	(b)									DE231	
DE232	(s)	†	(b)									DE232	
DE233	(s)	†	(b)									DE233	
DE234	(s)	†	(b)									DE234	
DE235	(s)	†	(b)									DE235	
DE236	(s)	†	(b)									DE236	
DE237	(s)	†	(b)									DE237	
DE238	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	0.5	0.5			11		6/ 1/43#	6/ 1/43	0.0	DE238
DE239	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	0.5	0.5			11-1/2		7/ 1/43#	7/ 1/43	0.0	DE239
DE240	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	0.5	0.5			11-4/5		7/24/43#	7/24/43	0.0	DE240
DE241	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	0.5	0.5			12		8/15/43#	8/15/43	0.0	DE241
DE242	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	0.5	0.5			12		9/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43	0.0	DE242
DE243	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	0.5	0.5			12		9/15/43#	9/15/43	0.0	DE243
DE244	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	0.5	0.5			10		10/ 1/43#	10/ 1/43	0.0	DE244
DE245	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.					10		10/15/43#	10/15/43	0.0	DE245
DE246	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	0.5	0.5			10		11/ 1/43#	11/ 1/43	0.0	DE246
DE247	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	0.5	0.5			10		11/15/43#	11/15/43	0.0	DE247
DE248	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	0.5	0.5			10		12/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43	0.0	DE248
DE249	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.	0.5	0.5			10		12/15/43#	12/15/43	0.0	DE249
DE250	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.					8		1/ 1/44#	1/ 1/44	0.0	DE250
DE251	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.					8		1/15/44#	1/15/44	0.0	DE251
DE252	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.					8		2/ 1/44#	2/ 1/44	0.0	DE252
DE253	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.					8		2/15/44#	2/15/44	0.0	DE253
DE254	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.					8		3/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44	0.0	DE254
DE255	(s)	†	Brown Shipbldg. Co.					8		3/15/44#	3/15/44	0.0	DE255

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.

(s) Steel Hulls.
 † Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

(b) Assignment to builder pending. Vessels previously awarded James River S.B. Corp. Cont. NObs402 cancelled.

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Safe
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Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
			June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
SUBMARINES (1526 Ton) (Cont'd)												
SS293	DRAGONET	Cramp S. B. Co.	5.9	2.3	4/28/42		17		1/ 1/44#	10/ 1/43 (a)	3.0+	SS293
SS294	ESCOLAR	Cramp S. B. Co.	1.2	0.7			17		3/ 1/44#	11/ 1/43 (a)	3.0+	SS294
SS295	HACKLEBACK	Cramp S. B. Co.	0.9	0.4			17		5/ 1/44#	1/15/44 (a)	3.6+	SS295
SS296	LANCETFISH	Cramp S. B. Co.	0.2	0.0			17		6/15/44#	3/ 1/44 (a)	3.7+	SS296
SS297	LING	Cramp S. B. Co.	0.2	0.0			17		8/ 1/44#	4/15/44 (a)	3.6+	SS297
SS298	LIONFISH	Cramp S. B. Co.	0.2	0.0			17		9/15/44#	5/15/44 (a)	4.0+	SS298
SS299	MANTA	Cramp S. B. Co.	0.2	0.0			17		11/ 1/44#	6/15/44 (a)	5.5+	SS299
SS300	MORAY	Cramp S. B. Co.	0.2	0.0			17		12/ 1/44#	7/15/44 (a)	5.5+	SS300
SS301	RONCADOR	Cramp S. B. Co.	0.2	0.0			17		1/ 1/45#	8/15/44 (a)	5.5+	SS301
SS302	SABALO	Cramp S. B. Co.	0.2	0.0			17		2/ 1/45#	9/15/44 (a)	5.5+	SS302
SS303	SABLEFISH	Cramp S. B. Co.	0.2	0.0			17		3/ 1/45#	10/15/44 (a)	4.5+	SS303
SS304	SEAHORSE	Mare Island	1.2	0.5			10		5/ 1/43#	5/ 1/43	0.0	SS304
SS305	SKATE	Mare Island	1.2	0.5			10		6/ 1/43#	6/ 1/43	0.0	SS305
SS306	TANG	Mare Island	0.8	0.5			12		10/ 1/43#	10/ 1/43	0.0	SS306
SS307	TILEFISH	Mare Island	0.8	0.5			12		11/ 1/43#	11/ 1/43	0.0	SS307
SS308		Portsmouth					10-3/5		10/16/43#	10/16/43	0.0	SS308
SS309		Portsmouth					10		10/30/43#	10/30/43	0.0	SS309
SS310		Portsmouth					10		11/27/43#	11/27/43	0.0	SS310
SS311		Portsmouth					10-1/4		12/22/43#	12/22/43	0.0	SS311
SS312		Portsmouth					9-3/5		12/30/43#	12/30/43	0.0	SS312
SS313		Electric Boat Co.										SS313
SS314		Electric Boat Co.										SS314

(a) Completion of vessels dependent on delivery of main propulsion units.

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/1/41

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As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name			Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
				June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
ESCORT VESSELS (Cont'd)													
DE256	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-1/2		10/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43\$	2.0-	DE256
DE257	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-2/5		10/10/43#	12/ 8/43\$	1.7-	DE257
DE258	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			7		10/25/43#	12/15/43\$	1.7-	DE258
DE259	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			7-1/4		11/ 5/43#	12/23/43\$	1.6-	DE259
DE260	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-1/2		11/15/43#	1/15/44\$	2.0-	DE260
DE261	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-2/3		11/25/43#	1/23/44\$	1.9-	DE261
DE262	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-1/2		12/10/43#	2/ 1/44\$	1.7-	DE262
DE263	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-2/5		12/20/43#	2/ 8/44\$	1.6-	DE263
DE264	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			7		1/ 1/44#	2/15/44\$	1.5-	DE264
DE265	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			7-1/4		1/10/44#	2/23/44\$	1.4-	DE265
DE266	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			7-1/2		1/25/44#	3/ 1/44\$	1.2-	DE266
DE267	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			7-4/5		2/ 5/44#	3/ 8/44\$	1.1-	DE267
DE268	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-1/2		2/15/44#	3/15/44\$	1.0-	DE268
DE269	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-2/3		2/25/44#	3/23/44\$	0.9-	DE269
DE270	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-1/2		3/10/44#	4/ 1/44\$	0.7-	DE270
DE271	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-4/5		3/20/44#	4/ 8/44\$	0.6-	DE271
DE272	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			7		4/ 1/44#	4/15/44\$	0.4-	DE272
DE273	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-1/4		4/10/44#	4/23/44\$	0.4-	DE273
DE274	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			7-1/2		4/25/44#	5/ 1/44\$	0.2-	DE274
DE275	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			7-4/5		5/ 5/44#	5/ 8/44\$	0.1-	DE275
DE276	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-1/2		5/15/44#	5/15/44\$	0.0	DE276
DE277	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-2/3		5/25/44#	5/23/44\$	0.1+	DE277
DE278	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-1/2		6/10/44#	6/ 1/44\$	0.3+	DE278
DE279	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			6-4/5		6/20/44#	6/ 8/44\$	0.4+	DE279
DE280	(s)	†	Boston Navy Yard	0.2	0.2			7		7/ 1/44#	6/15/44\$	0.5+	DE280
DE281	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		9/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43\$	0.0	DE281
DE282	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		9/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43\$	0.0	DE282
DE283	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		9/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43\$	0.0	DE283
DE284	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		9/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43\$	0.0	DE284
DE285	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		10/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43\$	1.0+	DE285

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(s) Steel Hulls

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.

\$ Revised Estimate.

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As of June 1, 1942

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Type, Number and Name			Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
				June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
ESCORT VESSELS			(Cont'd)										
DE286	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		10/ 1/43#	9/ 1/43	1.0+	DE286
DE287	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		12/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43\$	0.0	DE287
DE288	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		12/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43\$	0.0	DE288
DE289	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		12/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43\$	0.0	DE289
DE290	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		12/ 1/43#	12/ 1/43\$	0.0	DE290
DE291	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		1/ 1/44#	12/ 1/43	1.0+	DE291
DE292	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		1/ 1/44#	12/ 1/43	1.0+	DE292
DE293	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		1/ 1/44#	3/15/44\$	2.5-	DE293
DE294	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		1/ 1/44#	3/15/44\$	2.5-	DE294
DE295	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		3/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44\$	0.0	DE295
DE296	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		3/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44\$	0.0	DE296
DE297	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		3/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44\$	0.0	DE297
DE298	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		3/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44\$	0.0	DE298
DE299	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		4/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44	1.0+	DE299
DE300	(s)	†	Charleston Navy Yard	0.3	0.1			8		4/ 1/44#	3/ 1/44	1.0+	DE300
SUBMARINES			(1526 ton)										
SS217	GUARDPISH		Elec. Boat Co.	Del'd & Comm'd.	5/ 8/42.							1.4+	SS217
SS218	ALBACORE		Elec. Boat Co.	100.0	1.8	4/21/41	2/17/42	13-5/6	12/ 1/42	7/14/42	6/ 1/42\$	1.6+	SS218
SS219	AMBERJACK		Elec. Boat Co.	98.7	2.6	5/15/41	3/ 6/42	13-1/6	1/16/43	8/ 6/42	6/19/42\$	1.0+	SS219
SS220	BARB		Elec. Boat Co.	96.5	4.3	6/ 7/41	4/ 2/42	13-5/6	3/ 1/43	9/ 1/42	8/ 3/42	1.0+	SS220
SS221	BLACKPISH		Elec. Boat Co.	91.3	7.2	7/ 1/41	4/18/42	13-3/5	4/16/43	9/21/42	8/18/42	1.0+	SS221
SS222	BLUEPISH		Elec. Boat Co.	16.8	4.1			13-1/2	2/24/44	8/19/43	7/20/43	1.0+	SS222
SS223	BONEPISH		Elec. Boat Co.	14.6	3.2			13-1/4	3/24/44	9/21/43	8/21/43	1.0+	SS223
SS224	COD		Elec. Boat Co.	13.2	3.0			13-1/4	4/24/44	10/21/43	9/21/43	1.0+	SS224
SS225	CERO		Elec. Boat Co.	11.4	2.6			13-1/4	5/24/44	11/20/43	10/21/43	1.0+	SS225
SS226	CORVINA		Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			13-1/5	6/24/44	12/21/43	11/20/43	1.0+	SS226
SS227	DARTER		Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			13-1/4	7/24/44	1/20/44	12/21/43	1.0+	SS227
SS232	HALIBUT*		Portsmouth	Completed 5/13/42.									SS232
SS233	HERRING**		Portsmouth	97.0	10.0	7/14/41	1/15/42	10-5/6	4/12/43	7/25/42	6/10/42\$	1.5+	SS233
SS234	KINGFISH***		Portsmouth	94.2	11.1	8/29/41	3/ 2/42	9-3/5	6/28/43	9/ 5/42	6/17/42\$	2.6+	SS234
SS235	SHAD		Portsmouth	85.0	11.0	10/24/41	4/15/42	8-2/3	9/12/43	10/17/42	7/15/42\$	3.0+	SS235

(s) Steel Hulls.

† Authorized in the 1799 vessel program upon request of the British.

* Commissioned 10 April 1942

** Commissioned 1 May 1942.

*** Commissioned 20 May 1942.

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.

\$ Revised Estimate.

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Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
			June 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
SUBMARINES (1526 Ton) (Cont'd)												
SS238	WAHOO *	Mare Island	94.3	6.1	6/28/41	2/14/42	12	3/28/43	8/ 1/42	6/27/42\$	1.1+	SS238
SS239	WHALE	Mare Island	88.1	4.4	6/28/41	3/14/42	13	6/28/43	9/ 1/42	8/ 1/42	1.0+	SS239
SS240	ANGLER	Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			13-1/4	8/24/44	2/14/44	1/14/44	1.0+	SS240
SS241	BASHAW	Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			13-1/6	9/24/44	3/ 7/44	2/ 7/44	1.0+	SS241
SS242	BLUEGILL	Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			13-1/3	10/24/44	4/ 1/44	3/ 1/44	1.0+	SS242
SS243	BREAM	Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			13-1/6	11/24/44	4/19/44	3/20/44	1.0+	SS243
SS244	CAVALLA	Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			13-1/4	12/24/44	5/15/44	4/15/44	1.0+	SS244
SS245	COBIA	Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			13-1/6	1/24/45	6/ 7/44	5/ 6/44	1.0+	SS245
SS246	CROAKER	Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			13-1/5	2/24/45	7/ 6/44	6/ 7/44	1.0+	SS246
SS247	DACE	Elec. Boat Co.	14.4	3.6			16	3/24/45	8/ 7/44	11/21/43	8.5+	SS247
SS248	DORADO	Elec. Boat Co.	12.2	2.8			15-1/3	4/24/45	9/ 7/44	12/18/43	8.6+	SS248
SS249	FLASHER	Elec. Boat Co.	10.6	2.2			14-5/6	5/24/45	10/ 5/44	1/14/44	8.7+	SS249
SS250	FLIER	Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			14-2/5	6/24/45	11/ 7/44	2/10/44	8.9+	SS250
SS251	FLOUNDER	Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			14-1/3	7/24/45	12/ 1/44	3/11/44	8.6+	SS251
SS252	GABILAN	Elec. Boat Co.	9.8	2.0			14	8/24/45	12/21/44	4/ 8/44	8.4+	SS252
SS253	GUNNEL	Elec. Boat Co.	87.1	7.1	7/21/41	5/17/42	13-5/6	6/ 1/43	10/15/42	9/17/42	0.9+	SS253
SS254	GURNARD	Elec. Boat Co.	82.7	9.9	9/ 2/41		13	7/16/43	11/ 5/42	10/ 1/42	1.1+	SS254
SS255	HADDO	Elec. Boat Co.	75.0	9.7	10/ 1/41		13	9/ 1/43	12/ 7/42	10/31/42	1.2+	SS255
SS256	HAKE	Elec. Boat Co.	66.9	8.4	11/ 1/41		13-1/5	10/16/43	1/ 7/43	12/ 7/42	1.0+	SS256
SS257	HARDER	Elec. Boat Co.	55.8	8.1	12/ 1/41		13-1/4	12/ 1/43	2/ 6/43	1/ 8/43	1.0+	SS257
SS258	HOE	Elec. Boat Co.	48.4	7.4	1/ 2/42		13	1/16/44	3/ 6/43	2/ 6/43	1.0+	SS258
SS259	JACK	Elec. Boat Co.	41.3	9.9	2/ 2/42		13	8/24/43	4/ 6/43	3/ 6/43	1.0+	SS259
SS260	LAPON	Elec. Boat Co.	35.7	9.1	2/21/42		13-1/3	9/24/43	5/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	1.0+	SS260
SS261	MINGO	Elec. Boat Co.	31.9	10.4	3/21/42		13	10/24/43	5/20/43	4/21/43	1.0+	SS261
SS262	MUSKALLUNGE	Elec. Boat Co.	32.6	15.0	4/ 7/42		13-1/4	11/24/43	6/15/43	5/15/43	1.0+	SS262
SS263	PADDLE	Elec. Boat Co.	22.6	7.4	5/ 1/42		13-1/6	12/24/43	7/ 6/43	6/ 5/43	1.0+	SS263
SS264	PARGO	Elec. Boat Co.	18.5	4.7	5/21/42		13-1/3	1/24/44	8/ 2/43	7/ 1/43	1.0+	SS264
SS265	PETO	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	83.8	5.0	6/18/41	4/30/42	15-2/5	8/ 4/43	6/ 1/43	10/ 1/42\$	8.0+	SS265
SS266	POGY	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	72.1	11.7	9/15/41		14-1/5	11/ 4/43	9/ 1/43	11/21/42\$	9.3+	SS266
SS267	POMPON	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	57.0	10.5	11/26/41		13-1/2	2/ 4/44	11/24/43	1/10/43\$	10.5+	SS267

* Commissioned 15 May 1942.

\$ Revised Estimate.

247an21

As of June 1, 1942

B-6

Type, Number and Name		Contractor	Percentage of Completion		Keel Laid	Launched	No. of Mos. Keel Laying to Completion	Date of Completion			Months Ahead(+) or Behind(-) 11/1/41 Prediction	Type and Number
			June 1 1942 TOTAL	Gain for May 1942 TOTAL				As per Contract or Order	As Reported by Building Yard 11-1-41	As Last Reported by Building Yard		
SUBMARINES (1526 Ton) (Cont'd)												
SS268	PUPPEP	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	35.1	8.5	2/16/42		12-2/3	4/ 4/44	2/ 6/44	3/ 7/43\$	11.0+	SS268
SS269	RASHER	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	25.2	8.3	5/ 4/42		11-5/6	6/ 4/44	4/18/44	4/30/43\$	11.6+	SS269
SS270	RATON	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	18.2	7.2	5/29/42		12-2/5	1/ 4/45	6/24/44	6/12/43\$	12.4+	SS270
SS271	RAY	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	11.5	2.0			12-3/5	3/ 4/45	9/ 1/44	7/30/43\$	13.1+	SS271
SS272	REDPIN	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	10.0	0.5			12-3/5	5/ 4/45	2/ 6/44	9/18/43\$	4.6+	SS272
SS273	ROBALO	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	10.0	0.5			12-3/5	7/ 4/45	1/ 6/45	11/ 6/43\$	14.0+	SS273
SS274	ROCK	Manitowoc S. B. Co.	10.0	0.5			12-3/5	9/ 4/45	3/ 2/45	12/25/43\$	14.2+	SS274
SS275	RUNKER	Portsmouth	56.0	14.0	2/ 8/41	5/30/42	10-4/5	5/ 1/43	11/28/42	10/31/42	0.9+	SS275
SS276	SAWFISH	Portsmouth	45.2	16.3	1/20/42		10	7/ 1/43	1/ 9/43	11/20/42	1.6+	SS276
SS277	SCAMP	Portsmouth	36.8	13.3	3/ 6/42		9-1/6	9/ 1/43	2/20/43	12/10/42	2.3+	SS277
SS278	SCORPION	Portsmouth	28.5	10.3	3/20/42		9	11/ 1/43	4/10/43	12/19/42	3.7+	SS278
SS279	SNOOK	Portsmouth	24.9	11.3	4/17/42		9	1/ 2/44	5/22/43	1/20/43	4.1+	SS279
SS280	STEELHEAD	Portsmouth	22.5	11.5			8-3/5	3/ 1/44	6/26/43	2/20/43	4.2+	SS280
SS281	SUNFISH	Mare Island	75.3	6.2	9/25/41	5/ 2/42	11-2/3	10/ 1/43	10/15/42	9/15/42\$	1.0+	SS281
SS282	TUNNY	Mare Island	70.9	13.3	11/10/41		11-1/6	1/ 2/44	12/ 1/42	10/15/42\$	1.6+	SS282
SS283	TINGSA	Mare Island	35.9	11.8	2/21/42		12-1/3	7/ 1/43	4/ 1/43	3/ 1/43\$	1.0+	SS283
SS284	TULI BEE	Mare Island	29.4	8.9	4/ 1/42		12	8/ 1/43	5/ 1/43	4/ 1/43\$	1.0+	SS284
SS285	BALAO	Portsmouth	1.9	0.8			9-2/3		6/ 1/43#	4/20/43	1.4+	SS285
SS286	BILLFISH	Portsmouth	1.9	0.8			9-1/4		6/20/43#	5/ 1/43	1.6+	SS286
SS287	BOWPIN	Portsmouth	1.9	0.8			9-1/4		7/15/43#	5/11/43	2.1+	SS287
SS288	CABRILLA	Portsmouth	1.9	0.8			9-1/4		9/ 4/43#	6/11/43	2.8+	SS288
SS289	CAPELIN	Portsmouth	1.9	0.8			9-1/6		10/ 3/43#	7/24/43	2.3+	SS289
SS290	CISCO	Portsmouth	1.9	0.8			9		11/ 2/43#	8/20/43	2.4+	SS290
SS291	CREVALLE	Portsmouth	1.9	0.8			9-5/6		11/24/43#	9/15/43	2.3+	SS291
SS292	DEVILFISH	Cramp S. B. Co.	11.2	4.2	3/31/42		16		11/ 1/43#	8/ 1/43	3.0+	SS292

* Based on completion by Manitowoc S.B. Co. prior to operation by sub-contractor Electric Boat Co. preparatory to delivery to Government

First estimate submitted subsequent to 11/ 1/41.
\$ Revised Estimate.

247an 22

Safe: Navy
JUN 9 1912
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Memo for the President—

Herewith
the formal request by the
Navy Dept for action by
the Atty Gen in the Johnston
Case.

Jab. says he does not think a
charge of treason would lie
in this case

JK

2472081

JAG:CA:lb

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

JUN 9 1942

Sir:

I recommend that immediate action be taken by your department to obtain indictments under the Espionage Act (50 USC 31) against Mr. Stanley Johnston, a newspaper correspondent now in this city, Mr. J. L. Maloney, managing editor of the Chicago Tribune and such other individuals and/or corporations as are implicated in the unauthorized publication of a newspaper article which appeared in the Sunday Times-Herald, Washington, D. C. on June 7, 1942, under the caption "UNITED STATES NAVY KNEW IN ADVANCE ALL ABOUT JAP FLEET."

A copy of the aforesaid newspaper article is transmitted herewith for your ready reference. I understand that this article also appeared in the Chicago Tribune, the New York Evening News, and the San Francisco Chronicle. Its publication involved the disclosure of secret and confidential information pertaining to the national defense of this country, for which all those to blame should be prosecuted as promptly and vigorously as possible—not only because the enormity of their crime demands severe punishment but in order that the action taken by our Government in this case may serve as a warning to others.

It is not necessary or desirable that the facts of this matter be fully set forth in this letter. Our evidence will be laid before the representative of your department who is placed in charge of the prosecution. For the present, I assume it will be readily apparent to your department that even the caption of the aforesaid article discloses secret and confidential information to the detriment of our national defense, in that it puts the enemy on notice that our Navy has been able to obtain advance information concerning the strength and movement of his forces, thereby assisting him to locate and close sources of military information vitally important in our future conduct of the war.

In somewhat further detail, I may add that Mr. Johnston was on board a vessel of our Navy returning from the Coral Sea when a secret and confidential dispatch was received on board from the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet. The contents of the article published in Sunday's Times-Herald and other newspapers

247a0 Q2

leaves no room for reasonable doubt in the mind of any intelligent person that Mr. Johnston "lawfully or unlawfully" came into possession of the said dispatch and willfully communicated the same to his publishers who, in turn, disclosed it to the world.

One provision of law which has been clearly violated in this matter is clause (d) of section 31, Title 50, U. S. Code, which reads as follows:

"whoever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being intrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, willfully communicates or transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it * * * shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years and may, in the discretion of the court, be fined not more than \$10,000."

May I ask that upon receipt of this letter, you have your representative communicate with Vice Admiral Russell Willson, Chief of Staff of the United States Fleet, Room 3056, Navy Building, Telephone extension 4901, who will promptly furnish all additional information which your department may need for presentation of this matter to the grand jury.

Very truly yours,



Enclosure (1)

The Honorable
The Attorney General.

2472003

U. S. Navy Knew In Advance All About Jap Fleet

**Guessed There Would
Be Feint at One Base,
Real Attack at Another**

The strength of the Japanese with which the American Navy is battling somewhere west of Midway Island in what is believed to be the greatest naval battle of the war was well known in American naval circles, reliable sources in the Naval Intelligence disclosed here tonight.

The Navy learned of the gathering of the powerful Japanese units soon after they put forth from their bases, it was said. Although their purpose was not specifically known at that time, the information in the hands of the Navy Department was so definite that a feint at some American base, to be accompanied by a serious effort to invade and occupy another base, was predicted. Guesses were even made that Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians and Midway Island in the Hawaiian group might be targets.

In Three Sections

It was known that the Japanese fleet—the most powerful yet used in this war—was broken into three sections—first, a striking force; next a support force, and finally an occupation fleet.

It was apparent to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's strategists in Hawaii that the feint would probably be made by the supporting force, the real blow struck by the striking fleet, with the occupation force standing by, ready to land troops as soon as defenses were broken down.

Had the attack on Midway been successful, Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands would have been the next point of attack.

The advance information enabled the American Navy to make full use of air attacks on the approaching Japanese ships, turning the struggle into an air battle along the modern lines of naval warfare.

Exactly how the Japanese disposed their units as between Dutch Harbor and the Midway Islands is not known here.

How Forces Were Divided

However, before the fleet was divided for attacks on the Aleutians and Midway, the various forces were made up approximately as follows according to Navy information here.

The striking force: Four aircraft carriers, the Akaga and Kaga of 26,900 tons each, and the Hiryu and Soryu, of 10,000 tons each.

Two battleships of the Kirishima class—29,300 tons, with 14-inch guns.

Two cruisers of the Tone class—new 8,500-ton 6.1-inch gun ships.

Twelve destroyers.

Support Force

The support force is described by the same source as comprising:

One aircraft carrier of the Ryu-kyo class, 7,100 tons.

Two Kirishima class battleships.

Four new 8,500-ton cruisers of the Mogami class—including the Mogami, the Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano—with 15 guns of 6.1-inch calibers.

One light cruiser.

Ten destroyers.

Occupation Force

The occupation force included:

Four cruisers—the Chakas, Myoko, Chitose and Choda, all believed of 8,500 tons with main batteries of 6-inch guns.

Two armored transports of the Kunikuma Maru class—converted liners.

Four to six troopships.

Eight to 12 supply vessels.

Twelve destroyers.

Ten submarines.

Well informed as it was, the Navy was on the alert for the first movements of this force. When it turned eastward into the Pacific from the vicinity on the Chishima or Kurile Island chain all American outposts were warned.

Real Goal Concealed

American naval dispositions were made in preparation for the various possible attacks the Japs were believed to be planning. Up to this time the Japanese had not committed themselves to any action. They were still in position to turn their real threat against either Dutch Harbor or Midway. By last Tuesday the Americans were able to conclude that a feint was to be made at Dutch Harbor.

Meanwhile, preparations among all available American forces in the vicinity of Midway were being rushed in the hope of striking a telling blow against the Japs. The wisdom of this course became apparent on Wednesday when the feint was made in the form of air raids on Dutch Harbor. The same day the fleets in the Midway area commenced their now historic battle.

a47a024

From: Washington Times-Herald

Date JUN 1942

13F
Sub
J

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN McCREA

Have you got the June first
completion progress figures for
definite types of ships, as I
would like to take it to Hyde
Park with me?

F. D. R.

*Please put in the
President's basket to
go to Hyde Park*

a47ap01

17032

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
Box*

September 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you speak to Secretary
Knox about this?

F.D.R.

17 September

I explained this date to
Secretary Knox the cover plans
contemplated to meet the
danger noted in his letter
of 15 September. W(0441004)

W.W.L.

2472901

EPSE: Safe, Navy

51270

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1942

(SC)A7-2/EF13
(044100A)

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

My dear Mr. President:

I have just had a confidential letter from my London correspondent, Bill Stoneman. I should like to quote from his letter for your information. He says:

"In this connection it is very important for you to know that people in London are already talking about our plans for the immediate future. Most of the people who talk about the business are newspapermen but that doesn't mean that others don't hear about it. Unless this stops the French and Germans will both hear about it and then it will be awfully hard or even impossible for us to get away with it. I would be the last person to try to suggest that honorable newspapermen shouldn't be trusted with the most confidential news but this time I think that the gossip is a little bit too widespread for comfort.

"Without embarrassing you by telling you what I personally know I may say that acquaintances of mine have been informed by their various sources that 1) we are going into Tunis in 5 weeks, 2) the American fleet left Scapa some time ago and is now being prepared for the North African show, 3) it is going to be an American show."


It is simply terrible that a situation like this should arise. It is not a thing that can be met by denials, but how would it do in order to cast doubt over our intentions, to create a staff and go through all the motions of preparing for an expedition elsewhere, say into Northern Norway and then let these plans be sure to leak out? Of course, there is nothing new or original about this suggestion, but it has worked before and it might work again. In the jittery state of the German mind, it might be effective.

Yours sincerely,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The President
The White House

a47ag02



COCOS ISLAND

NORTHEAST PROFILE

ALTITUDE OF PLANE 4500 FT.

1099LHb

05



PX 71-38 (7)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

0207

DATE 14 MAR 1942

NORTHERN COAST OF ALBEMARLE ISLAND, BETWEEN
ALBEMARLE POINT AND CAPE BERKELEY, SHOWING POINT THAT
MIGHT BE MISTAKEN FOR ALBEMARLE POINT WHICH IS FURTHER
EAST.

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH

BY ORDER OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a476602

EX 71-37(19)

Q16 n19/161-18 (370084)

Hydro Office

a47col



51

PX 71-38(8)

362

DATE 14 MAR 1942

BOAT LANDING AT VILLAMIL, ALBEMARLE ISLAND,
IS MARKED "X".

PHOTOGRAPH
OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972


By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

047cc02



Wafer Bay

PX71-37(18)




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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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PX 71-38(9)

GARDNER BAY, HOOD ISLAND.

A U.S.N.A.P PHOTOGRAPH
NO. 70-100

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972
ADD

OSD letter, May 3, 1972
APR 6 1973
By RT, NARS Date _____

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Wafer Bay

PX 71-37(17)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

947e02



111

a47ee01

PA 71-38 (10)

DATE 1 MAR 1942

WRECK BAY, CHATHAM ISLAND.

FOR THE U. S. NAVAL PHOTOGRAPH
DIVISION, BY ORDER OF THE
CHIEF OF BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973


a47 eeo2



047621

Wafer Bay
Eaton Head

PX 71-37(16)



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E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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CH 70

PX 71-38 (11)

32	DATE 14 MAR 1942
GARDNER BAY, HOOD ISLAND.	
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH	
NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date _____

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Wafer Bay
Eaton Head

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By ET, NARS Date APR 6 1973

a47902



PA 71-38 (12)

8291 DATE 14 MAR 1949
UNNAMED COVE, SE OF GARDNER BAY, HOOD ISLAND.
MARINE ALGAE ZONE
TIDAL ZONE.
A. J. J. PHOTOGRAPH
BY ORDER OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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PX 71-37(14)

Lionel Head

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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112

a47hh01

PK 71-38(13)

8231 DATE 12 MAR 1942
SUBJECT FRESHWATER BAY, CHATHAM ISLAND.
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182. 31 AUG
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186. 4 SEP
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203. 21 SEP
204. 22 SEP
205. 23 SEP
206. 24 SEP
207. 25 SEP
208. 26 SEP
209. 27 SEP
210. 28 SEP
211. 29 SEP
212. 30 SEP
213. 1 OCT
214. 2 OCT
215. 3 OCT
216. 4 OCT
217. 5 OCT
218. 6 OCT
219. 7 OCT
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238. 26 OCT
239. 27 OCT
240. 28 OCT
241. 29 OCT
242. 30 OCT
243. 31 OCT
244. 1 NOV
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246. 3 NOV
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

a47hho2



947101

PX 71-37(13)

South Coast of Cocos

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
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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

GSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

947102



PX 71-38 (14)

2297

14 MAR 1942

DATE

SUBJECT WRECK BAY, CHATHAM ISLAND.

REF:

1. WRECK BAY, CHATHAM ISLAND
2. WRECK BAY, CHATHAM ISLAND
3. WRECK BAY, CHATHAM ISLAND

OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH
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U.S. GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS AGENCIES.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

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947:01

Nuez Island

PX 71-37(12)

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
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

047:02



7237

2734 MAR 1942

BLUE MOUNTAIN (CERRO AZUL), SW CORNER
OF ALBEMARLE, THE HIGHEST POINT IN THE GALAPAGOS
ARCHIPELAGO. VIEW FROM SOUTH, SHOWING LAVA FLOW
INDICATED ON CHARTS.

MADE FOR
NAVY AIR STATION
P.O. BOX 5012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

PX 71-38 (15)



047k01

Huez I.
Colnett I.

PX 71-37 (11)

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OSD letter, May 3, 1973

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

947K02



a47KKO1

260

141100N 1302

CAPE ROSE, SOUTHERN COAST OF
ALBEMARLE ISLAND, FROM SW.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3¹⁹⁷² APR 6 1973

By IT, NARS Date _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PX 71-38 (16)

a47kk02



947101

Nuez Island

PX71-37(10)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

947102



a47LLO1

PX 71-38 (17)

8297

14 MAR 1942

VILLAGE AND ROADSTEAD OF VILLAMIL, ALBEMARLE I.

FOR

NAVY AND STATION

JOSEPH, CAMP, ILLINOIS

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 1973

947LL02



35

a47m01

Nuez I.

PX 71-37 (9)

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• DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date PR 6 1973

q47mod



a47mm01

PX71-38 (18)

13 MAR 1973
CHRISTOPHER POINT, ALBEMARLE ISLAND,
FROM NORTH.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APP 3 1973

a47mm02



Colnett Point
Nuez I.
Wefer Bay at right

PX 71-37(8)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date PR 6 1973

947202



34

947nn01

Px 71-38(19)

3237

154 MAY 1947

CAPE HAMMOND AND WESTERN SIDE OF
NARBOROUGH ISLAND.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

GSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

947nn02



947001


Colnett Point

PT 71-37 (7)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Excluded
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

947002



PX 71-38 (20)

3297

14 MAR

CAPE HOWARD AND SOUTHERN SIDE OF NARBOROUGH
ISLAND.

NOT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



947p01

Chatham Bay
Conic I. at left.

PX 71-37(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

947p02



36

947pp01

Px 71-35(2)

NARBOROUGH ISLAND, FROM SE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May 2, 1972 APR 6 1973

By RT, NARS Date _____

a 47 pp02



Wafer Bay
Cascara Island

PX71-37(2)

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CLASSIFIED
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

a47902



PX 71-38 (22)

222 MAR 1942
CAPE BERKELEY, ALBEMARLE ISLAND,
FROM NORTH.

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
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 1,652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

247-02



947c01

Chathan Bay

PX 7/-37(1)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

a47r02



PX 71-36(23)

8237

14 NOV 1972

"FOSTER COVE", SW PART OF ELIZABETH BAY,
ALBEMARLE ISLAND.

REL INFORMATION

NOV 14 1972

ANTHROPOLOGY

NOV 14 1972

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
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

047502



Boat Rock

PX 71-37(5)

Nuez Island
Colnett Point

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date 3 1973

a47502



PX71-38(24)

5237

2000

CARTAGO BAY, NW PART, LOOKING SE .

[Faint, illegible text from bleed-through]

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CSD letter, May 3, 1972

E- RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

9475502



247+01

Colnett Point
Nuez Island

71-37(4)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

a47+02



16

a47tt01

PA 71-38 (25)

0211 DATE 14 MAR 1942
SUBJECT BINDLOE ISLAND, SOUTHERN END.

RECEIVED U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH
SECTION ON 17 APR 1942 BY ORDER OF THE
J. P. H. [illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

a47++02



947001

Nuez I.

PX 71-37(3)

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
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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS DATE APR 6 1973

947v02



PX7-38(26)

NO. 321

DATE 11 MAR 1942

FROM: CAPE IBBETSON, PINTA ISLAND, FROM SW.

RE: INFORMATION
RE: 1510, 0111Z 10 MAR

RE: PHOTOGRAPH
RE: COVER OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS DATE APR 6 1973




947v01

PX 71-38(1)

8297

145 00 042

WESTERN SHORE OF "FOSTER COVE", SHOWING
LAVA ARM EXTENDING NORTHWARD WHICH PROVIDES A
LEE WHEN SW OR W WINDS OCCUR.




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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

a47v02



PX 71-38(27)

3227	14 MAR 1942
BINDLOE ISLAND, FROM NORTH.	
CONFIDENTIAL	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

a47vv02



947w.01

Px 71-38 (2)

ANCHORAGE OFF VILLAMIL, ALBEMARLE ISLAND, FOR
LIGHT CRAFT IS CLOSE TO LAVA ROCKS SHOWN IN LEFT SIDE OF
PHOTO.

a47w02



PX 71-38 (28)

8251	DATE 14 MAR 1942
WEST SIDE OF PINTA ISLAND, FROM SOUTH.	
THE WEST SIDE OF PINTA ISLAND, CAPITAL ZONE.	
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH	
TAKEN BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE OF THE	
MILITARY AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC SERVICE.	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

247ww02



24

CH7

PX 71-38(3)

829

JAMES BAY, JAMES ISLAND, FROM WEST.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

a47x02



12

947xx01

PA 71-38 (29)

8292

14 MAR 1962

CAPE CHALMERS, PINTA ISLAND, FROM WEST.

TOGRAPH

OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APP 6 1973

947w02



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PX71-38(4)

CAPE MARSHALL, ALBEMARLE ISLAND.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT; NARS Date APR 6 1973

947402



PX71-38(30)

8297

14 MAR 1942

WEST PINTA ISLAND, FROM NORTH.

RECEIVED INFORMATION
BY THE BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS
ON 14 MAR 1942
PHOTOGRAPH
BY ORDER OF THE
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

9474402



27

a47z01

PX 71-38 (5)

Classified
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

2203

DATE 18 MAR 1972


ALBEMARLE POINT, ALBEMARLE ISLAND, FROM SE

FOR
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION
P.O. BOX 12, GAITHERSBURG, MD.

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a47202



9472201

PX 71-32 (31)

82 DATE 4 MAR 1942
NORTHERN POINT OF PINTA ISLAND, FROM NE.

REMARKS:

WINDY AND CLOUDY. WAVE ACTION!
ON BEACH, CORAL ZONE.

PHOTOGRAPH

SOUTH OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS D.A. APR 6 1973

9472202

SAFE FILE: Plan Dog



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVY MANAGEMENT OFFICE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

WFO:LJE:pl

20 FEB 1956

Combr
56-472

Mr. Herman Kahn, Director
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
Hyde Park, New York

Dear Mr. Kahn:

As requested in your letter of November 10, 1955, the classification status of Admiral H. R. Stark's memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy dated November 12, 1940, bearing the notation Cp-12-CTR and known as "Plan Dog," has been reviewed.

The Chief of Naval Operations has declassified the "Plan Dog Memorandum" and the security classification on the document in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library should be removed.

Very truly yours,

L. J. Darter, Jr.
L. J. Darter
Head, Naval Archives Branch

PSF (Safe) Navy

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-12-CTB

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
~~SECRET~~
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1940.

Memorandum for the Secretary.

Referring to my very brief touch in a recent conference as to the desirability of obtaining at once some light upon the major decisions which the President may make for guiding our future naval effort in the event of war, and in further immediate preparation for war, you may recall my remarks the evening we discussed War Plans for the Navy. I stated then that if Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere; but that if she loses the problem confronting us would be very great; and, while we might not lose everywhere, we might, possibly, not win anywhere.

As I stated last winter on the Hill, in these circumstances we would be set back upon our haunches. Our war effort, instead of being widespread, would then have to be confined to the Western Hemisphere.

I now wish to expand my remarks, and to present to you my views concerning steps we might take to meet the situation that will exist should the United States enter war either alone or with allies. In this presentation, I have endeavored to keep in view the political realities in our own country.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

048601

~~SECRET~~

The first thing to consider is how and where we might become involved.

The immediate war alternatives seem to be:

(a) War with Japan in which we have no allies. This might be precipitated by Japanese armed opposition should we strongly reinforce our Asiatic Fleet or the Philippines Garrison, should we start fortifying Guam, or should we impose additional important economic sanctions; or it might be precipitated by ourselves in case of overt Japanese action against us, or by further extension of Japanese hegemony.

(b) War with Japan in which we have the British Empire, or the British Empire and Netherlands East Indies, as allies. This might be precipitated by one of the causes mentioned in (a), by our movement of a naval reinforcement to Singapore, or by Japanese attack on British or Netherlands territory.

(c) War with Japan in which she is aided by Germany and Italy, and in which we are or are not aided by allies. To the causes of such a war, previously listed, might be added augmented American material assistance to Great Britain, our active military intervention in Britain's favor, or our active resistance to German extension of military activities to the Western Hemisphere.

(d) War with Germany and Italy in which Japan would not be initially involved, and in which we would be allied with the British. Such a war would be initiated by American decision to

intervene for the purpose of preventing the disruption of the British Empire, or German capture of the British Isles.

(e) We should also consider the alternative of now remaining out of war, and devoting ourselves exclusively to building up our defense of the Western Hemisphere, plus the preservation by peaceful means of our Far Eastern interests, and plus also continued material assistance to Great Britain.

As I see it, our major national objectives in the immediate future might be stated as preservation of the territorial, economic, and ideological integrity of the United States, plus that of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; the prevention of the disruption of the British Empire, with all that such a consummation implies; and the diminution of the offensive military power of Japan, with a view to the retention of our economic and political interests in the Far East. It is doubtful, however, that it would be in our interest to reduce Japan to the status of an inferior military and economic power. A balance of power in the Far East is to our interest as much as is a balance of power in Europe.

The questions that confront me are concerned with the preparation and distribution of the naval forces of the United States, in cooperation with its military forces, for use in war in the accomplishment of all or part of these national objectives.

~~SECRET~~

I can only surmise as to the military, political, and economic situation that would exist in the Atlantic should the British Empire collapse. Since Latin-America has rich natural resources, and is the only important area of the world not now under the practical control of strong military powers, we can not dismiss the possibility that, sooner or later, victorious Axis nations might move firmly in that direction. For some years they might remain too weak to attack directly across the sea; their effort more likely would first be devoted to developing Latin American economic dependence, combined with strongly reinforced internal political upheavals for the purpose of establishing friendly regimes in effective military control. The immediacy of danger to us may depend upon the security of the Axis military position in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, the degree of our own military preoccupation in the Pacific, and the disturbing influence of unsatisfied economic needs of Latin-America.

The present situation of the British Empire is not encouraging. I believe it easily possible, lacking active American military assistance, for that empire to lose this war and eventually be disrupted.

It is my opinion that the British are over-optimistic as to their chances for ultimate success. It is not at all sure that the British Isles can hold out, and it may be that they do not realize the danger that will exist should they lose in other regions.

~~SECRET~~

Should Britain lose the war, the military consequences to the United States would be serious.

If we are to prevent the disruption of the British Empire, we must support its vital needs.

Obviously, the British Isles, the "Heart of the Empire", must remain intact.

But even if the British Isles are held, this does not mean that Britain can win the war. To win, she must finally be able to effect the complete, or, at least, the partial collapse of the German Reich.

This result might, conceivably, be accomplished by bombing and by economic starvation through the agency of the blockade. It surely can be accomplished only by military successes on shore, facilitated possibly by over-extension and by internal antagonisms developed by the Axis conquests.

Alone, the British Empire lacks the man power and the material means to master Germany. Assistance by powerful allies is necessary both with respect to men and with respect to munitions and supplies. If such assistance is to function effectively, Britain must not only continue to maintain the blockade, but she must also retain intact geographical positions from which successful land action can later be launched.

Provided England continues to sustain its present successful resistance at home, the area of next concern to the British Empire ought to be the Egyptian Theater.

~~SECRET~~

Should Egypt be lost, the Eastern Mediterranean would be opened to Germany and Italy, the effectiveness of the sea blockade would be largely nullified; Turkey's military position would be fully compromised; and all hope of favorable Russian action would vanish.

Any anti-German offensive in the Near East would then become impossible.

The spot next in importance to Egypt, in my opinion, is Gibraltar, combined with West and Northwest Africa. From this area an ultimate offensive through Portugal, Spain and France, with the help of populations inimical to Germany, might give results equal to those which many years ago were produced by Wellington. The western gate to the Mediterranean would still be kept closed, provided Britain holds this region.

This brief discussion naturally brings into question the value to Britain of the Mediterranean relative to that of Hong Kong, Singapore and India. Were the Mediterranean lost, Britain's strength in the Far East could be augmented without weakening home territory.

Japan probably wants the British out of Hong Kong and Singapore; and wants economic control, and ultimately military control, of Malaysia.

It is very questionable if Japan has territorial ambitions in Australia and New Zealand.

But does she now wish the British out of India, thus exposing that region and Western China to early Russian penetration or influence? I doubt it.

It would seem more probable that Japan, devoted to the Axis alliance only so far as her own immediate interests are involved, would prefer not to move military forces against Britain, and possibly not against the Netherlands East Indies, because, if she can obtain a high degree of economic control over Malaysia, she will then be in a position to improve her financial structure by increased trade with Britain and America. Her economic offensive power will be increased. Her military dominance will follow rapidly or slowly, as seems best at the time.

The Netherlands East Indies has 60,000,000 people, under the rule of 80,000 Dutchmen, including women and children. This political situation can not be viewed as in permanent equilibrium. The rulers are unsupported by a home country or by an alliance. Native rebellions have occurred in the past, and may recur in the future. These Dutchmen will act in what they believe is their own selfish best interests.

Will they alone resist aggression, or will they accept an accommodation with the Japanese?

Will they resist, if supported only by the British Empire?

Will they firmly resist, if supported by the British Empire and the United States?

~~SECRET~~

Will the British resist Japanese aggression directed only against the Netherlands East Indies?

Should both firmly resist, what local military assistance will they require from the United States to ensure success?

No light on these questions has been thrown by the report of the proceedings of the recent Singapore Conference.

The basic character of a war against Japan by the British and Dutch would be the fixed defense of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and Java. The allied army, naval, and air forces now in position are considerable, and some future reenforcement may be expected from Australia and New Zealand. Borneo and the islands to the East are vulnerable. There is little chance for an allied offensive. Without Dutch assistance, the external effectiveness of the British bases at Hong Kong and Singapore would soon disappear.

The Japanese deployment in Manchukuo and China requires much of their Army, large supplies and merchant tonnage, and some naval force. It is doubtful if Japan will feel secure in withdrawing much strength from in front of Russia, regardless of non-aggression agreements. The winter lull in China will probably permit the withdrawal of the forces they need for a campaign against Malaysia. The availability of ample supplies for such a campaign is problematical.

Provided the British and Dutch cooperate in a vigorous and efficient defense of Malaysia, Japan will need to make a

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major effort with all categories of military force to capture the entire area. The campaign might even last several months. Whether Japan would concurrently be able successfully to attack Hong Kong and the Philippines, and also strongly to support the fixed positions in the Mid-Pacific, seems doubtful.

During such a campaign, due to her wide dispersion of effort, Japan would, unquestionably, be more vulnerable to attack by the United States (or by Russia) than she would be once Malaysia is in her possession.

This brings us to a consideration of the strategy of an American war against Japan, that is, either the so-called "Orange Plan", or a modification. It must be understood that the Orange Plan was drawn up to govern our operations when the United States and Japan are at war, and no other nations are involved.

You have heard enough of the Orange Plan to know that, in a nutshell, it envisages our Fleet's proceeding westward through the Marshalls and the Carolines, consolidating as it goes, and then on to the recapture of the Philippines. Once there, the Orange Plan contemplates the eventual economic starvation of Japan, and, finally, the complete destruction of her external military power. Its accomplishment would require several years, and the absorption of the full military, naval, and economic energy of the American people.

In proceeding through these Mid-Pacific islands, we have several subsidiary objectives in mind. First, we hope that our attack will induce the Japanese to expose their fleet

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in action against our fleet, and lead to their naval defeat. Second, we wish to destroy the ability of the Japanese to use these positions as air and submarine bases from which to project attacks on our lines of communication to the mainland and Hawaii. Third, we would use the captured positions for supporting our further advance westward.

Most of the island positions are atolls. These atolls, devoid of natural sources of water other than rainfall, and devoid of all supplies, are merely narrow coral and sand fringes around large shallow areas where vessels may anchor. Alone, they are undefendable against serious attack, either by one side or the other. They do, however, afford weak positions for basing submarines and seaplanes. Our Fleet should have no difficulty in capturing atolls, provided we have enough troops, but we could not hold them indefinitely unless the Fleet were nearby.

We know little about the Japanese defenses in the Mid-Pacific. We believe the real islands of Truk and Ponape in the Carolines are defended with guns and troops, and we believe that some of the atolls of the Marshalls may be equipped as submarine and air bases, and be garrisoned with relatively small detachments of troops.

The Marshalls contain no sites suitable for bases in the absence of the Fleet, though there are numerous good anchorages.

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With the Fleet at hand, they can be developed for use as seaplane and submarine bases for the support of an attack on real islands such as Ponape and Truk. With the Fleet permanently absent, they will succumb to any serious thrust.

Our first real Marshall-Caroline objective is Truk, a magnificent harbor, relatively easily defended against raids, and capable of conversion into an admirable advanced base. When we get this far in the accomplishment of the "Orange Plan", we have the site for a base where we can begin to assemble our ships, stores, and troops, for further advance toward the Philippines. It would also become the center of the defense system for the lines of communications against flank attack from Japan.

Getting to Truk involves a strong effort. We would incur losses from aircraft, mines and submarines, particularly as the latter could be spared from the operations in Malaysia. We would lose many troops in assaulting the islands.

Going beyond Truk initiates the most difficult part of the Orange Plan, would take a long time, and would require the maximum effort which the United States could sustain.

Truk is not looked upon as a satisfactory final geographical objective. It is too far away to support useful

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operations in the China Sea. It can not be held in the absence of fairly continuous Fleet support. No matter what gains are made in the Mid-Pacific, they would undoubtedly be lost were the Fleet to be withdrawn to the Atlantic. We would have then to choose between a lengthy evacuation process, and a major loss of men, material and prestige.

In advancing to the capture of Ponape and Truk, the Orange Plan contemplates proceeding promptly, delaying in the Marshalls only long enough to destroy Japanese shore bases, to capture the atolls necessary to support the advance, and to deny future bases to Japan.

We have little knowledge as to the present defensive strength of the Marshall and Caroline groups, considered as a whole. If they are well defended, to capture them we estimate initial needs at 25,000 thoroughly trained troops, with another 50,000 in immediate reserve. If they are not well defended, an early advance with fewer troops might be very profitable. Several months must elapse from the present date before 75,000 troops could be made ready, considering the defense requirements of Alaska, Hawaii, and Samoa, and our commitments with respect to the internal political stability of the Latin-American countries.

We should consider carefully the chances of failure as well as of success. An immediate success would be most important morally, while a failure would be costly from the

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moral viewpoint. Before invading Norway, Germany trained for three months the veterans of the Polish campaign. Remembering Norway, we have the example of two methods of overseas adventure. One is the British method; the other is the German method.

The question of jumping directly from Hawaii to the Philippines has often been debated, but, so far as I know, this plan has always been ruled out by responsible authorities as unsound from a military viewpoint. Truk is 1900 miles from Yokohama, 5300 miles from San Francisco, 3200 miles from Honolulu, and 2000 miles from Manila. I mention this to compare the logistic problem with that of the Norway incident. An enormous amount of shipping would be required. Its availability under present world conditions would be doubtful.

Of course the foregoing, (the Orange Plan), is a major commitment in the Pacific, and does not envisage the cooperation of allies. Once started the abandonment of the offensive required by the plan, to meet a threat in the Atlantic, would involve abandoning the objectives of the war, and also great loss of prestige.

A totally different situation would exist were the Philippines and Guam rendered secure against attack by adequate troops, aircraft, and fortifications. The movement of the Fleet across the Pacific for the purpose of applying direct pressure upon Japan, and its support when in position, would be less difficult than in the existing situation.

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Should we adopt the present Orange Plan today, or any modification of that plan which involves the movement of very strong naval and army contingents to the Far East, we would have to accept considerable danger in the Atlantic, and would probably be unable to augment our material assistance to Great Britain.

We should, therefore, examine other plans which involve a war having a more limited objective than the complete defeat of Japan, and in which we would undertake hostilities only in cooperation with the British and Dutch, and in which these undertake to provide an effective and continued resistance in Malaysia.

Our involvement in war in the Pacific might well make us also an ally of Britain in the Atlantic. The naval forces remaining in the Atlantic, for helping our ally and for defending ourselves, would, by just so much, reduce the power which the United States Fleet could put forth in the Pacific.

The objective in a limited war against Japan would be the reduction of Japanese offensive power chiefly through economic blockade. Under one concept, allied strategy would comprise holding the Malay Barrier, denying access to other sources of supply in Malaysia, severing her lines of communication with the Western Hemisphere, and raiding communications to the Mid-Pacific, the Philippines, China, and Indo-China. United States defensive strategy would also require army reenforcement